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Recent Cases
CLOSE CORPORATIONS-INABILITY TO COMPEL
ATTENDANCE AT A SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING BY
MEANS OF AN INJUNCTION
Hall v. Hall1
Edward and Harry Hall were fifty percent shareholders and the
only directors of Musselman and Hall Contractors, Inc., a Missouri
corporation. On Edward's death, his widow, Margaret Hall, suc-
ceeded to a fifty percent stock interest in the corporation. Harry
Hall, as the surviving director, appointed his wife, Florence, to re-
place Edward as a director of the corporation. 2 Thereafter, acting as
the board of directors, Harry and Florence elected themselves presi-
dent and vice-president.3 They continued as directors and officers
of the corporation; no further elections were held.
Upon the directors' failure to call the required annual meeting4
of the corporation, Margaret Hall called an annual meeting, to be
held on the date specified in the bylaws. In order to make the major-
ity needed to make a quorum, both fifty percent shareholders had
to attend the meeting.' Harry Hall refused to attend. Therefore, no
election of new directors was possible, and Margaret adjourned the
annual meeting from week to week.
The failure to hold a meeting and to elect new directors left
Harry in practical control of the corporation. The directors passed
a resolution to sell all authorized but unissued stock. Margaret Hall
objected7 to this resolution contending the stock issue was approved
by directors unlawfully holding office. Margaret brought suit to en-
1. 506 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
2. § 351.320, RSMo 1969, provides:
In the case of the death or resignation of one or more of the directors of a
corporation, a majority of the survivors or remaining directors may fill the vacancy
or vacancies until the successor or successors are elected at a stockholders meeting.
3. § 351.360, RSMo 1969.
4. § 351.225, RSMo 1969.
5. Id.
6.. § 351.265, RSMo 1969.
7. The director's action was one of a variety of techniques frequently employed to
"squeeze out" minority shareholders. In the usual situation, shareholder-directors with effec-
tive control cause the corporation to issue a large number of new shares at a time when
minority shareholders with preemptive rights are not in a position to finance the acquisition
of their part of the issue. The effect of the new issue, therefore, is to dilute those minority
shareholders' relative interests in the corporation. For other common types of squeeze-out
techniques, see F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORAroNS § 8.07 (1971).
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join Harry from refusing to attend the shareholders' meetings, to
enjoin the directors from establishing a terminal date for the exer-
cise of preemptive rights, and to enjoin the directors from continu-
ing to act as directors and officers pending a meeting-of the share-
holders.' The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a
cause of action. The court of appeals affirmed
A close corporation, such as the one involved in Hall, can result
from any of a number of business situations. Members of a partner-
ship may decide to incorporate in order to obtain limited liability
or some type of tax advantage. 10 The nature of the association be-
tween the participants, however, often remains unchanged, the par-
ticipants viewing the assumption of corporate form as a mere for-
mality. Hall makes it clear that such a belief is unfounded and that
the corporate form has inherent dangers not associated with a part-
nership.
The Uniform Partnership Act" allows a partnership to fashion
the type of management and organizational structure best suited to
its needs. Furthermore, a statutory fiduciary duty exists between
partners.'" If this relationship is breached or if the partners disagree,
a partner is free to withdraw and thereby dissolve the partnership.1 3
Once incorporated, however, much of the flexibility in determining
organization and control of the enterprise is lost as a result of the
statutory and judicial concept of the "corporate norm."
The leading case espousing the doctrine of "corporate norm" is
Jackson v. Hooper." Two stockholders, owning all the stock of a
corporation and desiring to retain joint control in themselves,
agreed that three of the named directors would be dummy directors.
Jackson then broke the agreement and combined with the dummy
directors to deprive Hooper of control. The court held that the
agreement was void as against public policy, stating:
The law never contemplated that persons engaged in business as
partners may incorporate, with intent to obtain the advantages
and immunities of a corporate form, and then, Proteus-like, be-
8. 506 S.W.2d at 45.
9. Id.
10. See F. O'NAL, note 7 supra at § 1.08.
11. Enacted in Missouri as Ch. 358, RSMo 1969. See § 358.180, RSMo 1969, which
provides that a partner's rights and duties as set out in the statute are subject to a contrary
agreement between the parties.
12. § 358.210, RSMo 1969.
13. § 358.310, RSMo 1969.
14. 76 N.J. Eq. 592; 75 A. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910).
[Vol. 40
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come at will a copartnership or a corporation . . . . They cannot
be partners inter sese and a corporation as to the rest of the world."
Missouri judicial decisions and the dicta contained therein indicate
that the courts have favored a strict application of the Jackson
doctrine.'" Recent statutory changes demonstrate, on the other
hand, that the legislature is more ready to recognize the distinctive
needs of the close corporation." Hall gave the court an opportunity
to alter its treatment of close corporations, and to reject the hereto-
fore rigid adherence to the Jackson doctrine.
The court narrowed the controversy to one issue: Could a share-
holder be compelled to attend stockholders' meetings if his failure
to attend would prevent the presence of a quorum? In reaching its
decision, the court relied on language found in section 351.275,
RSMo 1969, which states that a shareholder "shall be under no
obligation to the corporation other than to pay to the corporation
the full consideration for which said shares were issued." A right to
participate in the management of the corporation accompanies the
ownership of the shares of stock,"8 and the court in Hall found that
this also carries with it an equal right not to participate. In uphold-
ing Harry Hall's right to abstain, the court realized that by its
decision Margaret Hall is denied her acknowledged right to partici-
pate. According to the court, this result follows from the distinction
between the "corporate existence" and the "identity of the share-
holders."' 9
However, it is questionable whether the statute" relied on by
the court in Hall necessitates the decision reached. The section's
primary purpose is to grant limited liability to a holder of stock.
This limited liability is nevertheless subject to a court's power to
"pierce the corporate veil."2 Missouri courts have recognized their
15. Id. at 599, 75 A. at 571.
16. Santa Fe Hills Golf & Country Club v. Safehi Realty Co., 349 S.W.2d 27, 34 (Mo.
1961); Leggett v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 342 S.W.2d 833, 851 (Mo. En Banc 1960);
Taylor v. Baldwin, 362 Mo. 1224, 1245, 247 S.W.2d 741, 753 (En Banc 1952).
17. Typical of such changes are § 351.050, RSMo 1969 (allowing a single incorporator);
§ 351.315, RSMo 1969 (allowing a single director); and §§ 351.265, .325, RSMo 1969 (allowing
the articles of incorporation to specify the number of shareholders and directors required to
make a quorum over and above a simple majority). See Buchanan, Missouri Corporation
Statutes-Needed Changes For Close Corporations, 38 Mo. L. Rv. 460 (1973).
18. Insurance Agency Co. v. Blossom, 231 S.W. 636, 638 (St. L. Mo. App. 1921).
19. 506 S.W.2d at 45.
20. § 351.275, RSMo 1969.
21. See Z. CAVrrCH, BusnmsS OROANIZATIONS § 120.05 (1974). "[A] court will disregard
corporate personality whenever the same is asserted for a purpose inconsistent with the policy
of the law in maintaining the concept." Id. at § 120.0511].
1975]
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ability to disregard the separate legal identities of a corporation and
its shareholders in order to protect parties outside the corporation. 22
Some states have extended the use of this equitable power to mat-
ters involving disputes among the shareholders themselves.2 3 Hall
indicates that Missouri courts will not go so far, and will strictly
apply the doctrine of Jackson v. Hooper24 when dealing with intra-
corporate conflicts.
The court premised its argument on the assumption that Harry
Hall is under no legal duty to participate in the corporation. Harry
Hall was, however, in complete control of the corporation and by his
inaction as a shareholder was trying to insure that he would retain
that complete control. The court sensed the injustice that may ac-
company the result, but stated that it is bound by "established rules
and precedents" and is not free to act "merely upon its own concep-
tions of what may be right in a particular case."" The injunctions
sought were therefore denied. The court did suggest other possible
remedies available to Margaret Hall, which include bringing an
action to force dissolution of the corporation, trying by quo war-
ranto5 the respondents' right to continue as officers and directors,
22. May Dep't. Stores Co. v. Union Elect. Light & Power Co., 107 S.W.2d 41, 55 (Mo.
1937). See Lynn v. Lloyd A. Lynn Inc., 493 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); Smith
v. City of Lee's Summit, 450 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972) (indicating that use
of a corporation's separate legal entity as a subterfuge to defeat public convenience, to
perpetrate a fraud, or as means to justify a wrong, will allow a court to grant relief to
outsiders); cf. Butler v. Butler, 379 S.W.2d 175, 178 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
23. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965).
, * . [Clourts have long ago quite realistically, we feel, relaxed their attitudes
concerning statutory compliance when dealing with close corporation behavior,
permitting "slight deviations" from corporate "norms" in order to give legal effi-
cacy to common business practice.
Id. at 29, 203 N.E.2d at 584.
24. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
25. 506 S.W.2d at 45; Possien v. Higgins, 421 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Mo. 1967). But see
Weaver v. Jordan, 362 S.W.2d 66 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
Equity is reluctant to permit a wrong to be suffered without remedy. It seeks to do
justice and is not bound by strict common law rules or the absence of precedents.
It looks to the substance rather than the form and will not sanction an unconsciona-
ble result merely because it may have been brought about by means which simulate
legality. And once rightfully possessed of a case it will not relinquish it short of
doing complete justice.
362 S.W.2d at 75.
26. Section 531.010, RSMo 1969, provides that if "any person shall usurp, intrude into
or unlawfully hold or execute any office or franchise," the attorney general or any prosecuting
attorney may, at the relation of any person, bring a quo warranto action in a circuit court.
Section 531.050, RSMo 1969, provides that once an officer is adjudged guilty of any such
usurpation, intrusion or unlawful holding, the court may oust such person from the office.
An office in a private corporation, created and chartered by the state, is deemed to be of a
public character, so that the public has a sufficient interest therein to render the remedy of
4
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and certain "alternative methods" which were not enumerated.2
In a partnership, the holder of a minority interest can use his
power to compel liquidation2 8 as a weapon against actions contrary
to his interest.29 If Margaret Hall had possessed such a power she
could have enforced her right to participate without judicial aid.
However, Missouri's corporation statutes provide for voluntary dis-
solution only if all of the shareholders agree to it,"0 or upon resolu-
tion by the board of directors and concurrence of two-thirds of the
shareholders .3 Section 351.485, RSMo 1969, gives a shareholder the
right to seek involuntary dissolution. However, absent a director
deadlock, the shareholder must show that "the acts of the directors
or those in control of the corporation are illegal, oppressive, or fraud-
ulent" or that "the corporate assets are being misapplied or
wasted. ' 3 2 The statute provides that even in the absence of fraud,
if the director's conduct can be characterized as oppressive, dissolu-
tion may be ordered. Recent Illinois cases indicate that a court of
equity has greater discretion in allowing dissolution in the case of
oppression by a director 3 than in the case of fraud.
It should be noted, however, that the model act from which
section 351.485, RSMo 1969, is taken expressly provided for dissolu-
quo warranto available against a corporate official. 74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 9 (1951). In
State ex inf. Taylor v. Cumpton, 362 Mo. 199, 240 S.W.2d 877 (En Banc 1951), the court
stated that willful failure and refusal by a county treasurer to perform statutory duties was
sufficient to result in forfeiture of office. Conceivably, Mrs. Hall could bring a quo warranto
action against both directors on the basis of their willful refusal to call the annual sharehold-
ers meeting required by statute. § 351.225, RSMo 1969. Though the remedy may be theoreti-
cally available, quo warranto does not offer dependable relief to persons in the position of
Mrs. Hall, since directors could always avoid its reach by carefully complying with statutory
duties. There would be no technical breach of duty if the directors called a meeting and
shareholders refused to attend, even though the directors were also the recalcitrant sharehold-
ers.
27. 506 S.W.2d at 45.
28. § 358.310, RSMo 1969.
29. See Buchanan, note 17 supra at 471.
30. § 351.460, RSMo 1969.
31. § 351.465, RSMo 1969.
32. § 351.485, RSMo 1969. This section also allows for dissolution upon the corpora-
tion's application, suit by a creditor in certain cases, action by the attorney general, or
forfeiture or revocation of the certificate of incorporation.
33. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Cor. Box Co., 20 Ill.2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960). In Gidwitz,
an Illinois court allowed dissolution under facts similar to Hall by characterizing as oppres-
sive the corporate president's use of his position to control and manage the corporation
without majority stock support, which effectively denied the other stockholders' rights and
privileges. See also Central Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill.2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957),
which held that the term "oppressive" does not necessarily savor of fraud, and that absence
of mismanagement or misapplication of assets does not prevent a finding that the conduct of
the directors or those in control of the corporation is oppressive.
1975]
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tion in a case like Hall.34 Missouri's failure to adopt such a provision
may indicate that the legislature intended to require more than
shareholder deadlock to justify dissolution. By that interpretation
Mrs. Hall would be denied dissolution until the situation within the
corporation worsened.
Thus, Hall stands as a warning to prospective shareholders and
their attorneys contemplating the formation of a close corporation.
Contingencies and intracorporate disputes such as those involved in
Hall must be anticipated and planned for through mutually consis-
tent charter, bylaws, and shareholder agreements. Missouri courts
will not intervene with case-by-case exceptions in such controver-
sies, but will strictly apply the corporation laws of the state to close
corporations in the same manner as to any large, publicly-held con-
cern.
This inflexible approach has been criticized by some writers
who believe that the only way to insure adequate protection for
minority shareholders is through judicial recognition of the distinc-
tive nature of the close corporation. 5 It may well be, however, that
a policy of judicial restraint, rather than interference, will ulti-
mately offer the greater measure of protection to shareholders. The
current Missouri policy does assure a predictable treatment of
shareholder disputes when submitted to the courts for resolution. In
the absence of a relevant enforceable agreement by which the par-
ties have contracted for particular rights and remedies, no relief will
be available unless specifically authorized by statute. If the statu-
tory provisions do not satisfy the potential needs of a corporation
or its shareholders, then the desired alternatives must be spelled out
and all the necessary parties bound by them.36 If special treatment
34. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT 2d ANN. § 97 (1971) gives a court the power to liquidate the
assets and business of a corporation when it can be shown that:
The shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have failed, for a period
which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors
to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the election of
their successors.
35. See, e.g., Comment, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders Through the Issuance of
Additional Shares, 2 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REy. 375, 388 (1972).
36. See Z. CAvrrcH, note 21 supra at § 186.03, in which the author discusses several
methods by which shareholders may provide for situations in which opposing factions frus-
trate corporate action: incorporating buy-out provisions in the charter or by-laws; the use of
irrevocable proxies; issuance of non-voting classes of stock; and providing for a voting trust.
See also O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of Special
Charter and By-law Provisions, 18 LAw & CONT. PROB. 451 (1953).
[Vol. 40
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for all minority shareholders or for all close corporations is needed,
the legislature, not the courts, will have to furnish it."
HAROLD W. HINDERER m11
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 223 (1973), which allows shareholders owning
ten percent or more of the shares to petition the appropriate court for an order compelling a
shareholder election to fill vacancies on the board of directors where the remaining directors
do not constitute a quorum.
7
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ABRIDGMENT OF THE
TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT
Walgren v. Howes'
The Board of Selectmen for the Town of Amherst had, since
1939, set the annual town election for the third week of February.
According to state law,2 it was necessary to hold a special caucus at
least 31 days before the town election. This special caucus, in the
nature of a non-partisan primary election, was required whenever
twice as many candidates as the number to be elected filed nomina-
tion papers. Absentee ballots were available. The special caucus was
to take place in mid-January at which time most students residing
on campus at the University of Massachusetts were required by the
University to vacate their residences during semester recess. 3 Wal-
gren, as a candidate for the office of selectman, was concerned about
the youth and student vote and attempted to persudade the Board
of Selectmen to rearrange the election schedule to encourage maxi-
mum voting in the college community by providing that the special
caucus as well as the general election be held when the colleges were
in session. The Board, however, voted to adhere to its initial plans
to hold the special caucus during the semester recess.
Walgren, Glusco and Sherman (a full-time student at the Uni-
versity residing in one of its dormitories), brought suit as voters to
prevent the holding of the local elections as planned, contending
that the Board's action violated the first, fourteenth, and twenty-
sixth amendments to the United States Constitution. The district
court denied temporary relief and granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment and dismissed for failure to state a claim.4 The
court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff's
petition alleging violations of the fourteenth and twenty-sixth
amendments stated a claim.5 The court held that the Board of Se-
lectmen's conduct may have abridged the twenty-sixth amendment
rights of a large group of 18 to 21 year-old voters in Amherst.' The
court's language also suggests that the twenty-sixth amendment
makes 18 to 21 year-old voters a protected group or "suspect class"
1. 482 F.2d 95 (1st Cir. 1973).
2. Caucus Act, ch. 149, Mass. Acts and Resolves of 1955, as amended ch. 54, Mass. Acts
and Resolves of 1963.
3. 482 F.2d at 97.
4. Id. at 98.
5. Id. at 99. The court also held that the district court had erred in granting summary
judgment because material issues of fact did exist. Id. at 98.
6. Id. at 102.
8
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whose right to vote may not be disproportionately abridged under
the fourteenth amendment unless the abridgment is necessary to
achieve some compelling governmental objective.7 Therefore the
court remanded for determination of: (1) whether the election date
placed such a burden upon the student's voting rights as to consti-
tute an abridgement of their rights; and (2) the adequacy of govern-
mental justificatioM8
The Supreme Court in a series of cases has held that certain
fundamental rights are entitled to special protection under the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.' For exam-
ple, in holding that the conditioning of the right to vote on the
payment of a poll tax is unconstitutional, the Court stated that
"once the franchise is granted the electorate, lines may not be drawn
which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.""0 The Court also noted that where funda-
mental rights (such as voting) are asserted under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, any classifications which might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Accordingly, if
a right is deemed to be a fundamental constitutional right the state
may not infringe upon that right without carrying the heavy burden
of showing an "overwhelming" or "compelling" state interest. The
right to vote has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a
fundamental constitutional right.12
7. Id. at 99-100. The court also considered the plaintiff's equal protection claim that
the Board of Selectman's scheduling discriminated against all voters who could not be present
in Amherst on the date of the caucus. Relying on Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973),
the court held that the compelling interest test did not apply because there was no total denial
of the absent voter's electoral franchise (absentee ballots were available). The court stated
that the plaintiffs would have a heavy burden of proof on this particular claim.
8. Id. at 102.
9. See e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)(illegitimates).
10. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1969).
11. Id. at 670. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Court, in striking down
a one year residency requirement for voting, pointed out that there exists within the Equal
Protection Clause a category of constitutionally protected rights which the state may not
infringe upon without a compelling state interest. 405 U.S. at 342. See also Evans v. Corn-
man, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (law disenfranching residents of National Institute of Health held
unconstitutional).
12. As early as 1886 the United States Supreme Court characterized the right to vote
as a "fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The Court, in dealing with the problem of apportionment, said
"the right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic
society." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), the Court held that a New York education law, which provided
that only owners of taxable real estate within the school district or parents or guardians of
pupils enrolled in district schools could vote in school district elections, violated the four-
1975]
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This constitutionally protected right to vote was extended to an
estimated eleven million 3 individuals when the twenty-sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution became effective in
1971.11 The amendment, based on similar language in the fifteenth,
nineteenth and twenty-fourth amendments, provides that the right
of citizens eighteen years or older to vote shall not be denied or
abridged on account of age. It has been said that the word
"abridged" in the twenty-sixth amendment means to diminish, re-
teenth amendment and stated that the franchise constitutes the foundation of our representa-
tive society. See also, Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). An Arizona law limiting the
vote in a general obligation bond election to only real property owners was declared unconsti-
tutional because the Court could find no compelling state interest to justify depriving non-
property owners of their right to vote in such an election. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204 (1970). Also, in Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), the Court said that before the
right to vote can be restricted the restriction must meet close constitutional scrutiny. Finally,
after surveying prior cases in the voting rights area, the Court flatly stated, "In decision after
decision, this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to
participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). Cf. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973), where the Supreme Court upheld an election in which only lan-
downers could vote afid the number of votes was apportioned according to assessed valuation
of the land. The Court noted, however, that the case did not involve a unit of local government
exercising general governmental power, as did prior voting rights cases. In Rosario v. Rocke-
feller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), the Court upheld a statute requiring voters to register for primary
elections eight months in advance on the grounds that there was a valid state interest and
voters were able to comply with the statute.
13. Comment, The College Voter and Residency Requirements, 17 S.D.L. Rxv. 131
(1972).
14. The twenty-sixth amendment provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
The movement to extend the right to vote had gained momentum in the 1960's when mass
disturbances on campus sparked interest in constructively channeling this youthful idealism
into the political system through the exercise of the right to vote. 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 937 (1971). Congress, in the Voting Rights Act of 1970, attempted by legislation to
extend the franchise to 18-year-olds in all elections, either state or federal. 42 U.S.C. § 1973
bb-1 (1970). The Supreme Court, however, held that although Congress had the power to
lower the voting age in federal elections, it lacked the power to lower the voting age in state
elections. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The nation was thus faced with an admin-
istrative nightmare of providing two separate electoral systems. 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 941-47 (1971). In response to all of these forces, Congress passed (Senate-March 10,
1971; House-March 23, 1971), and the necessary two-thirds of the states ratified, the twenty-
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
10
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duce, curtail, or deprive.'- Thus, the amendment was to serve a two-
fQld purpose: (1) prohibit complete denial of the right to vote to
young people; and (2) prevent any undue burdens on the exercise
of this right to vote." According to the court in Walgren, setting of
an inconvenient election date may be an undue burden on the right
of young people to vote, and therefore violative of the fourteenth and
twenty-sixth amendments."
Although any election date will inconvenience some individuals
in the community, the date would not ordinarily be subject to con-
stitutional attack because the group of inconvenienced voters would
be relatively small in number, and would include a cross-section of
the eligible voters. The date for the special caucus in Walgren,
however, disproportionately burdened one large (some 30 percent of
the electorate in Amherst) constitutionally protected group of voters
because it was held on a date when the members of that group were
required by university policy to vacate their residences." The city,
under state law, 9 had the option of rescheduling the election at a
time when these voters would be present. 0 Under such circumstan-
ces, an election day which deprives or burdens 18 to 21 year-olds of
the right to vote may be discrimination which is prohibited by the
twenty-sixth and fourteenth amendments.2'
Two state courts have recently struck down attempts to prevent
students from registering and voting in their college communities as
violations of the fourteenth and twenty-sixth amendments. In
Wilkins v. Bentley,22 the Supreme Court of Michigan stated that it
was not necessary for students to demonstrate an absolute denial of
the right to vote in order to require the state to show a compelling
interest for the action. The students were only required to show that
15. Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 571, 488 P.2d 1, 4, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1971).
16. Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971); Worden v. Board of
Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 294 A.2d 233 (1972).
17. Walgren v. Howes, 482 F.2d 95, 102 (1st Cir. 1973).
18. Id. at 95.
19. Caucus Act, ch. 149, Mass. Acts and Resolves of 1955, as amended ch. 54, Acts of
1963.
20. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text infra.
21. The general admonitory teaching of Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), a case
brought under the fifteenth amendment, seems most relevant. "The [fifteenth] amendment
nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous
procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise. . . ." 307 U.S.
at 275. So too should the twenty-sixth amendment strike down subtle discrimination in the
choice of an election day which will force youthful voters to vote by the more cumbersome
absentee method as well as the outright denial of their right to vote.
22. 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971).
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a burden had been placed on their right to vote.2 Likewise, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Worden v. Board of Elections24 stated that
the purpose of the twenty-sixth amendment was not only to extend
voting rights to 18 to 21 year-olds, but also to encourage their partic-
ipation by the elimination of all unnecessary barriers and burdens.2
The New Jersey court noted that the Senate Report considering the
Voting Rights Act of 1970 pointed out that it was inconsistent with
the purpose of the Voting Rights Act to force young voters to under-
take special burdens, such as absentee ballots, because this would
dissuade them from participating in the election. 26
In addition, the United States Supreme Court in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot indicated that a law, though not discriminatory on its
face, is invalid if its substantive effect is to discriminate against a
constitutionally protected group. In Gomillion, a city had changed
its boundaries from a rectangular shape to a 28-sided configuration.
Although this action was neutral on its face, the effect of the bound-
ary change was to "fence out" most blacks from the city, and there-
fore deprive them of the right to participate in city elections. 2 By
analogy, the setting of the special caucus election on a date when
most student voters would be required to vacate their residences,
though not discriminatory on its face, would discourage most stu-
dent voters from participating in the city's electoral process. Such
an election date, facially neutral but having the effect of burdening
the rights of young people to vote, would certainly fit within the
Gomillion rationale and could be held violative of the twenty-sixth
amendment.
Finally, since the special caucus in Walgren was similar to a
primary election (the "special caucus" was held whenever more
than twice as many candidates filed for office as the number to be
elected and was designed to limit the number of candidates who
could run for office in the regular town election), the Supreme
Court's decision in Bullock v. Carter"9 must be considered. In
Bullock, the Court held that a Texas primary election filing fee
system violated the Equal Protection Clause because its unreasona-
bly high filing fees limited a voter's choice of candidates by denying
23. Id. at 684, 189 N.W.2d at 429.
24. 61 N.J. 325, 294 A.2d 233 (1972).
25. Id. at 333, 294 A.2d at 237.
26. Id.
27. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
28. Id. at 347.
29. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
[Vol. 40
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some candidates the chance to file for election." Similarly, if the 18
to 21 year-olds' right to vote is burdened in a primary election, their
choice of candidates in the general election might be limited and
they would thereby be denied the opportunity to vote for a candi-
date of their own choosing.
In dealing with the specific facts of Walgren, the question arises
as to whether there existed a class of individuals within the protec-
tion of the twenty-sixth amendment who were entitled to raise the
issue of age discrimination. The scheduling of the caucus election
during the semester recess of area colleges did not burden the right
to vote of all young voters, but rather only those young voters who
lived in the college's dormitories and would be forced to vacate their
residences during the semester break. The setting of any election
date could be said to discriminate against voters absent on election
day, not merely young voters, and thus the twenty-sixth amend-
ment, since it applies only to age discrimination, would be inapplic-
able. Such an argument is, however, clearly not appropriate in light
of the facts in the Walgren case. Due to the date of the special
caucus election, 30 percent of the eligible voters of Amherst would
be absent on the date of the caucus, the vast majority of the absen-
tees being young college students clearly within the protection of the
twenty-sixth amendment. The exclusion of these voters from the
special caucus election arguably limits the choice of candidates for
whom these college students could vote in the general election.
Walgren would seem to be analogous to Gomillion v. Lightfoot" in
that just as the boundary change in Gomillion did not disenfran-
chise all blacks, the election date in Walgren did not burden the
right to vote of all young voters. However, in each case, the voting
rights of a constitutionally protected group were disproportionately
affected. Therefore, the members of the group were a proper class
to assert the constitutional protections of voting rights amend-
ments.
Even if the governmental unit can show reasons why an election
should be held on a date when it would place a burden on young
voters, the election date will usually nonetheless be unconstitu-
tional under the fourteenth and twenty-sixth amendment because
a reasonable alternative date will typically exist which would not
disproportionally burden the young voters' right to vote. In Shelton
v. Tucker32 the Court stated:
30. Id. at 149.
31. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
32. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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[E]ven if the government purpose be substantial and legitimate,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fun-
damental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of the legislative abridgement must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose."
The Court in a recent voting rights case, Dunn v. Blumstein,34
echoed the same concept, stating that it was not sufficient for the
state merely to show a very substantial interest. In pursuit of its
interest, the state cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden
or restrict a constitutionally protected activity and, if there are
other reasonable ways to achieve the state's goal with a lesser bur-
den on constitutionally protected activities, then the state may not
choose the way of greater interference.35 The Michigan Supreme
Court, in an action challenging the constitutionality of a voter regis-
tration statute, also recognized that the state has the burden of
demonstrating that the particular regulation is necessary and essen-
tial and not achievable by less drastic means. 6 In Walgren, less
drastic measures were available to the city since state law required
only that the caucus election be held at least 31 days before the
general election." It was possible for this requirement to be met
while holding the special caucus election at a time other than during
the semester recess.
The twenty-sixth amendment, by extending the franchise to
eleven million voters between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one,
not only guaranteed them the right to vote but also provided that
the right shall not be unduly burdened. The twenty-sixth amend-
ment, like the fifteenth amendment, was designed to strike down
the sophisticated as well as simple-minded discrimination against
the protected group. The setting of an election date at a time when
it would burden young persons' right to vote would seem to be just
such a forbidden discrimination. The amendment will not affect
33. Id. at 488. See also, Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951), for a
similar statement involving the commerce clause.
34. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
35. Id. at 343.
36. Michigan State U.A.W. Community Action Program Council v. Austin, 387 Mich.
506, 517, 198 N.W.2d 385, 389 (1972). In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), a case
involving the right to travel, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a Pennsylvania
welfare law requiring applicants to have resided in the state one year prior to receiving any
benefits. The Court noted that less drastic means were available to accomplish the state goal
of limiting payments to qualified recipients.
37. Caucus Act, ch. 149, Mass. Acts and Resolves of 1955, as amended by ch. 54, Mass.
Acts and Resolves of 1963.
[Vol. 40
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/15
RECENT CASES
national, state, and local elections in which the 18 to 21 year-old
voters are not disproportionately burdened compared to other seg-
ments of the electorate. Such elections are valid because a cross-
section of the electorate rather than one particular group's right to
vote is inconvenienced and thus the election date could not be said
to constitute unfair treatment of any one group. However, if a so-
called college town is involved, the twenty-sixth amendment may
require that the municipality not schedule elections during a recess
in the school year if the following factors are met: 1) college students
constitute a substantial portion of the eligible voters in the town;
2) the setting of the election date during a school vacation period
would disproportionately burden the voting.rights of the college-age
voters; 3) the date on which the election is to be held is within the
discretion of the city; and 4) there are reasonable alternative dates
for the election. If these factors are present, any election held during
a time when students are required to vacate their residences should
be closely scrutinized to determine if a compelling state interest
exists for holding the election on such a date.
Clearly the passage of a constitutional amendment creates seri-
ous problems of accomodation.3 8 Yet, if the twenty-sixth amend-
ment's purpose of encouraging youthful participation in the elec-
toral process is to be achieved, adjustments must be made in the
elective system to facilitate the exercise of the right to vote by these
newly franchised voters.
ROBERT E. COWHERD
38. Walgren v. Howes, 482 F.2d 95, 102 (1973).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL
PROTECTION-DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-
FELONS: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Richardson v. Ramirez'
Plaintiffs, three ex-felons who had completed their sentences
and paroles, sought a writ of mandamus in the California Supreme
Court to compel the clerks of their respective counties to register
them to vote in the 1972 elections. The California constitution2 and
statutes3 disenfranchise persons convicted of certain crimes whose
sentences and paroles have expired. Plaintiffs contended that these
provisions denied them the equal protection of the laws under the
fourteenth amendment. Relying on several recent United States
Supreme Court decisions on voter qualifications,4 plaintiffs argued
that California had to show a compelling state interest in order to
justify the exclusion of the class of ex-felons from the franchise. The
California Supreme Court found that the provisions violated four-
teenth amendment equal protection.5 The United States Supreme
1. - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2655 (1974).
2. At the time the action was instituted, the relevant constitutional provisions were
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1, which provided:
[N]o person convicted of any infamous crime, no person hereafter convicted of the
embezzlement or misappropriation of public money . . . shall ever exercise the
privileges of an elector in this State ...
and CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 11, which provided:
Laws shall be made to exclude from office, serving on juries, and from the right of
suffrage, persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or
other high crimes.
In November, 1972, the quoted portion of article I was deleted, and the following language
was added as new article 11, § 3:
The Legislature shall prohibit imporper practices that affect elections and shall
provide that no. . . person convicted of an infamous crime, nor person convicted
of embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, shall exercise the privileges
of an elector in this state.
The California Supreme Court held that the passage of this new article did not render the
case moot because the standard for disenfranchisement of ex-felons remained unchanged.
Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 204-05, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137, 139-40, 507 P.2d 1345, 1347-48
(1973), rev'd sub nom., Richardson v. Ramirez, - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 2655 (1974).
3. The implementing statutes are CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 310, 321, 383, 389, 390, 14240,
14246 (West 1961).
4. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S.
701 (1969).
5. Ramirez v. Brown, 9-Cal. 3d 199, 216-17, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137, 149, 507 P.2d 1345, 1357
(1973), rev'd sub nom., Richardson v. Ramirez, - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2655 (1974). The
named plaintiffs were voluntarily registered prior to the judgment. As a consequence, the
California Supreme Court denied them relief. The court, nevertheless, ruled on the constitu-
tional claim to provide guidance to other election officials faced with the same problem. This
circumstance, combined with other unusual procedural features of the case, led a majority
16




The United States Supreme Court relied on section 2 of the
fourteenth amendment. Section 2 provides for a reduction in a
state's congressional representation when it denies or in any way
abridges the right to vote for state or federal officers, except that a
state may exclude from the vote without penalty persons guilty of
"participation in rebellion, or other crime. ' 7 From an examination
of the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment, subsequent
Reconstruction legislation, and state practices, the majority con-
cluded that the language of this exception "was intended by Con-
gress to mean what it says."' Since the framers explicitly recognized
in section 2 of the amendment a state's power to exclude from voting
persons convicted of crimes, the Court reasoned that the equal pro-
tection clause of section 1 could not "prohibit outright" this form
of disenfranchisement Two dissenting justices in Richardson im-
plied that the decision approved a blanket disenfranchisement of
ex-felons "insulate[d] . . . from equal protection scrutiny."'" An
analysis of the majority opinion shows its holding to be considerably
more limited.
The usual procedure in equal protection cases is to determine
the applicable standard of judicial review and to measure against
that standard the particular classification being challenged. The
Court selects from a "spectrum of standards"'1 an appropriate one
of the United States Supreme Court to conclude that the action was not moot because it was,
in effect, a declaratory judgment in a class action. Richardson v. Ramirez, - U.S. at__._
94 S.Ct. at 2664 (1974).
6. - U.S. - - 94 S.Ct. 2655, 2671-72 (1974).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 reads in full:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxes. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
State. (emphasis added).
8. - U.S. - , 94 S. Ct. 2655, 2665-66 (1974).
9. Id. at -. , 94 S.Ct. at 2671.
10. Id. at _ 94 S.Ct. at 2682. Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, argued that
§ 2 "was not intended and should not be construed to be a limitation on the other sections of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at _.., 94 S.Ct. at 2680.
11. The phrase is Justice Marshall's. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
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depending on the "constitutional and societal importance of the
interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the
basis upon which the particular classification is drawn .... ,,12 The
initial step can be crucial because, as a practical matter, under
some tests distinctions rarely fail and under others they cannot
succeed.
In a line of cases stretching back over a decade,13 the Supreme
Court has treated the right to vote as a "fundamental matter.1' 4 The
Court has repeatedly affirmed that "to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights . . . ."I Although it has expressly stated that the
Constitution does not confer the right to vote on any one, 6 the high
court has said that "a citizen has a constiutionally protected right
to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in
the jurisdiction." (emphasis added) 7 Consequently, any selective
distribution of the franchise must be subject to "careful examina-
tion" and "close scrutiny."'" Absent special circumstances which
dictate that a lesser standard is proper," the legality of a classifica-
tion which gives the vote to some and withholds it from others is to
be judged by whether "the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest.""0
Richardson holds this standard inapplicable to state laws di-
senfranchising ex-felons because the language of the Constitution
itself as interpreted by the courts, indicates their right to vote is not
entitled to the same standard of constitutional protection afforded
the franchise generally." The case, however, does not specify what
standard of review is to be used. Its holding is confined to the "prop-
osition that § 1, in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not
have been meant to bar outright" the exclusion of former felons
from the vote.2 The majority did not say that section 2 permitted
12. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
13. See, e.g., cases cited note 4 supra and note 14 infra.
14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
15. Id. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
16. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874).
17. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
18. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
19. Id. at 632. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973) and Associated Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743
(1973), found such exceptions relying on language in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474
(1968), and Hadley v. Junior College Dist. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
20. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
21. - U.S. - , - 94 S.Ct. 2655, 2671.
22. Id. at -, 94 S.Ct. at 2671.
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such exclusions "outright," Section 2 was not used as the standard
itself against which to measure the classification. It only provided
guidance to the interpretation of the equal protection clause in this
matter.2 3 States may continue to consider prior convictions in estab-
lishing voter qualifications,24 but they still must comport with some
form of equal protection standards. Richardson makes no attempt
to measure the permissibility of the basis California has chosen for
excluding ex-felons from the vote. The Court implicitly approved
the disenfranchisement of ex-felons in some form, but it left unex-
plained what limitations, if any, are to be placed on such state
action. 5 Richardson provides a partial answer to the threshold prob-
lem of equal protection; it does not address the substance.
Richardson left few clues as to what standard of review is applica-
ble." The possibilities fall into two general categories.
The Supreme Court has applied a relatively low standard of
review in equal protection challenges to state economic regulations.
Under this "economic" equal protection test, a statute is valid if
there is "any state of facts [which] reasonably may be conceived
to justify" the classifications made. 2 The extensive discretion af-
forded to legislative line-drawing in this area is illustrated by the
fact that under this test the Court has struck down only one state
law.28
In two recent voter qualification decisions where the Court, as
it did in Richardson, retreated from the compelling state interest
test, the economic equal protection standard was applied.29 How-
ever, these cases are clearly distinguishable from the disenfranchi-
sement of ex-felons. Both involved limited purpose elections whose
effect would fall disproportionately on a particular group of voters."
23. Id. at _.--, 94 S.Ct. at 2671.
24. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
25. Prior to the decision it was hoped Richardson would provide a definitive review of
the problem. Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 83 YALE L.J.
580 (1974).
26. See cases cited note 36 infra.
27. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
28. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). One situation which may justify the invalidat-
ing of state laws excluding some ex-felons, even under this minimal test, is suggested by
Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970). In that case, the United States
District Court held a New Jersey statute violative of equal protection because of the haphaz-
ard development of the laws disenfranchising ex-felons. Their "curious history" led to incon-
gruous results. For example, embezzlers and attempted murderers could vote, but those
persons convicted of larceny and murder could not. Many other equally serious crimes were
not covered by the disqualification. Id. at 1188.
29. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,732 (1973);
Associated Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743,745 (1973).
30. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,728 (1973);
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In addition, even those voters disqualified in these special elections
could indirectly affect the subject matter through the general elec-
tions.3 In disenfranchisement, however, the exclusion of former fel-
ons is total. They have no alternative method of asserting their
interests through the election process.
Considering the importance the Court attaches to the franchise
generally,32 it seems unlikely that it will virtually abdicate its judg-
ment in these matters to that of the legislature-even where the
persons affected are ex-felons. While their right to vote does not
receive the same level of constitutional protection due to a constitu-
tional quirk,33 an ex-felon's access to the polls is no less fundamental
to him than it is to any other citizen. 4 Following this notion, the
appropriate standard of review should be the "reasonable" rational
basis. Under this test, not every conceivable rational basis will jus-
tify a classification. The rational basis must also be reasonable. The
Court has applied this test in previous voter qualification cases. 5
The decision in Richardson does not foreclose use of the test and
indeed the precedent cited by the majority suggests it may be pro-
per.36
Associated Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743,745 (1973).
31. Cf. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 640 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting):
The appellant is eligible to vote in all state, local, and federal elections in which
general governmental policy is determined. He is fully able, therefore, to participate
, . , in the processes by which the requirements for school district voting may be
changed . . . . He clearly is not locked into any self-perpetuating status of exclu-
sion from the electoral process.
32. See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
33. Even the majority in Richardson cannot explain why the words "other crime" were
tacked on the amendment, __ U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 2666-68. The historical record on
this point is, as Justice Marshall says, "unilluminating at best." Id. at-, 94 S.Ct. at 2680.
34. Id. at -, 94 S.Ct. at 2683 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). In Carrington, the Court struck down a
Texas law prohibiting servicemen who entered the state while in the military from voting as
long as they remained in the service. It was recognized the state had the power "to impose
reasonable residence restrictions on the availability of the ballot," but these steps went too
far. Id. at 91. The Court did not apply the "any conceivable" rational basis test since it
rejected a "conceivable" basis offered by Justice Harlan in the dissent. Id. at 99-101 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Subsequent cases have often cited Carrington as an application of the compel-
ling state interest test. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
However, Justice Blackmun was correct in noting that these later cases have significantly
elevated the standard of review used in Carrington. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 362
(1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Certainly the author of the opinion thought Carrington
applied the reasonable rational basis test. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 683 (1966) (Harlan with Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
36. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (previous
criminal record, along with age, residency, and literacy are factors which states may consider
in setting voter qualifications designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot); David v.
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Under the "reasonable" rational basis some laws disqualifying
former felons are likely to fall. The California practice is an interme-
diate position which would probably survive." The California courts
have interpreted their constitution to disfranchise a person for con-
viction of a crime only where the offense is "such that he who has
committed it may reasonably be deemed to constitute a threat to
the integrity of the elective process. ' 38 Whether such an exclusion
is truly effective or wise is debatable. 9 but one can certainly defend
as reasonable basing the disability on the nature of the crime rather
than the nature of the punishment."
Missouri statutory provisions, on the other hand, take a broader
position. The general disqualification statute denies the franchise to
"any person convicted of a felony"4 without qualification as to the
type of crime.4" Unlike California, Missouri also specifies chapter by
chapter in the feolony statutes, that conviction of each of the offen-
ses contained therein excludes a person from the vote.43 The irrelev-
ance of the nature of the crime is illustrated by the fact that Mis-
souri courts have held a person disenfranchised for a crime that was
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (person disenfrancised because still in the prohibited criminal
status); Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048(1968) (court pointed to reasonable justifications for disenfranchising ex-felons). See also
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958) (dictum that laws disenfranchising persons for
conviction of crime were nonpenal because they designate "a reasonable ground of eligibility
for voting"). The actual "reasonableness" of many of the classifications in these cases may
be questionable.- U.S. _ -, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 2684-86 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 605-06, 414 P. 2d 413, 418-19, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290-91 (1966);
Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 83 YALE L.J. 580, 581 &
n.9 (1974). Nevertheless, that is the standard against which they weremeasured.
37. Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 83 YALE L.J. 580,
582-84 (1974).
38. Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 611, 414 P.2d 412, 422, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 294 (1966).
The court did not specifically indicate what crimes fell into this category, but left the determi-
nation to local election officials.
39. See, e.g., 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 699 (1967). In practice, application of the rule has
varied widely from county to county because of a lack of more definite standards. Richardson
v. Ramirez, - U.S. at _ 94 S.Ct. at 2661 n. 12. The Supreme Court remanded the case
for consideration whether this lack of uniformity in enforcement was a separate denial of
equal protection. Id. at , 94 S.Ct. at 2671-72.
40. Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 611, 414 P.2d 412, 422, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 294 (1966).
41. § 111.021, RSMo 1969. The person is excluded forever after a second conviction of
any felony. First offenders suffer only a limited disenfranchisement. § 216.355, RSMo 1969.
42. In addition to felonies, misdemeanors "connected with the exercise of the right of
suffrage" disenfranchise a person in Missouri. Like felonies, a second conviction attaches the
disability forever in absence of a pardon. § 111.021, RSMo 1969.
43. §§ 129.420 (corrupt practices and election offenses), 557.490 (perjury), 558.130 (of-
fenses related to official duties), 559.470 (offenses against the person), 560.610 (offenses
against property), 561.340 (offenses against property involving fraud), 564.710 (offenses
against public health and safety), RSMo 1969.
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a felony in the jurisdiction where convicted but only a misdemeanor
in Missouri.4 With few exceptions,45 Felony convictions are disqual-
ifying across the board. If the purpose of these laws is to protect the
purity of the ballot box," then it is doubtful the state could reasona-
bly justify some of the exclusions."
The disenfranchisement of ex-felons may still prove to have a
constitutional limit. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist in Richardson
advises that the problem is more amenable to a legislative solu-
tion.4" The unpredictability of the Supreme Court is well known,
and how it may rule on a particular classification is a matter of
speculation. Therefore, those who support the lifting of state restric-
tions on the exercise of the franchise by former felons may find a
more responsive forum in the legislature. Extending the franchise
to ex-felons is a policy matter," and many states have done so to
one extent or another."0 There is no constitutional bar, state51 or
federal,5" to such action by the Missouri General Assembly.
JAMES W. ERWIN
44. State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d 787 (En banc 1943);
Bruno v. Murdock, 406 S.W.2d 294 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
45. §§ 111.021 (pardons), 216.355 (first offenders two years after completion of sent-
ence), 549.111 (completion of judicial parole), 560.610 (person under twenty years of age at
time offense committed), RSMo 1969.
46. "The true purpose of such a disqualification is now generally conceded to be not
merely additional punishment of the individual but to safeguard and preserve the purity of
elections." State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237, 1241, 175 S.W.2d 787, 788 (En
bane 1943).
47. For example, there seems to be little relation between a person's conviction for
stealing of domestic fowl in the nighttime and the possible threat he poses to the integrity of
the election process. § 560.610, RSMo 1969. See Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 605,414 P.2d
412, 418, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290 (1966).
48. - U.S. .... , -- , 94 S.Ct. 2655, 2671.
49. Id. at -, 94 S.Ct. at 2686 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally, Note,
Restoring the Ex-offender's Right to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIm. L.
REV. 721 (1973).
50. - U.S.-., - 94 S.Ct. 2655, 2685 n.28 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A bill has
been introduced in the House of Representatives which would restore voting rights in federal
elections to ex-offenders, H.R. 14594, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). It was unanimously re-
ported by a subcommittee to the full House Judiciary Committee on August 21, 1974. The
bill would not pre-empt state voting rights laws. 2 CIaUnIAL JUSME 10 (No. 3, Fall 1974).
51. Mo. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 provides:
No . . . person . . . while confined in any public prison shall be entitled to vote,
and persons convicted of felony, or crime connected with the exercise of the right
of suffrage may be excluded by law from voting. (emphasis added).
The Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as vesting "wide discretion in the
legislature to determine the extent to which persons convicted of a felony may be excluded
from the suffrage." State ex rel. Oliver v. Hunt, 247 S.W.2d 969, 973 (Mo. En Banc 1952).
52. - U.S. , , 94 S. Ct. 2655, 2671.
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/15
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAX EXEMPT STATUS AS
"STATE ACTION"
Jackson v. Statler Foundation'
Rev. Donald Jackson brought suit against thirteen private
charitable foundations, alleging that the foundations refused to hire
him as a director of their foundations, refused to give scholarships
to his children, and refused to grant money to his foundation, all for
reasons of race. Rev. Jackson sought injunctive and declaratory re-
lief, damages, revocation of the foundations' tax exempt status
under the Internal Revenue Code, and an order directing the foun-
dations to surrender all their assets to the United States Treasury.
2
On motion of the defendant foundations, the district court dis-
missed the complaint.3 The district judge held that insofar as appel-
lant based his claims on 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 the requisite "state
action" was lacking.
In a 3-0 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed in part the
district court's ruling.5 The decision of the Second Circuit hinged on
its belief that state action may be found from the fact that the
foundations enjoyed tax exempt status. Judge Friendly, joined by
three other circuit judges, filed a vigorous dissent to the circuit's
denial of his request to reconsider the case en banc. The dissent
found the logic of the panel to be uncompelling and characterized
the decision as "the most ill-advised decision with respect to 'state
action' yet rendered by any court. . .. "I
Some background fs essential when wading into "the murky
waters of the 'state action' doctrine." 8 The Equal Protection Clause
1. 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974).
2. Id. at 625. Rev. Jackson appeared before the court pro se. This fact caused a great
deal of confusion in ascertaining exactly what was claimed. The Second Circuit construed
the contentions of Rev. Jackson most generously. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519
(1972).
3. The decision of the district court is unreported.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See statute quoted at note 10 infra.
5. 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974).
6. Id. at 636. The history of the Jackson opinion merits discussion. The Jackson panel
at first thought an affirmative answer to the question of state action resulting from tax
exempt status was so obvious as to deserve only a single paragraph of a per curiam opinion.
Thereafter, Judge Friendly requested that the case be reconsidered en banc. After several
judges had voted in favor of reconsideration, the panel requested that a final vote be deferred
pending circulation of the new revised opinion. Despite the vote of half of the active judges
of the second circuit in favor of an en banc hearing of the case, reconsideration was denied
for lack of a majority vote. Judge- Hays, Feinberg and Mulligan joined with Judge Friendly
in supporting reconsideration.
7. 496 F.2d at 637 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
8. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 455 (D.D.C. 1972).
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of the fourteenth amendment9 and Section 19831' apply only where
a state has deprived a person of his constitutional rights. Discrimi-
natory conduct by a state is subject to constitutional prohibitions,
whereas the Equal Protection Clause "erects no shield""2 against
truly private discrimination "however discriminatory or wrong-
ful.' ' 13 It is clear, however, that "[c]onduct that is formally 'pri-
vate' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so
impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to
the constitutional limitations placed upon state action.' 4
It is significant that minimal state involvement is insufficient
to trigger constitutional restrictions. Governmental involvement in
private conduct does not rise to the requisite level of state action
unless the state has "significantly involved itself"'15 in the alleged
deprivation. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority," the Su-
preme Court said that the Equal Protection Clause applies to pri-
vate action in situations where the state has "so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence . . . that it must be recgonized
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person'of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
11. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
12. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
13. Id.
14. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
15. See e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967). Of late it has been frequently suggested that dual standards exist in
determining whether state action is present. A less rigorous standard is said to be used where
an allegation of racial discrimination is present. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Lefcourt v. Legal Aid
Soc'y, 445 F.2d 1150, 1155, n.6 (2d Cir. 1971); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968);
Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Pitts v. Dep't of Rev., 333 F.
Supp. 662, 668 (E.D. Wis. 1971). At page 1142 of Grafton the court states:
: I I while a grant or other index of state involvement may be impermissible when
it "fosters or encourages" discrimination on the basis of race, the same limited
involvement may not rise to the level of "state action" when the action in question
is alleged to affront other constitutional rights.
16. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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as a joint participant in the challenged activity. ... 17 Thus, state
action which is not "significant" is insufficient to bring private
conduct within the purview of constitituional sanctions.
The predecessor of Jackson was McGlotten v. Connally.5
McGlotten was a suit to enjoin officials of the Treasury Department
from granting tax exemptions and deductions to fraternal organiza-
tions which excluded nonwhites from membership. The three-judge
court held that the exemptions granted from income and the allow-
ance of deductions from contributions to these organizations consti-
tuted sufficient governmental involvement to require the organiza-
tions to act within consititutional limits. In so holding, the
McGlotten court focused on the fact that sections 17011 and 50220 of
the Internal Revenue Code expressly chose fraternal organizations
for tax relief. 2' In the words of the McGlotten court:
By providing differential treatment to only selected organizations,
the Government has indicated approval of organizations and hence
their discriminatory practice, and aided that discrimination by the
provision of federal tax benefits."
17. Id. at 725.
18. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court). For a severe criticism of
McGlotten, see Bittke & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972). See also, Note, The Internal Revenue Code and
Racial Discrimination, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1972); Comment, Tax Incentives As State
Action, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 414 (1973); Note, Granting of Tax Benefits to Discriminatory
Fraternal Orders is a Violation of the Equal Protection Aspect of the Fifth Amendment, 18
VmL. L. REv. 93 (1972).
19. Section 170 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides in part:
(c) Charitable Contribution Defined.-For purposes of this section, the term
"charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of-
(4) In the case of a contribution or gift by an individual, a domestic fraternal
society, order, or association, operating under the lodge system, but only if such
contribution or gift is to be used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals.
20. Section 501 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides in part:
(c) List of Exempt Organizations.-The following organizations are referred to in
subsection (a):
(8) Fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations-
(A) operating under the lodge system or for the exclusive benefit of the
members of a fraternity itself operating under the lodge system, and
(B) providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits
to the members of such society, order, or association or their dependents.
21. 338 F. Supp. at 457. See also Falkenstein v. Dep't of Rev., 350 F. Supp. 887, 889
(D. Or. 1972), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oregon State Elks Ass'n v. Falkenstein, 409 U.S.
1099 (1973); Pitts v. Dep't of Rev., 333 F. Supp. 662, 670 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Green v. Kennedy,
309 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956
(1970), sub nom. Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
22. 338 F. Supp. at 459.
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In Jackson, the Second Circuit held that the requisite "signifi-
cant" state involvement may result from an organization's enjoy-
ment of tax exempt status. The court's analysis turned on its pres-
entation of a five-factor "test" for determining the presence of state
action. The Jackson court viewed the following as relevant criteria
for determining whether state action was present: (1) the degree to
which the private organization is dependent on governmental aid;
(2) the extent and intrusiveness of the governmental regulatory
scheme; (3) whether the regulatory scheme connotes government
approval of the activity; (4) the degree to which the organization
performs a public function; (5) whether the organization has legiti-
mate claims to recognition as a private organization in either consti-
tutional or associational terms.23 According to the Jackson court,
however, all these factors need not be present to find "state ac-
tion.24 The Jackson court thus correctly accepted the premise that
state action may be found from a combination of several factors,
even though each factor considered by itself may be insufficient.2
Seemingly, even the McGlotten and Jackson courts at least
implicitly realize that not all tax exemptions make the recipient an
arm of the state for fourteenth amendment purposes. Not even these
courts would hold that an exemption granted to an individual trans-
forms his conduct into constitutionally restricted state action.
McGlotten attempts to limit the scope of its holding by advancing
the "selected organization" concept while Jackson purports to for-
mulate a further refinement by use of the five factors.
In his dissent to the Second Circuit's denial of reconsideration
en banc, Judge Friendly attacked the panel's decision on several
grounds. The dissenters principally objected to open endedness of
the panel's opinion, that it ignored the problem of the requisite
causal nexus between the action of the state and the alleged dis-
crimination, and its potentially devastating effect on private phi-
lanthropy.
The dissenters believed the panel's position placed no ascer-
tainable limitation on the use of tax exempt status in finding state
action. Indeed, the dissent found "no really tenable basis for distin-
23. 496 F.2d at 629. It should be noted that each of the first four factors could inde-
pendly be sufficient to support a finding of state action. See, e.g., O'Neil, Private Universities
& Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 155 (1970); Schubert, State Action & The Private
University, 24 RutroERs L. REV. 323 (1970); Mayes, Constitutional Restrictions on Termina-
tion of Services by Privately Owned Public Utilities, 39 Mo. L. REv. 205 (1974). In First
Amendment cases, however, the Court seems to be restricting the concept of "public func-
tion". See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
24. 496 F.2d at 634.
25. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
[Vol. 40
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guishing the tax deductions allowed individuals and corporations."2
Even the McGlotten court conceded that here "no bright-line rule
is possible."27 Likewise, the Jackson panel recognized, albeit unwit-
tingly, the sweeping scope of its holding by stating that on remand
the defendant foundations may negate a finding of state action by
showing that they somehow differed from "private foundations
generally.""
It is questionable whether the five factors enumerated by the
Jackson court will prove to be much assistance in determining
which tax exemptions constitute state action. The first factor, "sub-
stantial dependence" on an exemption or deduction, will typically
be present. Tax exempt organizations are often established for the
very purpose of diverting potential tax dollars to other uses. Since
the Jackson court found that the Internal Revenue Code's regula-
tory scheme for the prevention of abuse of tax exempt status was
sufficiently extensive and intrusive, it would appear that the court's
second factor will be satisfied in every tax exemption case. Concern-
ing the third factor, it would seem that every tax benefit in some
manner "connotes" government approval. "Connotation of govern-
ment approval" is no less present in an investment credit given a
corporation than an exemption granted a charitable foundation.
The fourth factor, whether or not a "public function" is served by
the entity receiving the tax exemption, is hardly helpful in light of
the Jackson court's express inclusion of such diverse activities as
research, hospital care, education, medicine, and the performing
arts within its purview of "public function. ' 29 The number of activi-
ties which may arguably be characterized as "public functions"
staggers the imagination.
The dissent furtherpoints to the problem of a failure to estab-
lish a causal nexus between the alleged discrimination and the state
action. In Powe v. Miles,3" the Second Circuit held that state regula-
26. 496 F.2d at 638 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
27. 338 F. Supp. at 457. The inadequacy of the McGlotten approach is perhaps best
demonstrated by that court's analysis. The McGlotten court refused to find state action from
the tax exemption granted social clubs under § 501(c)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. In so holding, the court states at 458:
Congress has simply chosen not to tax a particular type of revenue because it is not
within the scope sought to be taxed by the statute.
It would seem that such reasoning would apply equally to fraternal benefit organizations and
private charitable foundations. See Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 18, at 71.
28. 496 F.2d at 634 n. 17.
29. Id.
30. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
1975]
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tion of educational standards in private schools could not constitute
state action. In so holding, the court pointed out that:
• ..The state must be involved not simply with some activity of
the institution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but
with the activity that caused the injury. Putting the point another
way, the state action, not the private action, must be the subject
of complaint."
The Supreme Court approved this concept in Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis,32 where the Court refused to find that issuance of a liquor
license by a state could "foster or encourage racial discrimina-
tion."33
The requirement of a direct causal nexus has recently been
undermined by the Court in Norwood v. Harrison34 and Gilmore v.
City of Montgomery." In Norwood the Court determined that the
requisite state action was present in the granting of school books to
discriminating private schools. In Norwood the Court states that:
...The Constitution does not permit the State to aid discrimina-
tion even when there is no precise causal relationship between
state financial aid to a private school and the continued well-being
of that school. A State may not grant the type of tangible financial
aid here involved if that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate,
reinforce, and support private discrimination. 6
Following the Norwood rationale, the Court in Gilmore held that a
city could not give exclusive use of public recreational facilities to
private all-white schools. The Court reasoned that:
This means that any tangible state assistance, outside the general-
ized services government might provide to private segregated
schools in common with other schools, and with all citizens, is
constitutionally prohibited if it has a significant tendency to facili-
tate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.37
Norwood and Gilmore clearly support the premise that the
31, Id. at 81. See also Blackburn v. Ffsk Univ., 443 F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1971); Browns
v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1969); Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D.
Cal. 1973); Family Forum v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 347 F. Supp. 1167, 1172 (E.D. Mich.
1972); Mulvihill v. Butterfield Mem. Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
32. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
33. Id. at 177, But see BAssETT, The Reemergency of the "State Action" Requirement
in Race Relations Cases, 22 CATH. U.L. Ray. 39, 48 (1973); Tax Incentives as State Action,
supra note 18, at 436.
34. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
35. - U.S. _, 94 S. Ct. 2416 (1974).
36. 413 U.S. at 465-66 (emphasis added).
37. 94 S.Ct. at 2424.
[Vol. 40
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nexus requirement of Moose Lodge is no longer intact in race dis-
crimination cases. Assuming that a tax exemption is considered to
be tangible state aid 8 within the scope of Norwood and Gilmore, it
would appear that future tax exempt status cases will not be de-
feated solely because there is little relationship between the state
action and the discrimination. The inevitable result of the Norwood
rationale will be cases such as Jackson. If the Court follows the
Norwood retraction of the causal nexus language in Moose Lodge,
the result will surely be an unfortunate increase in federal court
supervision of activities previously thought of as private.
Judge Friendly aptly observed that "[I]f the federal courts
take over the supervision of philanthropy, there will ultimately be
no philanthropy to supervise." 9 Benefactors generally want to be
able to personally choose the object of their benevolence. Until
Jackson, a private charitable foundation could accomplish this pur-
pose without any worry of having to comply with the constitutional
limitations applicable to governmental actions. The inevitable rash
of court battles which will result from cases like Jackson cannot
possibly prove conducive to charitable giving. Few individuals de-
sire to have the assets of their charitable beneficiaries expended in
the defense of lawsuits.
Jackson further raises an interesting question as to whether the
actions of the federal government and federal officials are encom-
passed by section 1983 and the fourteenth amendment. Section 1983
refers to damages for deprivation of civil rights under color of state
law.40 Likewise, the fourteenth amendment places restrictions on
the actions which a state may take.41 In District of Columbia v.
Carter,42 a unanimous Supreme Court explained that:
In contrast to the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Four-
teenth Amendment has only limited applicability; the commands
of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed only to the State or
to those acting under color of its authority. Similarly, actions of
the Federal Government and its officers are beyond the purview of
the Amendment. 3
Relying on Carter, the Jackson panel correctly ruled that only state
38. It is arguable that a tax exemption is not tangible financial aid within the scope of
Norwood and Gilmore. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
39. 496 F.2d at 640 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
40. See statute quoted in note 10 supra.
41. See amendment quoted in note 9 supra.
42. 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
43. Id. at 423-24. See also, e.g., Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1969).
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tax exemptions could be considered in finding state action" for pur-
poses of section 1983.11 The Jackson panel placed no such limitation
on the exemptions considered under the fourteenth amendment al-
legation. In light of the Supreme Court's recent language in Carter,
it would appear that federal action should be irrelevant for purposes
of state action under an alleged violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment itself. Thus, the federal regulation and tax exemptions should
not have been considered in attempting to establish state action
under the fourteenth amendment." Where federal discrimination is
present, the petition should include an allegation of a fifth amend-
ment violation.
The criticism leveled at the decision of the Jackson panel ap-
pears to be well justified. The Jackson case is a dangerous and
unjustified expansion of the state action doctrine which is at war
with the vast majority of precedent.47 Unless corrected," the
Jackson decision could be the stepping stone toward federal court
supervision of countless private activities.
RIcHARD L. ADAMS
44. In United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966), the Court expressly equated the
requirement of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment with the requisite state in-
volvement under § 1983. Both concepts should now be treated equally.
45. 496 F.2d at 635.
46. This does not mean that racial discrimination by the federal government is toler-
ated. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Federal discrimination is prohib-
ited by means of the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment. If a classification would be
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, it is also inconsist-
ent with the due process requirement of the fifth amendment. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973).
47. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law
School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Bright v. Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971);
Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Broderick v. Catholic Univ. of America,
365 F. Supp. 147 (D.D.C. 1973); Grossner v. Ttrustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
48. Doubtless because of their confidence of prevailing on the merits, the foundations
did not file a petition for certiorari. While it is no longer possible to reverse the Jackson
decision itself, it is to be hoped that other courts will not see fit to follow in Jackson's path.
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INJUNCTION OF TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
State ex rel. Turner v. United-Buckingham Freight Lines, Inc.1
Defendant interstate trucking company violated an Iowa mis-
demeanor statute 1730 times during a 15 month period and was
fined more than $30,000. The statute prohibited double-bottom
troucks more than 60 feet in length from operating on Iowa high-
ways. 2 The State, alleging that defendant's deliberate and repeated
violations constituted a public nuisance, sought and was granted an
injunction. United Buckingham appealed, asserting court error in
finding the repeated violations a public nuisance, since there was
no evidence of irreparable injury, and in granting the injunction,
since criminal acts should not be enjoined. The Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed, stating that the public is injured when the integrity of a
statute is undermined by persistent violations, that equity has juris-
diction whether or not such conduct is labelled a public nuisance,
and that the defendant was properly enjoined since no adequate
remedy existed at law.
When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a penal offense, the defendant
generally invokes the maxim that equity won't enjoin the commis-
sion of a crime.3 The maxim reflects a two-fold public policy: the
plaintiff is adequately protected by the remedy at law, and the
defendant is entitled to the safeguards of a criminal proceeding.4
Exceptions to the maxim have always existed, however, so that a
court in equity would grant an injunction against trespasses, pur-
prestures (encroachments of the public way), and nuis-
ances-conduct which violated the law but which also violated pri-
vate or public property rights.5 The exceptions to the rule today are
so numerous and the criteria for enjoining so flexible that, according
to one writer, the "court is in fact invited to do as it pleases."8
1. 211 N.W.2d 288 (Ia. 1973).
2. IA. CODE § 321.457(6) (1973).
3. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF RENwEs § 2.11, at 115-16 (1973) (hereinafter
cited as DOBBS).
4. 78 HAav. L. REv. 994, 1016 (1965). The objections to "criminal equity" include that
it deprives the defendant of his jury trial; it deprives him of theprotection of the higher burden
of proof required in criminal prosecutions; it may twice subject the defendant to punishment
for the same acts-once for contempt for disobeying the injunction and again in a criminal
prosecution; it substitutes a definite penalty fixed by the legislature for whatever punishment
for contempt the court might see fit; and it "may result, or induce the public to believe that
it results, in the arbitrary exercise of power and in government by injunction," 43 C.J.S. Inj.
§ 150 (1945).
5. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); 43 C.J.S. Inj. §§ 151, 152 (1945); DOBBS at 115-16.
See Annots., 91 A.L.R. 315 (1934), 40 A.L.R. 1145 (1926).
6. DOBBS at 116.
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Courts have been increasingly willing to issue injunctions
against certain activities, albeit criminal, if they find that the con-
duct is a "public nuisance." A few courts refuse injunctive relief
unless the legislature has defined the activity as a public nuisance
and/or has expressly authorized such relief.7 Many, however, require
only that the conduct constitute a public nuisance,8 conduct which
"injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the public or
works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to the
public" or which is unlawful or antisocial and injures a substantial
number of people.9 A few courts have gone even further, rejecting
the need to label the conduct a public nuisance and simply deciding
whether equity should intervene. For example, the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed a decree restraining a defendant from the
unlicensed practice of dentistry, a penal offense, saying, ".
[T]he facts in this case present ample grounds for the intervention
of equity. . . .There is present a high public interest which the
State is entitled to have protected and the criminal remedy is inade-
quate to protect it. . . .[An injunction is necessary to protect the
public from the defendant's] incompetency and inefficiency."'
The court in United-Buckingham held that the repeated viola-
tion of a criminal statute is enjoinable. 2 Although it emphasized
that it is not necessary to label conduct a public nuisance in order
to enjoin it, the court quoted an earlier decision 3 for the proposition
that "The State has an interest in seeing that the law is not contin-
ually violated. Where a statute is openly, publicly, repeatedly, con-
tinually, persistently and intentionally violated a public nuisance is
created."' 4 The language thus endorsed is that of the Crawford Doc-
7. United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956); Elizabeth City v. Aydlett,
200 N.C. 58, 156 S.E. 163 (1930).
8. DOBBs at 116; A.L.R. at 320 (1935); 40 A.L.R. at 1159 (1926).
9. 58 A?. JUR. 2d Nuis. § 7 (1971).
10. DOBes at 116n.20. The court in United-Buckingham adopted this approach. 211
N.W.2d at 290.
11. State ex rel. McLeod v. Holcomb, 245 S.C. 63, 67, 138 S.E.2d 707, 708-09 (1964).
12. 211 N.W.2d at 290. See also State ex rel. Vance v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 518, 42 Am.
Rep. 182 (1882); State ex rel. Peterson v. Martin, 180 Ore. 459, 176 P. 2d 636 (1947); State
ex rel. Abbott v. House of Vision-Belgard-Spero, Inc., 259 Wisc. 87, 47 N.W.2d 321 (1951).
13. State ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550, 564 (Ia. 1973). The case
lends no support to the court's opinion. Defendant was enjoined from charging usurious
interest rates. The only legal remedy was cancellation of excess interest on the unpaid-bal-
ance; no criminal sanction was involved. The court held the practice a public nuisance,
reiterating the common law definition of "unlawful or antisocial conduct that in some way
injures a substantial number of people."
14. 211 N.W.2d at 290.
The only authority cited is Woods Bros. Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Ia. 550, 1 N.W.2d
655 (1942). Eicher is not in point, for the situation there was reversed. Plaintiff was a private
[Vol. 40
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trine which originated in an 1882 Kansas case: "We would think
that every place where a public statute is openly, publicly, repeat-
edly, continually, persistently and intentionally violated, is a public
nuisance."' 5 The Iowa court distorts the doctrine, however, wrench-
ing its original meaning from context for it refers to "every place"
and has no ready application to a situation involving highways and
trucks.
The original Crawford rule has been criticized by legal writers
as too broad and rejected by many of the courts that have consid-
ered it.'" Kansas itself has repudiated it." The effect of the doctrine
is to enjoin criminal conduct "when there is not only no actual
injury to the community, but not even a remote possibility of injury.
This appears to be a substantial departure from the settled law of
nuisance.' 8 A few courts nevertheless appear to embrace it;'" the
Iowa court seems to follow their lead and uses their language even
though it rejects the need to designate the conduct a public nuis-
ance. 20 The court in United-Buckingham did not require the State
to prove that the defendant's repeated violations did cause or were
likely to cause accidents. The court found that "[Tihe public is*
injured when the integrity of the statute is . . .undermined." 2'
The Iowa court finds an injunction appropriate because the
remedy provided by statute is inadequate to prevent the continual
violations.22 It reasons that the legal remedy is inadequate because
it failed to halt the repeated violations, and an injunction should
issue because the legal remedy is inadequate. Such analysis almost
party who sought to enjoin state highway officers. The "conduct subject to equitable jurisdic-
tion" was that of state officials, not that of highway users; the issue involved statutory
interpretation, not a defendant's repeated traffic offenses.
15. State ex rel. Vance v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 518, 522, 42 Am. Rep. 182, 186 (1882). The
doctrine is dictum; a Kansas statute expressly made saloons operating in violation of the law
a public unisance. Ironically, no injunction issued in Crawford because the statutory rem-
edy-"Shut up and abate"-was quite adequate. Id. at 522, 42 Am. Rep. at 184-85.
16. 1953 Wisc. L. REv. 163. See 25 BROOKLYN L. REv. 340 (1959).
17. State v. Barron, 136 Kan. 324, 15 P.2d 456 (1932).
18. 1953 Wisc. L. REv. at 169.
19. State ex rel. Peterson v. Martin, 180 Ore. 459, 176 P.2d 636 (1947); State ex rel.
Abbott v. House of Vision-Belgard-Spero, Inc., 259 Wisc. 87, 47 N.W.2d 321 (1951).
20. 211 N.W.2d at 290. Although the court gives no explanation for its refusal to label
defendant's conduct a public nuisance, the possible reason emerges from an examination of
the Iowa statutory definition of nuisance: "Whatever is injurious to health, indecent, or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as essentially to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance," IA. CODE § 657.1
(1973). The definition does not seem to cover United-Buckingham's use of over-length trucks,
at least without evidence of injury to health or of obstruction.
21. 211 N.W.2d at 290.
22. 211 N.W.2d at 291.
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obscures the holding-a repeated violation of a traffic law is enjoin-
able simply because it is a repeated offense. And since the persistent
breach of any penal law "undermines the integrity of the statute,"
any repeated public welfare offense is, by analogy, enjoinable with-
out any consideration of the specific facts involved or of the actual
or potential injury caused by the defendant's conduct.
The Iowa court finds the remedy at law inadequate, since the
defendant was fined 1730 times. The misdemeanor in question can
carry up to a $100 fine or thirty days imprisonment. The possibility
of jailing the truck drivers is mentioned and rejected as it would
punish them for "infractions .within the primary responsibility of
their corporate employers." But the court might yet have denied
an injunction on grounds that an adequate legal remedy did exist,
for Iowa Code section 321.484 (1973) provides, "It is unlawful for the
owner, or any other person, employing or otherwise directing the
driver of any vehicle to require or knowingly permit the operation
of such vehicle upon a highway in any manner contrary to law."24
The statute pertains not only to corporate owners but to "any per-
son," so it would seem those responsible, those directing or permit-
ting the continued offenses, might be threatened with a jail sent-
ence-not under the auspices of an injunction but under the stat-
ute.25
In United-Buckingham, a repeated traffic violation is held to
injure the public-injury sufficient to support an injunction-with
no consideration of actual or threatened damage and no considera-
tion of the constitutional aspects of enjoining a crime. 2 The legisla-
ture provided what it thought were appropriate penalties; if such
penalties are ineffective, it could increase them or provide special
treatment for chronic offenders. There is little or no precedent for
the court's actionY The cases cited in support are not in point. They
23. 211 N.W.2d at 292.
24. IA. CODE § 321.484 (1973) (emphasis added).
25. The effectiveness of this remedy may depend on the court's ability to obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant manager or owner.
26. See note 4 supra.
27. The situation in England is apparently somewhat different. 22 MOD. L. Rav. 535
(1959), surveys a recent trend toward relator actions to enjoin repeated violators and says,
"[There have been strong dicta to the effect that the question whether the defendants'
conduct has in fact caused or tended to cause injury to the public is not one into which [the
courts] can properly inquire." But in Att'y-Gen. v. Harris, 2 All E.R. 393, 3 W.L.R. 205
(1959), a flower-vendor who had been fined 189 times for plying his trade on Sunday was not
enjoined. The court said its duty was to inquire whether defendant's acts in truth injured the
public. The article sees Harris as a "useful corrective to recent trends in other directions"
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are either easily distinguishable on the facts or involve statutes
expressly authorizing injunctive relief or affording no criminal sanc-
tions at all.28
An injunction is a strong weapon. A court should issue an in-
junction only after it determines that the legal remedy is clearly
inadequate and that the harm threatened is substantial. The Iowa
court's approach to the problem in United-Buckingham is question-
able because it supports enjoining conduct simply and solely be-
cause statute is persistently violated.
29
KAY JFRRETr
28. Three of the nine cited cases deal with loan shark businesses charging usurious
interest rates and, in at least two of these, the only statutory remedy was cancellation of
excess interest; no act punishable criminally was involved. State ex rel. Turner v. Younker
Bros., Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Ia. 1973); State v. Hooker, 87 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1957); State ex
rel. Beck v. Basham, 146 Kan. 181, 70 P.2d 24 (1937). Two are rock festival cases in which
the promoters did not obtain the required health and safety licenses; one of these reviews
contempt charges, and the other has no issue as to persistent violations. Sound Storm Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Keefe, 209 N.W.2d 560 (Ia. 1973); Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Zemel Bros.,
Inc., 29 Conn. Supp. 45, 270 A.2d 562 (1970). Another cited case deals with the constitution-
ality of a statutory minimum on milk prices where injunctive relief was authorized by statute.
Montana Milk Control Bd. v. Rehburg, 141 Mont. 149, 376 P.2d 508 (1962). In two others,
the plaintiff is not the government. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Indepen-
dent Postal System of Am., Inc., 470 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1972) (suit to enjoin labor union);
Wood Bros. Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Ia. 550, 1 N.W.2d 655 (1942) (suit to enjoin govern-
ment officials).
The Iowa court ignores the subsequent history of the ninth case it cites, State v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 253 Minn. 236, 92 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. 1958), 262 Minn. 31, 115 N.W.2d 643
(1962). The State of Minnesota sought to enjoin defendant supermarket chain from selling
such drugs as Alka-Seltzer, Anacin, and Ex-Lax, alleging violations of the Pharmacy Act
which made it unlawful to sell drugs in unlicensed outlets. The court reversed the trial court
and granted plaintiff a new trial, saying the State had a prima facie case in view of the public
policy that uncontrolled sale of drugs and medicine was inimical to public health. A strong
dissent observed that neither injury nor inadequancy of legal remedy had been shown. The
language of a broad but controlling public policy sounds much like the language of United-
Buckingham. The most pertinent point of the Red Owl case, however, is that on retrial the
trial court denied the injunction, finding the drugs were not covered by the statute. The
supreme court, while reversing in part by holding the drugs within the Act's coverage, af-
firmed the denial of the injunction on grounds that the sales were not shown to be nuisances
or dangers to the public health; proof of specific injury was necessary.
29. Injunctions will lie in Missouri to "prevent the doing of any legal wrong whatever,
whenever in the opinion of the court an adequate remedy cannot be afforded by an action
for damages." § 526.030, RSMo 1969. A literal reading could authorize enjoining a continual
violator of a public welfare offense from committing future infractions. Case law suggests a
narrower construction: "[A] court of equity is powerless to enjoin the commission of any
crime not violative of property rights nor involving the creation of a public nuisance." State
ex rel. Chicago, B.&Q.R. v. Woolfolk, 269 Mo. 389, 190 S.W. 877 (En Banc 1916); a public
nuisance can be enjoined, but "there must be proof of the nuisance, as distinguished from
the mere crime," and an injunction will not lie to prevent or punish the commission of a
crime, State ex rel. Alton v. Salley, 215 S.W. 241 (Mo. 1919).
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EVIDENCE-THE RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION-EXCEPTIONS TO THE
HEARSAY RULE AND THE SCOPE OF THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
State v. Rowlett'
The state charged Sidney B. Rowlett with the murder of Robert
Bussen. The State's theory was that one William Herron did the
actual killing at Rowlett's direction in order to prevent the victim
from being a witness against Rowlett in a narcotics case. At Row-
lett's trial Herron was called as a witness for the State. He gave his
name and stated that he resided at the Missouri State Penitentiary.
He refused to answer all other questions on the grounds of self-
incrimination. Herron was asked whether he had pleaded guilty to
a charge of murder in the first degree. The trial court rejected the
witness's claim of privilege against self-incrimination and directed
the witness to answer. The witness again refused. Over objection of
defense counsel the court permitted the State to read Herron's
guilty plea from the former proceeding. Rowlett was found guilty.2
Rowlett appealed the conviction on the ground that the intro-
duction of Herron's guilty plea denied him the right to confront the
witnesses against him as guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution,3 and article 1, § 18(a) of the Missouri
State Constitution.
In reversing the conviction the Missouri Supreme Court de-
cided that Kirby v. United States5 controlled and that the admis-
sion of Herron's guilty plea violated Rowlett's right of confronta-
tion,' stating however:
Were the court at liberty to determine the admissibility of the
evidence here in question without constraint of prior decision of the
United States Supreme Court, the state's contention that the evi-
dence amounted to proof of a prior statement against penal inter-
est, and was thus fully within a recognized exception to the hearsay
rule and did not offend the constitutional guaranty of the right of
confrontation, might well be persuasive.'
1. 504 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1973).
2. Id. at 49.
3. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. .. "
4. Article 1 § 18(a) states: "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face..
5. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
6. 504 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Mo. 1973).
7. Id. at 52.
36
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/15
RECENT CASES
This language indicates the court's willingness to accept the
premise that once evidence is admissible under an exception to the
hearsay rule, the requirements of the state and federal confrontation
clauses are met. It is also in accord with Missouri decisions based
on the Missouri confrontation clause' and with the trend of United
States Supreme Court decisions. The court's failure to follow this
rationale, and its reliance on the 1899 Kirby case must be consid-
ered in light of the history of the hearsay and confrontation doc-
trines and cases interpreting these rules.
When the sixth amendment was adopted in 1782, the hearsay
rule had been established in England for more than a century.'
Certain exceptions to the hearsay rule, however, were generally ac-
cepted. ° The confrontation clause was adopted to prevent the use
of ex parte affidavits and depositions in lieu of witnesses in criminal
trials." The main purpose of the clause was to give defendants in
criminal proceedings the right of cross-examination. The presence
of the witness also allowed the judge and jury to view the witness's
demeanor and make a more informed judgment concerning the reli-
ability of the testimony given.12
In Mattox v. United States3 the United States Supreme Court
first established criteria for determining whether the admission of
evidence violated the confrontation clause. Mattox was convicted of
murder but the conviction was reversed on appeal and a new trial
was ordered. Two witnesses had died since the first trial and the
prosecutor read their former testimony into evidence in the second
trial. The Court found no violation of the confrontation clause. 4 The
Court stated:
There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never
lose the benefit of any of these safeguards even by the death of the
witness ... But general rules of law ofthis kind ... must occa-
8. See note 51 infra.
9. C. McCoRmICK, LAW OF EvmENcE § 252, at 606 (1972).
10. The exceptions included former testimony; Rex v. Vipont, 2 Burr. 1163, 97 Eng.
Repr. 767 (1761); Rex v. Radbourne, 1 Leach C.L. 457 (1787); Rex v. Jolliffe, 4 Term R. 285,
100 Eng. Repr. 1022 (1791); Annot., 15 A.L.R. 498,500; and dying declarations 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENcE § 1430; C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 252, at 606 (1972).
11. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242 (1895).
12. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 1395
(1940); see also Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1378 (1972).
13. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
14. Id. at 238.
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sionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessi-
ties of the case. 5
The Court in this early case recognized that the confrontation clause
is not a total bar to the admission of out of court statements. The
Court looked to the necessity of admitting the witness's prior state-
ments. Had the Rowlett court looked at the necessity for admitting
the guilty plea and its inherent reliability a different result might
well have followed.
The next significant development in this area was Kirby v.
United States,'" the case upon which the decision in State v. Rowlett
is based. Kirby was convicted of receiving stolen property of the
United States Government. A statute provided that a judgment
against the thief would be conclusive evidence in the trial of the
receiver that the property was stolen. Wallace, Baxter, and King
stole stamps from a post office, and Kirby received the goods. At
Kirby's trial the prosecution offered into evidence part of the record
from the trial of King, Baxter, and Wallace. The record indicated
that Wallace and Baxter pleaded guilty while King pleaded not
guilty but was convicted. The court instructed the jury that the
record of conviction made out a prima facie case that the property
was stolen. Kirby objected to the admission of the record on" the
ground that the statute was unconstitutional. 7
The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional. The
Court stated that the record of the conviction of the principal felons
was not admissible for any purpose.'"
The exact reasoning behind this decision is extremely difficult
to discern from the language of the decision. The Court stated:
We are of the opinion that the trial court erred in admitting in
evidence the record of the convictions of Wallace, Baxter and
King, and then in its charge saying that in the absence of proof to
the contrary, the fact that the property was stolen from the United
States was sufficiently established against Kirby by the mere pro-
duction of the record showing the conviction of the principal fel-
ons.'"
This statement seems to indicate that it was the admission of the
record of conviction and not the admission of the guilty plea which
violated Kirby's right to confrontation. The Court went on, how-
15. Id. at 243.
16. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
17. Id. at 47.50.
18. Id. at 60.
19. Id. at 53-54.
[Vol. 40
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ever, to discuss the fact that Kirby was not present when the guilty
pleas were entered and therefore could not cross-examine Wallace
and Baxter.20 The Court further emphasized the impropriety of the
admission of the record of convictions, however, saying:
And yet the court below instructed the jury that the conviction of
the principal felons upon an indictment against them alone was
sufficient prima facie to show, as against Kirby,... the existence
of the fact that the property was stolen .... 21
Later, the Court again emphasized the error of introducing the "re-
sult" of the trial of the principal felons.22 The Court, therefore, failed
to make it clear whether it was the admission of the guilty pleas,
the record of the convictions, or the procedural effect of such admis-
sions under the statute in question which violated Kirby's constitu-
tional rights."
Kirby was the first case to analyze the Mattox "necessity" ap-
proach to the confrontation clause. After stating in dicta that the
dying declaration exception to the confrontation and hearsay rules
arises from the necessity of the case,24 the Court discussed the inher-
ent reliability of such statements. The Court stated that the ground
upon which this exception rests is that due to the surrounding
circumstances ". . . [t]hey are equivalent to the evidence of a
living witness upon oath .. ."I' This statement indicates that in
addition to unavailability, there must be some indication that the
statement was reliable and that the declarant was telling the truth.
To satisfy the confrontation clause after Kirby, two factors must be
present: some necessity for the evidence's admission, and the relia-
bility of the evidence." Had the Rowlett court relied on this analy-
20. Id. at 54.
21. Id. at 54-55.
22. Id. at 55.
23. It is important to note that the prosecutor in Kirby made no showing that the
principal felons were unavailable to testify, and the case therefore could have been decided
by a straight-forward application of Mattox. The failure to allege unavailability also raises
hearsay problems. The guilty pleas could not fall under the declaration against interest
exception to the hearsay rule without a showing of unavailability. See C. McCoRMIcK, LAW
OF EVIDENCE, §§ 276, 280, at 670, 678 (1972); Pop. FED. R. EvW. 804 (b)(4) (1972). The
judgement against the principal who pleaded guilty would not have been admissible under
an exception to the hearsay rule even if the witness had been unavailable. See PRoP. FED. R.
Evm. 803 (22) (1972).
24. 174 U.S. at 61.
25. Id. at 61.
26. The confrontation cases following Kirby add little to the analysis of these issues.
Each however, points out that confrontation is not an absolute bar and that exceptions to
the rule exist. See West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258,260-61 (1904), (deposition admitted when
witness unavailable and defendant had opportunity to cross examine when deposition was
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sis, the evidence might have been ruled admissible. The witness was
unavailable for cross-examination since he invoked the fifth amend-
ment,2 and his plea was against his penal interest, supplying a
sufficient assurance of reliability.2
Though these factors are very similar to those used in analysis
of hearsay exceptions, two later cases distinguish the confrontation
clause and the hearsay rule. In Pointer v. Texas2' the Supreme Court
held it error to admit at trial testimony given by a witness at a
preliminary hearing where the defendant was present and could
cross-examine, but was not represented by counsel." This testimony
would have been admissible in Texas under the prior reported testi-
mony exception to the hearsay rule. This exception requires that the
witness be unavailable and that the defendant had an opportunity
to cross examine." The Supreme Court, however, stated that the
mere opportunity to cross examine is not enough. The confrontation
clause must be read in conjunction with the sixth amendment right
to counsel.2 The Court, therefore, based its decision on the
confrontation clause and on the right to counsel."
Barber v. Page4 also indicates the confrontation clause does not
have the same limits as the hearsay rule. At Barber's trial the court
admitted the transcript of a witness's testimony at a preliminary
hearing. At the time of the trial this witness was in a federal prison
in an adjoining state. The prosecution made no effort to produce
taken); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911), (". . . this general rule of law
embodied in the Constitution [the confrontation clause] . . . has always had certain well
recognized exceptions"); Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926), (the purpose of
the confrontation clause was not to broaden the common law rule or disturb its exceptions.)
27. 504 S.W.2d at 51. State v. Yates, 442 S.W.2d 21, 28 (Mo. 1969) (where witness
invokes the privilege against self incrimination, the unavailability requirement is satisfied.)
Osbourne v. Purdome, 250 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. En Banc 1952); Sutton v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282,
189 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1945); See also United States v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Mobley. 421 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1970) (refusal to testify based on unjustified
reliance on the fifth amendment); Mason v. United States, 408 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1969)
(same unjustified reliance); Annot. 45 A.L.R. 2d 1354; C. McCoRMICK, LAw OF EVIDENCE, §
253, at 612 (1972); PnoP. FED. R. Evm. 804 (a)(2) (1972).
28. See note 50 infra. It should also be noted that the indicia of reliability in this case
is very strong indeed. The plea of guilty to a first degree murder charge was obviously not
the result of any plea bargaining.
29. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
30. Id. at 401-402. It must be noted that Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
has no application to the facts at hand since the confession of Herron was not admitted to
prove Rowlett's guilt.
31. See PRop. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1) (1972).
32. 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
33. This case is also important because the Court held that the confrontation clause is
binding on the states. Id. at 403.
34. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
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him at trial. The Supreme Court held that it was error to admit the
transcript. The Court stated that a witness is not unavailable for
confrontation clause purposes unless the state makes a good faith
effort to obtain his presence. 5 This expanded the unavailability
requirement beyond what is necessary in the hearsay area. 6
In Barber and Pointer the Court indicated that hearsay and
confrontation are not co-extensive in scope. In each case the hearsay
exception was satisfied but the confrontation clause was violated.37
The cases since Barber, however, indicate a relaxtion of the confron-
tation clause requirement.
In California v. Green3 8 a state's witness claimed that he re-
membered nothing of prior statements that he had made concerning
the defendant's guilt or of his testimony at a preliminary hearing.
The defendants attorney had cross-examined the witness at the
preliminary hearing. This previous testimony was introduced into
evidence to refresh the witness's memory under a California statute
allowing admission for the purpose of proving the truth of the mat-
ter asserted. The Court held that neither this admission nor the
statute violated the confrontation clause.39 The Court did state that
the confrontation clause is not a mere codification of hearsay rules,4"
but also stated: "[T]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by
admitting a declarant's out of court statements as long as the de-
35. Id. at 720-25.
36. It is unclear whether the Proposed Federal Rules specifically embody the Barber
requirement of actual unavailability. Rule 804(a)(5) states that unavailability will be found
where the witness "Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been
unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means." As a practical
matter, the words "other reasonable means" will have to be read, in criminal prosecutions,
to include the actual unavailability requirement of Barber. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204, 209 (1972) (the witness was not merely absent from the state, but was also a permanent
resident of Sweden).
37. The confrontation cases immediately preceeding Barber add little to the confronta-
tion analysis. In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 416, 417, (1965), a prosecutor read the
confession of an alleged accomplice who was then on the stand but refused to answer any
questions. The prosecutor justified the action on the basis of "cross examining a hostile
witness". The confession implicated the defendant. The court found this violated the defen-
dant's right to confrontation. Justice Harlan stated in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 98 (1970)
that Douglas is most easily dealt with by viewing it as a case of prosecutorial misconduct.
No matter how the case is viewed, the decision is easily squared with the other cases applying
the necessity doctrine. The evidence submitted clearly fails to meet the reliability require-
ment of the necessity test since the part of the alleged confession implicating the defendant
is not against the interest of the declarant. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968);
Taylor, Codefendant's Confession in a Joint Trial, 35 Mo. L. Rav. 125 (1970). This part of
the confession would also fail to meet an exception to the hearsay rule.
38. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
39. Id. at 151-53.
40. Id. at 155.
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clarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective
cross-examination." 41
Any notion that Green established a strict requirement that
the out of court declarant be available for cross-examination was
dispelled in Dutton v. Evans.4 At the trial of Evans, the state called
a cell-mate of one of the defendant's co-conspirators. This witness
testified that his cell-mate, Williams, had said: "if it hadn't been
for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this
now." The statement was admitted over the objection of Evans
under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.43 The Court
found no violation of the confrontation clause. 44 The plurality opin-
ion emphasized the "indica of reliability" of the evidence,45 and
stated that the witness was vigorously cross-examined by the defen-
dant." This result is quite extraordinary in light of the Barber deci-
sion since no attempt was made to call the declarant, Williams to
the stand and the court failed to require any attempt to do this.
Justice Stewart based his decision on two grounds: first that the
evidence was not "in any sense crucial or devastating;"47 and, sec-
ondly, that the.evidence had sufficient indicia of reliability since it
was against the penal interest of Williams. 8 No matter how ques-
tionable the analysis, it is apparent that the plurality opinion was
still attempting to analyze the issues within the frame of reliability.
As Dutton and Green demonstrate, the Supreme Court has
been reluctant in recent decisions to use the confrontation clause to
strike down the admission of evidence admissible under an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.49 The Missouri court in Rowlett states that
Herron's guilty plea is a declaration against penal interest and
therefore probably fits within the hearsay exception. Thus the
41. Id. at 158.
42. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). It should be noted that Dutton was not a five man decision.
43. Id. at 74-78.
44. Id. at 89.
45. Id. at 89. The court focused on the spontaneity of the declarant's statement and
the fact that the statement was against his penal interest.
46. Id. at 86. As in the Green case, it is difficult to find how cross-examination would
help the defendant in the case. The declarant is not on the stand, and it is his sincerity that
must be tested, not that of his cellmate.
47. Id. at 87.
48. Id. at 89.
49. See Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971), (declaration against penal interest);
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), (prior reported testimony); See also Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), (where the court held that the hearsay rule could not be
used to deny the defendant his right to confrontation. This indicates that in certain circum-
stances, if suitable "indicia of reliability" exists, confrontation can require the admission of
evidence even though no hearsay exception is met.)
50. 504 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Mo. 1973). The court also indicates that if the evidence was some
[Vol. 40
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court could have followed the analysis used in more recent Supreme
Court decisions and found the record of the guilty pleas admissible.
In conclusion, the Missouri Supreme Court based its decision
solely on the Kirby case. As indicated above it is unclear whether
the Kirby Court meant to set up an absolute bar against such a use
of co-conspirators guilty pleas, whether the Court only meant to bar
introduction of records of the convictions, or whether the Court
objected to the procedural effects of the state statute. In light of this
ambiguity the Missouri Supreme Court might have reached a differ-
ent result by noting that the Kirby court considered the necessity
for admitting the evidence as well as the reliability. The court then,
without resorting to an ambiguous 1899 decision, could have based
its holding on the more recent interpretation of the confrontation
clause and analyzed the "indicia of reliability" and the availability
of the declarant as the Green Court did. Using this analysis, the
court could simply have stated that there was sufficient indicia of
reliability since the statement was against penal interest and that
the Mattox and Barber necessity requirements were met because
the witness refused to testify and, therefore, his plea of guilty should
be admitted." The court then could have followed the Missouri
cases indicating that, if a hearsay exception is met, the Missouri
confrontation requirement is satisfied.2
The effect of this decision is to engraft a strict rule of exclusion
against the admission of guilty pleas in such instances onto the
Missouri confrontation clause. Such a rule is not likely to be re-
quired by the United States Supreme Court if the analysis of necess-
ity and reliability continues in the confrontation area.
JoHN R. SIMs
other form of declaration against penal interest that there would be no violation of the right
to confrontation. This is in conflict with State v. Gorden, 356 Mo. 1010, 1014, 204 S.W.2d
713, 715 (Mo. 1947) which held that admission of a declaration against penal interest did
violate the Missouri confrontation clause. Rowlett is consistent, however, with State v. Spica,
389 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1965), which stated that if there is a valid hearsay exception satisfied
there is no violation of the right of confrontation. Id. at 46. See State v. Colvin, 226 Mo. 446,
126 S.W. 448 (1910).
51. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
52. See cases cited note 51 supra.
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Elwood Grissum died March 5, 1970, leaving real estate and
personal property worth approximately $286,405. Decedent willed
his entire estate to Nora Grissum, his sister. Nora filed an action in
equity to have her brother's estate declared partnership property,
with one-half going immediately to her. Since this would have
meant a net difference of over $57,000 in estate and inheritance
taxes, the State of Missouri was made a defendant.2 Nora contended
that in the 1930's, she and her brother orally created a partnership
to operate a farm, to accumulate property, and to share the profits
equally. The Circuit Court of Cooper County found for Nora and the
State appealed, claiming that the evidence did not sufficiently es-
tablish a partnership. 3 The Supreme Court of Missouri found that
there was "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence4 to show the
existence of a partnership and affirmed.5
Since 1949, the law concerning partnerships in Missouri has
been embodied by the Uniform Partnership Act.6 On the subject of
determining the existence of a partnership, its terms are quite gen-
eral. Section 358.060, RSMo 1969, states that "any association...
is not a partnership under this law, unless such association would
have been a partnership in this state prior to the adoption of this
law." Grissum has to some extent clarified that law.
A partnership is a voluntary association of two or more persons
to combine their investments or energy in a lawful business enter-
prise.7 It is characterized by the sharing of profits and losses and is
based on a contract between the parties.' Where no express written
1. 505 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1974).
2. Id. at 83. The original caption of the case showed Nora Grissum as plaintiff and
defendant. An Administrator ad Litem was later appointed. The caption was changed by the
Supreme Court but the State alone appealed.
3. Id. at 85. The State also objected to the admission of "collateral evidence" and
claimed the action violated the Statute of Frauds. Id.
4. Id. at 86.
5. Id.
6. §§ 358.010-.430, RSMo 1969.
7. Van Hoose v. Smith, 355 Mo. 799, 198 S.W.2d 23 (1946); Chapin v. Cherry, 243 Mo.
375, 147 S.W. 1084 (1912).
8. Temm v. Temm, 354 Mo. 814, 191 S.W.2d 629 (1946); Dixon v. Dixon, 181 S.W. 84
(Mo. 1915). A party alleging the existence of a partnership faces a substantial problem when
the contract is oral. Such was the case in Grissum, where the problem was compounded
because Nora was prevented from testifying by the Missouri Deadman's Statute, § 491.010,
RSMo 1969. In Grissum, no oral contract was found.
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or oral agreement can be shown, a contract of partnership may be
implied from the behavior of the parties.' The apparent intent of the
parties determines the existence of the partnership."0 Whether the
parties shared profits and losses has traditionally been a critical
consideration regarding this intent."
Section 358.070(4), RSMo 1969, provides that the receipt of
profits by a person in a business raises a rebuttable presumption
that he is a partner in that business. The facts in Grissum with
regard to profit sharing were not definitive. Nora and Elwood lived
together on the farm and shared expenses. A substantial part of the
farm income was reinvested in the farm. Nora, however, had no
bank account in her own name and paid no personal income tax on
farm income before 1970. Although a large amount of money'2 was
placed in various joint accounts after 1967, there was no evidence
that Nora ever drew on any profits for her personal benefit. 3 While
the court possibly could have concluded that Nora and Elwood
shared profits, it did not. Instead, the court found that while neither
party sought to make personal use of the profits, both had the right
to receive profits at any reasonable time.'4
It seemed clear before Grissum that courts would not imply a
partnership in the absence of an actual distribution of profits.'5
Although it did not expressly overrule any prior case, the obvious
consequence of Grissum is that an actual distribution of shared
profits may no longer be needed to establish a partnership by impli-
cation. The court did not, however, reach the question of whether
the right to share profits could now be considered prima facie evi-
dence of a partnership. Such an interpretation involves a more lib-
eral reading of the Uniform Partnership Act than any court has
previously given it, and does not seem likely. Nor did the court
abandon profit sharing completely as a requirement of partnership.
Although Grissum liberalizes the profit sharing requirement, any
proof that an alleged partner did not have the right to share profits
will almost certainly be fatal to the claim.
While an agreement not to share losses may preclude the exist-
9. Schneider v. Schneider, 347 Mo. 102, 146 S.W.2d 584 (1941); Neville v. D'Oench, 327
Mo. 34, 34 S.W.2d 491 (1931); Priest v. Chouteau, 12 Mo. App. 252 (St. L. Ct. App.), afl'd,
85 Mo. 398 (1882).
10. MacDonald v. Matney, 82 Mo. 358 (1884). See text accompanying notes 20-25 infra.
11. Maclay v. Freeman, 48 Mo. 234 (1871).
12. Approximately $80,000. 505 S.W.2d at 83.
13. Id. at 87.
14. Id.
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ence of a partnership,'6 the absence of any agreement on the subject
probably will not.'" If all other requirements of a partnership are
met, the court will imply an obligation to share in any losses.'" It
may actually be easier to show a partnership without an express
agreement about loss sharing.'9
The existence of a partnership is a question of the intent of the
parties involved.20 In Schneider v. Schneider,21 the court pointed out
that it is not necessary that "each of the parties . . . fully under-
stand all of the legal incidents which follow upon partnership exist-
ence. )2 2 Their conduct under the arrangement is evidence of their
intent. The sort of evidence required may vary with the circumstan-
ces of the case. Intention may be measured by the degree of partici-
pation of the parties in management of the business, 23 the ownership
status of the parties with regard to business property, 24 or the state-
ments and actions of the parties as they can be construed under the
alleged partnership.25 Grissum seems to indicate that, unlike the
profit sharing requirement, the absence of any of these factors will
not necessarily prevent the existence of a partnership.2
In Grissum, Nora was able to prove that she was consulted
about most business decisions, that she kept all of the books, made
the bank deposits, and paid all of the bills. Witnesses testified to
many admissions by Elwood showing that he considered the busi-
16. Gill v. Ferris, 82 Mo. 156 (1884); Bussinger v. Ginnever, 213 S.W.2d 230 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1948).
17. Hindman v. Secoy, 218 S.W. 416 (Spr. Mo. App. 1920).
18. Schneider v. Schneider, 347 Mo. 102, 146 S.W.2d 584 (1941).
[W]here there is an agreement to share profits and no clear understanding that
the losses are not to be divided, a partnership may be implied which would carry
with it the obligation to participate in the payment of losses.
Id. at 108, 146 S.W.2d at 588-89. Lengle v. Smith, 48 Mo. 276 (1871).
19. If the language of an agreement is unclear, the parties may be bound by their words
and not their intentions. See Skinner v. Whitlow, 184 Mo. App. 229, 167 S.W. 463 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1914).
20. Temm v. Temm, 354 Mo. 814, 191 S.W.2d 629 (1946); Prasse v. Prasse, 77 S.W.2d
1001 (Mo. 1934); Bussinger v. Ginnever, 213 S.W.2d 230 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948). See e.g.,
Shawneetown Feed & Seed Co. v. Ford, 468 S.W.2d 54 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971) (creditor
seeking access to his debtor's alleged partnership property); Neville v. D'Oench, 327 Mo. 34,
34 S.W.2d 491 (1930) (plaintiff seeking an accounting from an alleged partner).
21. 347 Mo. 102, 146 S.W.2d 584 (1940).
22. Id. at 107, 146 S.W.2d at 588.
23. Allison v. Dilsaver, 387 S.W.2d 206 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965); Troy Grain & Fuel Co.
v. Rolston, 227 S.W.2d 66 (K.C. Mo. App. 1950).
24. Such ownership is generallyinconclusive. See Deyerle v. Hunt, 50 Mo. App. 541
(K.C. Ct. App. 1892).
25. Fyock v. Riales, 251 S.W.2d 102 (Spr. Mo. App. 1952).
26. Joint ownership of business property was one of the elements missing in Grissum.
See Neville v. D'Oench, 327 Mo. 34, 34 S.W.2d 491 (1930).
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ness a "50-50 proposition" and intended to "fix things up" so that
"Nora would be protected sometime."' Evidence was also intro-
duced that several signs on the farm and farm equipment pro-
claimed "Elwood and Nora Grissum's Farms."' Thus, in the opin-
ion of thecourt, these factors outweighed the fact that all farm prop-
erty was in Elwood's name and that no partnership income tax
returns were filed before Elwood's death. The court emphasized that
people like Nora and Elwood Grissum cannot be expected to know
the formal requirements of a partnership. 2 Although Nora and El-
wood did not manifest their desire to establish a partnership by the
most rational legal means available, it was obvious to the court what
their intentions were. 0
No consistent verbalization of the required degree of proof had
appeared in previous Missouri appellate decisions dealing with the
existence of implied partnerships. Various decisions refer to "a pre-
ponderence of the evidence," 3' "clearest and most positive evi-
dence, '32 and "cogent, clear and convincing evidence."' Grissum
attempts to establish a uniform standard of proof for future cases,
and to further define that standard so it is workable. Recognizing
that such formulas are only vague guidelines, the court adopted, at
least where the conveyance of property is involved, the "clear, co-
gent, and convincing" test. 4 This means that the party with the
burden of proof must "clearly convince" the court that the require-
ments of partnership were met. "Cogent" means only that the evi-
dence appeal to the court's reasoning, particularly when the back-
grounds of the parties are considered.3 5 Parties with a working
knowledge of the business world could probably not show a partner-
ship with the same type of evidence used in Grissum. Although the
court probably does not intend to make this a completely subjective
test, it seems that the parties' respective positions and knowledge
27. 505 S.W.2d at 84.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 87.
30. In Shawneetown Feed & Seed Co. v. Ford, 468 S.W.2d 54 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971),
the alleged partner owned a part of the building involved, worked full time, and wrote checks
on the business account to pay the bills. Yet the court found no partnership. The Grissum
court did not directly distinguish Shawneetown but the fact that the parties involved were
husband and wife probably provided a sufficient motive for their behavior. Thus their con-
duct did not necessarily imply partnership intent. The brother and sister relation is not
comparable because no obligation to support Nora can be imputed to Elwood.
31. Bevan v. Hill, 262 S.W. 416, 418 (K.C. Mo. App. 1924).
32. Jones v. Bruce, 211 S.W. 692, 693 (K.C. Mo. App. 1919).
33. Prasse v. Prasse, 77 S.W.2d 1001, 1005 (Mo. 1934).
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will be taken into account when the court interprets their intentions
from past actions. The same holds true when the court measures the
sufficiency of the evidence.
The decision in Grissum reflects the court's desire to clarify the
factors to be examined when one seeks to imply a partnership. Its
obvious impact is to liberalize the requirement of showing the "part-
ners' " intentions by allowing parties to show a right to share profits
rather than an actual division. Whether many situations will arise
where the courts will find such a right remains an open question.
The standard of proof set out in Grissum has a less predictable
influence on the law. Such formulas are at best only guidelines, and
each subsequent case will probably be decided on its own particular
facts. The end result of Grissum is that both creditors and aggrieved
partners should find it easier to show a partnership in Missouri.
THOMAS R. JAYNE
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PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL-THE BASIS OF A CAUSE
OF ACTION WHICH IS NEITHER CONTRACT, TORT
OR QUASI-CONTRACT
Debron Corp. v. National Homes Construction Corp.1
Debron, a general contractor planning to bid on the construc-
tion of a new building, sought bids from several subcontractors for
fabrication and erection of the structural steel. National Homes, the
only subcontractor to submit a bid, telephoned a bid for $128 per
ton for the erection of the structural steel and $14 per hundred
square feet for the steel deck. It was orally agreed that Debron would
use this bid in computing its own bid, and that if Debron were
awarded the primary contract, National Homes would be the steel
erection subcontractor. After Debron was declared low bidder, Na-
tional Homes continued to pursue the project and continually as-
sured Debron of its intent to do the job. 2 Debron ordered the steel,
provided two performance bonds, and made contracts with painters
and laborers under the assumption that National Homes would per-
form. National Homes then advised Debron that it would not per-
form any work on the project. Debron nevertheless sent National
Homes a formal purchase order using the unit price quotations
agreed upon. The total price was less than previously specified,
however, because fewer tons of steel were required than had been
estimated. 3 In addition, the back of the purchase order contained
eleven terms and conditions not previously discussed with the Na-
tional Homes representative.4 National Homes did not sign this
purchase order, and did not perform any work on the project. De-
bron had another subcontractor erect the steel, at a cost of
$97,691.00 over National Homes' bid.5
Debron brought suit against National Homes solely on the
theory of "promissory estoppel."' A count for breach of contract had
1. 493 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1974).
2. This was evidenced by National's meetings with the owners, and by communications
and meetings with Debron. Id. at 354, 355.
3. National's total price bid was $495,608. The price on the purchase order was $8,746
less than National's bid. Id. at 355.
4. The new terms and conditions were standard clauses. Id. at 359.
5. Id. at 355.
6. The term "promissory estoppel" is used by the majority of courts to denote the
doctrine expressed in the Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932). This section provides that:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.
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been voluntarily dismissed by Debron prior to trial. The jury re-
turned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $97,691, but the trial
court granted judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict
on the ground that Debron had not met its burden of proving reli-
ance on the original bid.' The court of appeals, applying Missouri
law, reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the ver-
dict for plaintiff, finding that plaintiff's use of defendant's bid and
preparations for performance constituted reliance which would jus-
tify the verdict. The court of appeals held that promissory estoppel
can be the basis of a separate cause of action, and that not all of
the elements necessary under a contract action are essential to such
an action.'
The prerequisites for promissory estoppel are: (1) A promise
which the promisor should have reasonably expected to induce ac-
tion or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the promisee, (2) actual inducement of such action or for-
bearance, and (3) an injustice which can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was initally rejected in
commercial transactions.'0 Courts felt that a promise made to in-
duce a counter-promise or other consideration was not enforceable
until the bargained for consideration was received." The Restate-
ment of Contracts, Section 90, however, does not attempt to so.
restrict the doctrine. Indeed, the modern trend is not to limit the
doctrine's application, but to expand the doctrine to any promise
which meets its requirements.' 2 In construction bid cases similar to
Debron the doctrine has been construed broadly. The majority of
courts have applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel, holding
that the general contractor's reliance renders the subcontractor's
offer irrevocable for a reasonable period of time.'3 The doctrine of
In explaining this doctrine, the American Law Institute avoided use of the phrase "promissory
estoppel." The phrase has been criticised as inaccurate because of these various other usages
of the word "estoppel." 1A Corbin, Contracts § 204 (1963).
7. Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 362 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
8. 493 F.2d at 357, 358.
9. Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932). See also Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Require-
ments and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459 (1950).
10. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). See also Boyer,
Promnissory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents: (pts. I & II), 50 Mich. L. Rev. 639, 873
(1952); Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 Yale L. Rev.
343 (1969).
11. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933).
12. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 106 (1970).
13. Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941) (promissory
estoppel not applied because promisee failed to show irreparable detriment); Reynolds v.
[Vol. 40
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promissory estoppel has been accepted in Missouri,'4 and as early
as 1909 the doctrine was applied to commercial transactions. ,5 Thus,
Debron was only a new application of a doctrine established in
Missouri law.'"
When a promise lacks consideration, but is enforced because
the elements of promissory estoppel are met, some courts have
viewed the detrimental reliance as a substitute for consideration.'7
Other courts have looked at promissory estoppel as simply making
the promise enforceable without consideration.' 8 The latter charac-
terization treats the promise as an offer which is made irrevocable
by offeree's reliance, and which must be accepted within a reasona-
ble time. Regardless of which approach is used, the net result is an
enforceable contract. Promissory estoppel applied in either manner
treats the doctrine as an element of the law of contracts.'"
Debron's significance stems from the plaintiffs use of the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel as a cause of action which is neither
contract, tort or quasi-contract. This approach had been employed
in other jurisdictions,"0 but, not in Missouri.
Texarkana Constr. Co., 237 Ark. 583, 375 S.W.2d 818 (1964); Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen
Engineering Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 95, 92 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1971); H. W. Stanfield Constr. Corp.
v. Robert McMullan & Son, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 3d 848, 92 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1971); Norcross v.
Winters, 209 Cal. App. 2d 207, 25 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1962); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.
2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); E. A. Coronis Associates v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super.
69, 216 A.2d 246 (1966); Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d
879 (1943). But see James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933);
Southeastern Sales & Service Co. v. T. T. Watson, Inc., 172 So.2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965).
14. Pitt v. Gentle, 49 Mo. 74 (1871); School District v. Sheidley, 138 Mo. 672, 40 S.W.
656 (En Banc 1897); In re Jamison's Estate, 362 Mo. 1054, 202 S.W.2d 879 (1947); Feinberg
v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959). See also Bollow, Promissory Estoppel-
Reliance On Mistaken Bid of Subcontractor, 26 Mo. L. Rev. 356 (1961).
15. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119 S.W. 400 (En
Banc 1909) (tenant relied on lessor's promise to consent to as assignment of the lease). Accord,
Aden v. Dalton, 341 Mo. 454, 107 S.W.2d 1070 (1937) (prohibited cancellation of a mining
lease after lessor permitted entry on the leased land for exploration).
16. 493 F.2d at 357.
17. See Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 373,
374, 159 N.E. 173, 175 (1927).
18. See e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
19. There must still be an acceptance to invoke promissory liability. N. Litterio & Co.
v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963); R. J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child,
122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952). In Daum, the attempted acceptance was found to be a
counter-offer. Because no acceptance had occurred, the court refused to apply the doctrine
of promissory estoppel. Id. at 208, 247 P.2d at 823. See also Navin, Some Comments on
Unilateral Contracts and Restatement 90, 46 Marq. L. Rev. 162, 168, 169 (1962).
20. Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 291 Minn. 113, 190
N.W.2d 71 (1971); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
Compare Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948). In Hoffman, plaintiff relied on
1975]
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It is not perfectly clear what approach the court of appeals
employed in finding for the general contractor." Debron could have
been decided on a purely contractual basis. The facts would have
supported a finding of an offer and an acceptance followed by a
revocation. The court said that the offer had been accepted," but it
was ambiguous as to when the acceptance actually occurred. Still,
the opinion can be construed as recognizing an acceptance by con-
duct rather than words,23 before the revocation. The court alluded
to an acceptance when it stated that the general contractor
promptly informed the subcontractor that he was being awarded the
job, and that the subcontractor acted accordingly. 4 This could be
regarded as establishing an acceptance.25 This aspect of the case was
not reached, however, because the count for breach of contract had
been dismissed by plaintiff before trial. 6
There are two possible interpretations of the court's reasoning
in reaching its decision. First, Debron can be regarded as applying
promissory estoppel to make a subcontractor's offer irrevocable once
the general contractor relies on it. Using this rationale, however, the
irrevocable offer must still be accepted within a reasonable time,
just as if it was an action in contract. This view, adopted by the
defendant's promise to grant him a supermarket franchise. Defendant contended that there
would be no binding contract even if the promisee were to accept, because his promise lacked
the essential factors necessary to establish an offer. The court found for the plaintiff, stating
that the promise did not have to meet the requirements of an offer. Hence, the doctrine of
promissory estoppel was applied, not as an element of contract law, but as a separate cause
of action. This extended the promissory estoppel doctrine further than had most courts at
that time. See Note, Contracts: Reliance Losses: Promissory Estoppel as a Basis of Recovery
for Breach of Agreement To Agree:, 51 Cornell L.Q. 351, 355 (1966).
21. In this respect the decision was similar to that in Constructors Supply Co. v. Bos-
trom Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 291 Minn. 113, 190 N.W.2d 71 (1971) a similar construction
bid case cited with approval in Debron. The Bostrom court found for the general contractor,
but it is not clear what approach it used. On one hand, it seems that the court decided that
the subcontractor's offer was made irrevocable by the general contractor's reliance. This is
implied by the court citation with approval of cases that have so held. Id. at 118, 119, 190
N.W.2d at 74, 75. This treats the promissory estoppel doctrine as an element of contract law.
On the other hand, it also appears that the court approached the doctrine of promissory
estoppel as the basis of a separate cause of action. The court concluded that a cause of action
based on promissory estoppel was established, and avoided any reference to an acceptance.
Id. at 119, 120, 190 N.W.2d at 76. Although the analysis of the court is not clear, Bostrom
provides some authority for the proposition that promissory estoppel is an appropriate basis
for a separate cause of action.
22. 493 F.2d at 358.
23. An acceptance of an offer may be established by conduct as well as by words. See
Shepard v. Glick, 404 S.W.2d 441 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966); Jacob Dold Packing Plant v. General
Box Co., 194 S.W.2d 55 (K.C. Mo. App. 1946).
24. 493 F.2d at 358.
25. Id. at 354, 355.
26. Id. at 353.
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Restatement Second,2 7 is supported by the cases cited in Debron.2 1
It is further buttressed by the court's references to "a binding offer
in the form of a promise, ' 2 and to its requirement of acceptance
within a reasonable time." These statements indicate the use of
promissory estoppel to make the offer irrevocable as a principle of
contract law.
Second, the Debron opinion can be interpreted as applying
promissory estoppel as the basis of a non-contractual cause of ac-
tion. Plaintiff plainly urged this viewpoint when it dismissed its
count for breach of contract, and submitted proof solely on the
theory of promissory estoppel without reference to a contract. Using
this approach, the cause of action has only the three requirements
of promissory estoppel." The traditional contract principles of offer
and acceptance are not necessary. The court concluded that the
necessary requirements for promissory estoppel were met in
Debron.32 The court's assertion that the events after the subcontrac-
tor's revocation were irrelevant indicates that it was employing
promissory estoppel as a separate cause of action. 3 This suggests
that an acceptance or counter-offer (traditional contract concepts)
would not determine whether substantial detriment had been in-
duced by the subcontractor's promise. The court, however, strayed
from this approach by discussing the necessity of acceptance within
a reasonable time and the question of whether there had been a
27. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89(B)(2) (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973) reads:
An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent
necessary to avoid injustice.
Illustration No. 6 under this section provides:
A submits a written offer for paving work to be used by B as a partial basis for B's
bid as general contractor on a large building. As A knows, B is required to name
his subcontractors in his general bid. B uses A's offer and B's bid is accepted. A's
offer is irrevocable until B has had a reasonable opportunity to notify A of the award
and B's acceptance of A's offer.
28. E.g., Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 237 Ark. 583, 374 S.W.2d 818 (1964);
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); Northwestern Engineering
Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943).
29. 493 F.2d at 357.
30. Id. at 358.
31. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
32. The court found that the facts showed a sufficient promise by the subcontractor,
made with a reasonable expectation of inducing action of a definite and substantial character
on the part of the general contractor. 493 F.2d at 357. This promise did induce such action
on the part of the general contractor, and substantial injustice would occur without enforce-
ment of the promise. 493 F.2d at 358.
33. Id. at 358.
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counter-offer.34 Nevertheless, Debron does state that a cause of ac-
tion based on promissory estoppel alone is appropriate for commer-
cial transactions in Missouri. The cause of action brought by the
plaintiff was not one in contract, tort or quasi-contract, but was
based on promissory estoppel, and the general contractor was suc-
cessful.
In many cases, it would be appropriate to apply promissory
estoppel to create enforceable contracts, by making offers irrevoca-
ble once they are relied on." This approach would fail, however, in
those cases that lack an offer or an acceptance. In cases that do not
meet the requirements of contract law, the separate cause of action
based on promissory estoppel should be used to prevent unjust re-
sults. This modern trend in the liberalization of the promissory
estoppel doctrine is an exception to traditional contract principles,
and its progressive use may be expected to set a course for the
future. Such use of the promissory estoppel doctrine should be
encouraged, especially when it is necessary to a just result.
STEPHEN K. GRIFFIN
34. Id. at 359.
35. In most cases promissory estoppel is contractually invoked to enforce a subcontrac-
tor's bid to a general contractor, but it should be pointed out that promissory estoppel is also
available to subcontractors. Use of the promissory estoppel doctrine, by the subcontractor,
would help eliminate "bid shopping." "Bid shopping" occurs when the general contractor,
after being awarded the main contract, uses the low bid already received from the subcontrac-
tor in order to pressure others to submit even lower bids. Many times, the original subcontrac-
tor will lower his own bid, in an effort to keep from losing the subcontract to another. See
generally Gaides, The "Firm Offer" Problem In Construction Bids And The Need For Promis-
sory Estoppel, 10 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 212 (1968); Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study
of Business Practice In The Construction Industry, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 237 (1952).
36. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts §§ 108, 111 (1970).
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS: NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S
RESALE PROVISIONS AND THE SECURED PARTY'S
RIGHT TO A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT
Wirth v. Heavey'
Edward and Charlotte Wirth, payees of a note and secured
parties under a security agreement, brought this action for a defi-
ciency judgment against the debtors, James and Gloria Heavey. 2
The note being in default, the Wirths made demand upon the Heav-
eys for the total balance due and conctirrently gave notice of their
intent to hold a private sale of the collateral described in the secu-
rity agreement. The Wirths rejected a subsequent tender of the late
payment and solicited bids through the newspaper with the follow-
ing results: (1) bids of $350 and $310 for two refrigerated root beer
barrels, and (2) bids of $500, $450, $400 and $150 for all of the
equipment.3 The Wirths displayed the collateral to the interested
parties and then purchased it themselves for $650, reselling the two
root beer barrels to the $350 bidder.
Relying on Uniform Commercial Code Sections 9-504(3) and 9-
507(1),' the defendant answered alleging "certain irregularities in
the disposition of the collateral" 5 and further contending that the
plaintiffs should be denied a deficiency judgment. The circuit court
found that the private sale of the collateral was in conformity with
Section 9-504(3) and entered judgment for the plaintiffs.' The court
of appeals reversed the lower court's determination of compliance
with the Code, but affirmed the deficiency judgment.
Upon default of the debtor, the secured party's right to dispose
of the collateral by sale or other disposition7 is regulated by Uniform
1. 508 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
2. Id. at 264. The action against James Heavey was subsequently dismissed with preju-
dice after the underlying debt was discharged in bankruptcy. The Wirths and Heaveys were
formerly partners in a Mugs-Up Root Beer Drive-In operation. Plaintiffs sold their interest
in the business to the Heaveys for $4,000 and took a security interest in the business equip-
ment.
3. Id.
4. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the UNFoRM COMERCIAL
CODE (1962). Sections 400.1-101-400.10-102, RSMo 1969, correspond to the UNIoFM COMMER-
CIAL CODE (1962) except for variations and alternatives, noted where applicable.
5. 508 S.W.2d at 265.
6. Id. The court determined the deficiency to be $3,317.79, after crediting the note for
$650, and interest and attorney's fees. A further credit of $134 was allowed from the sale of
non-secured inventory and judgment was entered for $3,083.77 [sic].
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(1), allows a secured party to "sell, lease or other-
wise dispose" of the collateral. In addition, the secured party has available alternative reme-
dies. See Id. §§ 9-501(1), 9-505 and Comments.
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Commercial Code Section 9-504. The principle limitations upon the
secured party's conduct are those of good faith' and commercial
reasonableness.' A more specific limitation prohibits the secured
party from purchasing at private sale unless " . . . the collateral is
of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type
which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations
... ,"I Where the sale of the collateral results in a price less than
the total balance due, Section 9-504(2) renders the debtor liable for
the deficiency.
Under Section 9-507(1), noncompliance with the provisions of
the Code governing conduct after default makes the secured party
liable for "any loss" incurred by the debtor." The purpose of this
provision is to safeguard the debtor's interests through judicial re-
straint of attempts to unreasonably dispose of the collateral, or
awarding damages if the disposition has already occured.' 2 While
this Section provides the debtor with an affirmative cause of action,
its applicability to a deficiency suit setting is not defined in the
Code.3
The cases are hopelessly split on the issue of whether denial of
a deficiency to a secured party is permissible under the Code. In
nearly all of the cases, the noncomplying acts are violations of the
notice provision. 4 A majority15 of these cases, led by Skeels v. Uni-
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203, provides: Every contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(3) provides that "every aspect of the disposition
must be commercially reasonable." The purpose of these generalized precepts is to
provide a greater realization for the mutual benefit of the parties. See 0. SPIVACK, SECURED
TRANSACTIONS (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE) 133 (3d ed. 1963); Gilmore, Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code-Part V Default, 7 CONF. ON PER. F N. L.Q. 4, 7 (1952).
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(3).
11. This Section'also provides that the secured party's liability may extend beyond the
debtor to include any person entitled to notification or any person whose security interest is
made known prior to disposition. A further proviso allows for a minimum statutory penalty
in the case of consumer goods.
12. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-507(1) and Comment 1. See Hogan, The Secured
Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 MINN. L. REv. 205, 207 (1962).
13. It has been suggested that this situation was not considered by the Article 9 drafts-
men. See 2 G. GILMORE, SECuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.4, at 1264 (1965).
14. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(3). The basic premise is for "reasonable notifica-
tion" with variations for implementation depending on the type of collateral, method of
disposition, and existence of other secured parties.
15. Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 701, 161 S.E.2d 420,422 (1968);
Comment, Remedies For Failure to Notify Debtor of Disposition of Repossessed Collateral
Under the UCC, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 221 (1972); Comment, Article 9-Notice Provisions Upon
Default, 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 535, 552. But see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 26-15, at 1002 (1972).
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versal C.L T. Credit Corp.," hold that compliance with the Code is
a condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency. 7 The primary
justifications for denying a deficiency are: (1) it operates as a deter-
rent to the secured party's noncompliance;" (2) the debtor has lost
his opportunity to redeem," therefore the secured party should lose
his right to a deficiency judgment;" (3) lack of notice prevents the
debtor from being present at the sale in order to insure a proper sale
and protect his equity;2' (4) under pre-Code case law, 22 most courts
denied a deficiency;23 and (5) Section 9-507 is not expressly made
an exclusive remedy. 24 In essence, these courts have establihsed that
16. 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.
1964).
17. In re Bro Cliff, Inc., 8 UCC RzP. SERv. 1144 (W.D. Mich. 1971); Edmondson v. Air
Serv. Co., 123 Ga. App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589 (1971); C.I.T. Corp. v. Haynes, 161 Me. 353, 212
A.2d 436 (1965); One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 40 Mass. App. Dec. 64 (Boston Mun
Ct. 1968); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Ferris, 9 UCC REP. SERv. 899 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1971);
Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Serna, 81 N.M. 474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970); Crosby v. Basin Motor
Co., 83 N.M. 77, 488 P.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1971); and cases cited notes 18-24 infra.
18. Associates Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1965); Comment, The Right to an Article 9 Deficiency Judgment Without 9-504 Notice
of Resale, 7 VAL. U. L. REv. 465, 471 (1973); cf. Posel, Sales and Sales Financing, 16 RuTrGRs
L. REv. 329, 345 (1962)(pre-Code case law).
19. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-506 specifies the manner and circumstances in
which the debtor has the right of redemption.
20. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696,702 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd
on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d
999, 1007, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320 (1972)(California has modified § 9-504(3) by adding more
specificity to the notice requirement); Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, 133 Ill. App. 2d 717, 721,
271 N.E.2d 404, 407 (1971). See also Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Ky.
App. 1966). Cf. note 47 infra.
21. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696,702 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd
on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); see Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, 133 Ill. App.
2d 717, 721, 271 N.E.2d 404, 407 (1971).
22. Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1008, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (1972);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1090, 323 N.Y.S.2d
13, 15 (Civ. Ct. 1971); 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 13, § 44.9.4, at 1262, 1263; J. WrTE & R.
SUMrmRS, supra note 15, § 26-15, at 1000. Contra, Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass.
App. Dec. 35, 39 (Dist. Ct. 1964)(not followed in One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 40 Mass.
App. Dec. 64 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1968)); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382,
386, 276 A.2d 402, 404 (Dist. Ct. 1971).
23. Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 15, § 24, at 82 (1956).
24. Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1008, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (1972);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d
13, 16 (Civ. Ct. 1971); 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 13, § 44.9.4, at 1264. See generally J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 26-15, at 1000; Comment, Denial of Deficiency: A Problem
of Reasonable Notice Under UCC § 9-504(3), 34 OoO ST. L.J. 657, 661-668 (1973). Contra,
Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Simon v. Central Nat'l
Bank, 243 So. 2d 634, 635 (Fla. App. 1971) (substantial compliance with the notice provision
is sufficient); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 870, 496 P.2d 966, 969
(1972). "The sensible thing is to apply the Code penalty and no more." Hogan, Pitfalls in
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noncompliance with the notice provision is a defense available to
the debtor to bar the secured party's recovery of any deficiency
judgment.
This flat denial of any deficiency, particularly in light of the
Code's express provision allowing the debtor to recover "any loss"
precipitated by the secured party's misconduct,?' was unacceptable
to many courts. In Mercantile Financial Corp. v. Miller2l the court
held Section 9-507(1) specifically provides the debtor with an af-
firmative cause of action for damages (or as a set-off in a deficiency
suit) and that the drafters of the Code did not intend to deny the
secured party a deficiency as an additional penalty.2" The burden
of proof was placed on the debtor to establish the extent of his
losses. 21
In Norton v. National Bank of Commerce,29 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court employed the same rationale as that subsequently
used in Miller to deny application of the Skeels rule.3" In contrast
with Miller, however, the Norton court went on to say:
[Slimple considerations of fair play cast the burden of proof upon
the [secured party] .... We think the just solution is to indulge
the presumption in the first instance that the collateral was worth
at least the amount of the debt, thereby shifting to the creditor the
burden of proving the amount that should reasonably have been
obtained through a sale conducted according to law.3'
The hybrid approach of Norton results from a reluctance to
Default Procedure, 86 BANK. L.J. 965, 978 (1969).
Other justifications have also been advanced. An interesting Georgia trilogy of cases
initially denied the secured party a deficiency on the basis of accord and satisfaction, which
rationale eventually evolved into denial of any deficiency based on interpretation of the Code.
Moody v. Nides Fin. Co., 115 Ga. App. 859, 156 S.E.2d 310 (1967); Johnson v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 117 Ga. App. 131, 159 S.E.2d 290 (1968); Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117
Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968).
25. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
26. 292 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
27. Id. at 801. Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 35, 39 (Dist. Ct.
1964)(not followed in One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 40 Mass. App. Dec. 64 (Boston
Mun. Ct. 1968)); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 870, 496 P.2d 966,
969 (1972).
28. Cases cited note 27 supra. 2 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE To THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.3009, at 670 (1964), wherein the author states ... the injured
party is entitled only to the damages he can prove."
29. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
30. Id. at 149, 398 S.W.2d at 542. The court reasoned that § 9-504(2) gives the secured
party the right to a deficiency and that § 9-507(1), being the debtor's exclusive remedy for
any loss created by the secured party's misconduct, did not automatically terminate that
right.
31. 240 Ark. at 150, 398 S.W.2d at 542 (emphasis added).
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impose a difficult burden of proof on the debtor.32 It has been
adopted by many courts.3 Other rationales advanced in support of
the Norton rule are: (1) the secured party's deficiency may not
necessarily correspond to the amount of the debtor's damages;34 (2)
penal damages are disfavored in the Code35 and imposition of an
additional penalty in addition to that prescribed in section 9-507(1)
is unwarranted;" and (3) the Code's emphasis on flexibility pre-
cludes operation of stringent pre-Code case law,37 thereby leaving
room for "honest error." 3 Although the Norton rule reads into the
Code a rebuttable presumption that the collateral was worth at least
the amount of the debt, the secured party may still recover a defi-
ciency if he can successfully demonstrate that the reasonable value
of the collateral was less than the outstanding debt.39
In the absence of Missouri precedent and in reliance on section
9-507(1) as the debtor's exclusive remedy, the court in Wirth re-
jected the Skeels rule and adopted the Norton standard as a "more
just remedy."40 It has been suggested that Norton was unclear as to
the specific requirements to be met in order to allow the secured
party to recover a deficiency.4' This uncertainty, coupled with the
32. Id. The court stated the secured party's wrongful disposition of the collateral with-
out notice " . . . made it at least difficult, if not impossible, for [the debtor] to prove the
extent of his loss with reasonable certainty."
33. Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969); Carter v. Ryburn Ford
Sales, Inc., 248 Ark. 236, 451 S.W.2d 199 (1970); Barker v. Horn, 245 Ark. 315, 432 S.W.2d
21 (1968); T & W Ice Cream, Inc., v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162
(L. Div. 1969); Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Howard, 75 Misc. 2d 181, 347 N.Y.S.2d 306
(Rochester City Ct. 1973); Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415
S.W.2d 347 (1966); and cases cited notes 34-39 infra.
34. Comment, Denial of Deficiency: A Problem of Reasonable Notice Under UCC § 9-
504(3), supra note 24, at 662; e.g., Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 386,
276 A.2d 402, 404 (1971).
35. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106(1) and Comment 1.
36. Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, supra note 24. See also Conti Causeway Ford
v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 386, 276 A.2d 402, 404 (1971); Posel, Sales and Sales
Financing, supra note 18, at 346.
37. Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 15, § 24, at 82 (1956).
38. Note, Secured Transactions - Tortious Repossession of Inventory - Right of Debtor
to Receive Notice of Disposition of Repossessed Collateral Under Uniform Commercial Code
- Skeels v. Universal C.IT. Credit Corp., 5 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 831, 836 (1964). See
Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 385, 276 A.2d 402, 404 (1971); cf.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504, Comment 1.
39. Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 669, 453 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1970);
Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc., 248 Ark. 236, 451 S.W.2d 199 (1970); J. WHrrE & R.
SLMERS, supra note 15, § 26-15, at 1004.
40. 508 S.W.2d at 268.
41. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 26-15, at 1004; Comment, Remedies For
Failure to Notify Debtor of Disposition of Repossessed Collateral Under the UCC, supra note
15, at 231.
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fact that in many cases the secured party has failed to rebut the
presumption," has led to some skepticism that the Norton presump-
tion has really not brought about any change from the earlier Skeels
rule.43 By holding that the secured party rebutted the presumption,
Wirth adds viability to Norton, although it fails to explain what
kind of evidence the creditor must introduce to meet his burden or
proof."
A distinction, however, may be drawn between the facts of
Skeels, Norton, and Wirth. In Skeels and Norton, the noncomplying
act was violation of the notice provision,45 whereas Wirth was not a
notice case, but rather concerned a secured party's purchase at a
private sale in violation of Section 9-504(3) . In light of this distinc-
tion, a two part analysis should be employed to determine the appl-
icability of Section 9-507(1) to the deficiency suit. First, should the
court adopt the Skeels rule and deny the secured party a deficiency?
When the sole violation is a wrongful creditor purchase, several of
the justifications for the Skeels rule are not present. The debtor in
Wirth was provided with proper notice, thereby affording him an
opportunity to redeem and protect his equity." Also, pervading
many of these cases is an unarticulated and undenominated concept
of fair play.4" Fair play was apparently a motivating force in the
42. E.g., Gallatin Trust & Savings Bank v. Darrah, 152 Mont. 256, 448 P.2d 734 (1968);
T & W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (L. Div.
1969); Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966).
43. J. WHrr & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 26-15, at 1006.
44. 508 S.W.2d at 269. The evidence considered by the court included the conflicting
testimony of the parties, the cost of much of the equipment in an used condition several years
before, that the note was given in part for the Wirth's interest in an ongoing business, and
presumably the bids received. See also, Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87, 92 n.17
(Alas. 1969) (presumption rebutted where secured party introduced evidence of bid solicita-
tions from a four state area and depositions of two appraisers); cf. T & W Ice Cream, Inc. v.
Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 328, 336, 337, 258 A.2d 162, 167 (L. Div. 1969)(secured
party's testimony that he had contacted nondealer with regards to value of the collateral was
insufficient to rebut presumption).
45. See notes 16 and 32 supra.
46. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. It would appear that the rationale for
denying the secured party the opportunity to purchase the collateral at private sale is founded
on the notion that the secured party's interests are diametrically opposed to those of the
debtor in this situation. The drafters of the Code did allow for the above two exceptions, but
in these situations violations of the debtor's interests, in terms of price, should be readily
ascertainable.
47. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, there is some authority for
the proposition that the debtor's right to redeem continues after the sale in cases of wrongful
creditor purchase. 2 G. GILMoRE, supra note 13, at 1255; Hogan, The Secured Party and
Default Proceedings Under the UCC, supra note 12, at 241.
48. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
49. E.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1964)(wherein the court states ". . . a jury
could not easily avoid the conclusion that it would be grossly improper and inconsistent with
60




If the Skeels rule is rejected as it was in Norton and Wirth, the
court must then determine whether the debtor should bear the bur-
den of proving his loss. The violation's practical effect upon the
burden of proof should be considered. In Norton, the basis for shift-
ing the burden of proof to the secured party was the fact that with-
out notice the collateral could be moved a great distance before the
debtor even learned of its sale. Thus, according to the Norton court,
the noncomplying secured party would be benefited by his own
misconduct and an onerous burden would be placed on the debtor."
In Wirth, however, the debtor had received proper notice" and, if
anything, the secured party's wrongful purchase inhibited escape of
the collateral. The court in Wirth may have failed to perceive this
subtle distinction. 3 Section 9-507(1) contemplates an affirmative
cause of action with the burden of proof on the debtor.54 Accord-
ingly, unless there is strong justification for shifting the burden to
the secured party (for example, where the notice provision is vio-
lated), it should remain on the debtor.5
The precise nature of, and circumstances surrounding, the vio-
lation should be the critical factors in determining the applicability
of Uniform Commercial Code § 9-507(1) to a deficiency suit. The
notice cases provide an excellent reference point but should not
necessarily be controlling for all violations of the Article 9, Part V
resale provisions.
GARRETr W. WALTON
good faith dealing ... "); Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 150, 398
S.W.2d 538, 542 (1966) (wherein the court states ". . . simple considerations of fair play cast
the burden of proof upon the bank."); cf. 4 R. ANDSRsON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
507:6, at 645 (2d ed. 1971).
50. 508 S.W.2d at 268. Referring to forfeiture of a deficiency, the court states, "Such a
sanction, however, does not suit the circumstances of this case. What appears to be a more
just remedy. . . was expressed. . . in Norton. .. .
51. 240 Ark. at 150, 398 S.W.2d at 542.
52. 508 S.W.2d at 264.
53. This, however, is not an uncommon occurence. E.g., Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales,
Inc., 248 Ark. 236, 451 S.W.2d 199 (1970). Indeed, many commentators have blindly applied
the Norton rule across the board to include all violations of Article 9, Part V. E.g., Note,
Uniform Commercial.Code - Disposition of Collateral, ' 20 ARK. L. Rnv. 385 (1967).
54. Cases cited note 27 supra; 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 28; Comment, Remedies For
Failure to Notify Debtor of Disposition of Repossessed Collateral Under the UCC, supra note
15, at 227, Comment, Creditor's Deficiency Judgment Under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Effect of Lack of Notice and a Commercially Reasonable Sale, 33 MD. L. Rv.
327, 340 (1973), cf. Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, supra
note 12, at 240, 241.
55. The anomaly of the court's application of Norton is that in essence the court has
imposed a penalty upon the secured party which is one of the very issues the Norton line of
cases presented in denying application of the Skeels rule. See notes 35, 36 supra.
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TAXATION-CHALLENGING AN I.R.S. RULING: THE
ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT STRICTLY APPLIED TO
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
Bob Jones University v. Simon'
and
Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc..2
Bob Jones University is a fundamentalist religious institution.
The fundamentalists believe that God intended the segregation of
the races and that miscegenation is forbidden by the Bible. In obedi-
ence to this principle, the University concededly prohibits the ad-
mission of Negroes. In a ruling letter of April 30, 1942, 3 the Univer-
sity was granted tax-exempt status4 as a religious and educational
organization under what is currently section 501 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. 5 Tax-exempt status is important because it
exempts the University from the income tax, and makes contribu-
tions8 to the University tax-deductible.7 In 1970, the Internal Reve-
1. - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2038 (1974).
2. - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2053 (1974).
3. Apparently the University enjoyed tax-exempt status since its founding in 1926.
However, the earliest record of such status is an Internal Revenue Service letter dated March
30, 1951, which refers to a similar ruling letter dated April 30, 1942. See Bob Jones Univ. v.
Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D.S.C. 1971), rev'd, - U.S. _, 94 S.Ct. 2038 (1974).
4. § INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 501(a) exempts § 50-(c)(3) organizations from federal
income tax. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are also exempted by the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 3121(b)(8)(B) from paying federal social security taxes and by the INT. RV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 3306(c)(8) from paying federal unemployment taxes.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3). Section 501(c)(3) provides that included in the
list of exempt organizations are:
Corporations and any community chest, fund, or foundation organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, liter-
acy, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals,
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propa-
ganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and which does not partici-
pate in or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
6. An institution may apply to the Internal Revenue Service for a ruling as to its tax-
exempt status. If an institution qualifies to receive tax-deductible contributions, then the
institution will receive a ruling letter stating that it meets the requirements of § 501(c)(3)
and § 170(c)(2). See Rev. Proc. 72-3, 72-4, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 698, 706. Receipt of such letter
(commonly referred to as an advance assurance of deductibility of contributions) normally
means that the organization will be placed on the Service's Cumulative List (Cumulative List
of Organizations described in Section 170 (c) of the Internatl Revenue Code of 1954) of tax-
exempt organizations. This listing is periodically updated and issued as Publication No. 78
of the Internal Revenue Service. See Rev. Proc. 72-39, 1972-2 Cum. BuLL. 818. Inclusion in
the Cumulative List is essential to a successful fund-raising effort by organizations such as
Bob Jones University because many donors will not contribute unless the organization is
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nue Service (hereinafter referred to as the Service) announced that
private schools who have racially discriminatory admission policies
would no longer be granted tax-exempt status.' After receiving a
letter of inquiry as to admissions policies during 1970 and after
conducting extensive discussions and conferences with the Service
during 1971, Bob Jones University concluded that revocation of its
tax-exempt status appeared imminent.
Thereupon, the University filed suit in the Federal District
Court of South Carolina and requested injunctive relief from the
revocation of its tax-exempt status. The University alleged that the
Commissioner's actions were contrary to the provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, would cause irreparable harm in the form of
decreased contributions, and would violate its constitutional rights
under the first and fifth amendments.' The Commissioner moved to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of the
Anti-Injunction Act, section 7421(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.'0 The District Court of South Carolina denied the motion
among those enumerated in the Cumulative List. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, - U.S.
-, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 2042 (1974).
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(a)(1) and (c)(2). Section 170(a)(1) states that
"[There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as defined in subsec-
tion (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year." Section 170(c)(2) defines a
charitable contribution as a contribution or gift to or for the use of:
A corporation, trust, or community chest fund, or foundation-
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under
the law of the United States, any state or territory, the District of Columbia, or any
possession of the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary,
or educational purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any public share-
holder or individual; and
(D) no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation.
Similar deductions for donations to § 501(c)(3) organizations are provided for federal gift and
estate tax purposes. See INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2522(a)(2), 2055(a)(2).
8. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 CuM. BuLL. 230.
9. See Brief of Appellant at 10-13, Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, - U.S. -----, 94 S.Ct.
2038 (1974) (Brief is published in 6 L. REPRnrs: TAX SERIES no. 1, 42-45 (1974).
10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a). Section (a) 7421 provides:
(a) Tax.-Except as provided in Sections 6212(a) and (c), 6231(a) and 7426(a)
and b(1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is
the person against whom such tax was assessed.
The three express exceptions to the INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a) do not apply to
the cases in this note. The first exception provides that if the Commissioner has mailed to
the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, and the taxpayer files a petition within the prescribed
time, the Commissioner shall have no right to determine any additional deficiency of income
tax for the same taxable year. If he does, then an injunction may issue. Id. § 6212(a), (c).
Second, the Commissioner may not assess a deficiency until the taxpayer has been notified
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to dismiss and granted an injunction pendente lite to the. Univer-
sity." On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that the court lacked jurisdiction, and dismissed the University's
petition.'2
A similar case, Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 3 arose
in Washington, D.C. "Americans United" is a nonprofit, educa-
tional corporation whose goal is to promote the principle of the
separation of church and state. through educating citizens. In 1950,
a ruling letter" granted "Americans United" tax-exempt status. 5 In
1969 the Service revoked the 1950 ruling because "Americans
United" was allegedly engaging in a substantial effort to influence
legislation." Unlike Bob Jones University, "Americans United" was
permitted to continue its federal income tax-exemption as a social
welfare institution under section 501 (c)(4). 1 However, contribu-
tions to "Americans United" were no longer tax-deductible. Subse-
of such deficiency and the time in which the taxpayer may file a petition in the tax court
has either expired or, if the petition has been filed, the decision of the tax court has become
final. If the Commissioner makes such assessment, he may be enjoined. Id. § 6213(a). Third,
the court may grant an injunction if a levy or sale would irreparably injure the property rights
of third parties which the court determines to be superior to the rights of the United States.
Id. § 7426 (a), b(1).
The predecessor of this provision was enacted in 1867 and was virtually the same as
section 7421(a). Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475. The legislative history of
the Act of March 2, 1867, apparently remains a mystery. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, -
U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 2046 (1974); Gorowitz, Federal Tax Injunctions and the Standard
Nut Cases, 10 TAXEs 446 n.6 (1932); Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal
Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 HAv. L. Rxv. 109 n.9 (1935). The courts have held
that the manifest purpose of § 7421(a) is to permit the United States to assess and collect
taxes alleged to be due without judicial interference, and to require that the legal right to
the disputed sums be determined by post-enforcement procedures such as a refund suit.
Enoch v. Williams Packing & Nay. Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). See also Bob Jones Univ. v.
Simon, - U.S. ___, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 2046 (1974); Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 193-94
(1883); Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1875); State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S.
675, 613-14 (1875); Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 110 (1871); Cohen v.
Durning, 11 F.Supp. 824, 825-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
11. Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971), rev'd, -U.S.
94 S.Ct. 2038 (1974).
12. Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903 (1973), rehearing denied, 476 F.2d 259
(4th Cir. 1973), afl'd, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2038 (1974).
13. - U.S.-., 94 S.Ct. 2053 (1974). "Americans United" is incorporated as "Prot-
estants and other American United for Separation of Church and State."
14. Brief for Respondent at 1, 2, Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., - U.S.
94 S.Ct. 2053 (1974) (Brief is published in 6 L. REPRINTS: TAX SERiES no. 2, 1, 111-12 (1974)).
15. See statutes quoted notes 5 and 7 supra.
16. Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 2053, 2056 (1974).
See § 501(c)(3) and § 170 (c)(2)(d) quoted in notes 5 and 7 supra.
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(4). See Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc.,
U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2053, 2056 (1974).
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quently, contributions decreased substantially.'1
"Americans United" and two of its donors filed suit in the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking injunc-
tive relief requiring the reinstatement of its section 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status. "Americans United" alleged that the Commis-
sioner's actions had caused irreparable harm in the form of the loss
of contributions and had violated constitutional rights under the
first and fifth amendments.' 9 The District Court dismissed the ac-
tion because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction," basing the dis-
missal on section 7421(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.21
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
the dismissal as to the donors, but it reversed as to "Americans
United" and remanded. 22
As a result of the conflict between the circuits with respect to
the application of section 7421(a), 23 the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in both cases.24 In each case, the Court held
that the petitioner's action to enjoin the revocation of tax-exempt
status was prohibited by section 7421(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. The Court reasoned that the suits were brought "for
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of [a] tax"25
18. Brief for Respondent at 2, Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., - U.S.
94 S.Ct. 2053, 2056 (1974) (Brief is published in 6 L. REPRINTS: TAX SERmS no. 2, 1, 115-19
(1974)). Appearance on the Cumulative List of tax-deductible organizations was essential to
"Americans United" in order to have a sufficient flow of contributions from donors, and the
1969 ruling removed it from the Cumulative List. Id. at 94 S.Ct. at 2056, 2065 (dissent-
ing opinion). See also Bob Jones University v. Simon, - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 2038, 2042
(1974).
19. Brief for Respondent at 5-9, Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., - U.S.
94 S.Ct. 2053 (1974) (Brief is published in 6 L. RRmTs: TAX SERmES no. 2, 1, 115-19 (1974)).
20. The District Court dismissed the complaint in an unpublished order filed March 9,
1971. See Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., - U.S. , 94 S.Ct., 2053, 2057 (1974).
21. See note 10 supra.
22. "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd mem.,
94 S.Ct. 2053 (1974).
23. For an extensive comparison of the two cases, see Bob Jones University v. Connally,
472 F.2d 903, (4th Cir. 1973), rehearing denied, 476 F.2d 259, 260 (4th Cir. 1973), af'd,
U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2038 (1974). In denying the motion for rehearing, the Court of Appeals
distinguished the two cases. But see Note, Applicability of Prohibition of Suits to Restrain
Assessment and Collection of Taxes to Revocation of Tax Exemptions under Section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code, 73 COLUM. L. Rav. 1502 (1973); Note, Tax-Injunctions-The
Federal Courts of Appeals Have Split over whether a Tax Exempt Organization May Enjoin
IRS Revocation of Its Tax Exempt Status, 62 GEo. L.J. 1019 (1974); Note, "Americans
United" Inc. v. Walters and Bob Jones University v. Connally: Revocation of Tax Exempt
Status, 46 Tmn. L.Q. 596 (1973); Note, The Loss of Privileged Tax Status and Suits to
Restrain Assessments, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 573 (1973).
24. Cert. granted sub. nom. Bob Jones Univ. v. Shultz, 414 U.S. 817 (1973); Cert.
granted "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 412 U.S. 927 (1973).
25. See note 10 supra.
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and, thus, were prohibited, despite allegations of constitutional vio-
lations, inadequacy of alternative remedies, and irreparable harm.
The language of section 7421(a), commonly referred to as the
Anti-Injunction Act, would appear to preclude the granting of an
injunction to prevent the assessment or collection of a tax. Never-
theless, section 7421(a) has been subject to several interpreta-
tions."0 In early cases, courts interpreted the statute as an absolute
prohibition against an injunction. 21 Then, in 1916, the Supreme
Court denied an injunction but stated in dictum that "extraordi-
nary and exceptional circumstances" might allow a court to enjoin
the collection of a tax.2 Subsequently, in Hill v. Wallace,2 the
Court applied the "extraordinary and exceptional circumstances"
approach in granting an injunction to restrain the collection of a tax
that allegedly would have financially ruined the grain futures mar-
ket in the United States. However, a year later in Graham v.
Dupont" the Court retreated from this view by classifying Hill with
an earlier case, which held that the statute does not apply to a
penalty in the form of a tax." Then, in Miller v. Standard Nut
Margarine Co.,12 the Court readopted the "extraordinary and excep-
tional circumstances" doctrine. Standard Nut Margarine Company
sought to restrain a tax on its products that would "destroy its
26. For a more detailed historical study see Lenoir, Congressional Control over Suits
to Restrain the Assessment or Collection of Federal Taxes, 3 ARiz. L. Rav. 177 (1961); Note,
Applicability of Prohibition of Suits to Restrain Assessment and Collection of Taxes to
Revocation of Tax Exemptions under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 73
COLuM. L. REV. 1502 (1973); Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes
Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 HARv. L. REv. 109 (1935); Note, Procedural Due Process
Limitations on the Suspension ofAdvance Assurance of Deductibility, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 427,
438 n.46 (1974); Note, The Loss of Privileged Tax Status and Suits to Restrain Assessments,
30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 573 (1973); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 550 (1959); Annot., 108 A.L.R. 184
(1937).
27. See Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 447 (1903); Snyder v.
Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883); Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1876); State R.R. Tax
Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1876); But-see Frayser v. Russell, 9 F. Gas. 728 (No. 5067) (C.C.E.D. Va.
1878); Pullan v. Kinsinger, 20 F. Cas. 44 (No. 11463) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870).
28. Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 121-22 (1916).
29. 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
30. 262 U.S. 234, 258 (1923).
31. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922). The Court in Lipke held that the so-called
tax of the National Prohibition Act was in reality a penalty designed to punish violations of
the Act rather than a tax designed to raise revenue. Thus, the Anti-Injunction statute was
inapplicable because the suit would not restrain the collection of a tax.
32. 248 U.S. 498 (1932). Standard Nut Margarine Co. is one of the main cases relied
upon by Bob Jones University and "Americans United" in their briefs. See Brief for Appellant
at 2, 10, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 39, Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2038 (1974);
Brief for Respondent at 15, 19, 23 25, Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., - U.S.
94 S.Ct. 2053 (1974) (Briefs are published in 6 L. RaEnmTs: TAx Szms no. 1 and 2, 1 (1974)).
[Vol. 40
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business, ruin it financially and inflict loss for which it would have
no remedy at law."33 The Supreme Court held that despite the Anti-
Injunction Act, an injunction may be granted to prevent the collec-
tion of an illegal tax when there exist "special and extraordinary
circumstances sufficient to bring the case within some acknowl-
edged head of equity jurisprudence."34 Thus, the Court viewed the
Anti-Injunction Act as-merely requiring the petitioner to show irre-
parable harm and the lack of an adequate remedy at law.35
In Enoch v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., Inc.,35 the
Supreme Court significantly narrowed, without explicitly overrul-
ing, the Standard Nut Margarine Co. test. Williams Packing de-
clared that an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act should be al-
lowed only if: 1) equity jurisdiction exists and 2) it is clear that
under no circumstances could the government ultimately prevail."
The two-fold Williams Packing test has been consistently followed
to deny injunctions, 38 although a few cases have allowed the injunc-
tion upon an undeniable showing of illegality and bad faith. 9
In both Bob Jones University and "'Americans United" the
Supreme Court declared that section 7421(a) is subject to no
judicially-created exception other than the two-pronged Williams
Packing test." Although the Court acknowledged that both organi-
33. 284 U.S. at 510.
34. Id. at 509, 510.
35. This declaration of Standard Nut Margarine Co. was generally followed by the
courts for several years. See Allen v. Regents of the Univ. System, 304 U.S. 439 (1938);
Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 550 (1959); Annot., 108 A.L.R. 184 (1937).
36. 370 U.S. 1 (1962). The Court denied an injunction to a corporation engaged in
providing trawlers to fishermen. The corporation claimed that it was not the employer of the
fishermen for purposes of social security and unemployment taxes and that collection of said
taxes would destroy the plaintiff's business.
37. Id. at 7.
38. See Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1973); Bowers v. United States,
423 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1970); Transport Mfg. & Equip. Co. v. Trainor, 382 F.2d 793 (8th Cir.
1967); Kentucky v. Coyle, 352 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1965); Enterprises Unlimited Inc. v. Davis,
340 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1965); Johnson v. Wall, 329 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1964); Vuin v. Burton,
327 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1964); McCann v. United States, 248 F.Supp. 585 (E.D. Pa. 1965);
Stone v. Phillips, 245 F. Supp. 247 (D. Colo. 1965); Galanti v. United States, 244 F.Supp.
528 (D.N.J. 1965); Cooper Agency, Inc. v. McLeod, 235 F.Supp. 276 (E.D.S.C. 1964), afl'd,
348 F.2d 919 (1965); Kornberg v. Tomlinson, 225 F.Supp. 70 (S.D. Fla. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d
300 (1965); Turner v. Burton, 213 F.Supp. 267 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
39. Anderson v. Richardson, 354 F.Supp. 363 (S.D.Fla. 1973) (government's tax claim
was based on information gained by an illegal search and seizure); Center on Corporate
Responsibility, Inc. v. Schultz, 368 F.Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973) (political influence played a
role in the Internal Revenue Service's ruling). See generally Pizzarello v. United States, 408
F.2d 579 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969); White v. Cardoza, 368 F.Supp.
1397 (E. D.Mich. 1973); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
40. - U.S. at_ , 94 S.Ct. at 2048 (1974); -U.S. at._, 94 S.Ct. at 2057 (1974).
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zations had shown that equity jurisdiction existed,41 the Court held
that the charitable organizations' constitutional claims were "suffi-
ciently debatable to foreclose any notion that under no circumstan-
ces could the Government ultimately prevail' . "...-42 Thus, Bob
Jones University and "Americans United' had not fulfilled the sec-
ond part of the Williams Packing exception and their suits were
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Although the Williams Packing test was expressly held to be
controlling, the Court may have expanded the scope of the test
beyond the limits of Williams Packing. The Court in Williams
Packing strongly implied that if the "central purpose of the Act" is
not in question, then section 7421(a) is inapplicable.43 The "central
purpose of the act" is to assure the United States "of the prompt
collection of its lawful revenue."" Therefore, it could be argued that
if there is no appreciable revenue to be collected, then the Act
should not apply and the suit on the injunction should not be dis-
missed.
Both Bob Jones University and 'Americans United" made this
argument. In Bob Jones University, the petitioner argued that its
primary purpose was not to obstruct the collection of revenue but
instead was to enjoin the Service from withdrawing its section
41. Many donors will not contribute to a charitable organization that is not among
those enumerated in the list of tax-deductible organizations. Thus, the revocation of an
organization's tax-deductible status and consequent removal from the list is likely to result
in a significant loss of donations. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 2038,
2042, 2051 (1974); Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2053, 2059
(1974). Furthermore, the remedies at law are inadequate to avoid or recover the loss of
contributions for the interim between the revocation of the tax-deductible status and the final
adjudication of the validity of the revocation. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, - U.S.
94 S.Ct. 2038, 2043, 2051 (1974); Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., - U.S. _ 94
S.Ct. 2053, 2059 (1974). See note 62 infra.
42. - U.S. at_, 94 S.Ct. at 2052; - U.S. at -, 94 S.Ct. at 2057-58.
43. 370 U.S. at 7. The court in Williams Packing states:
Nevertheless, if it is clear that under no circumstances could the government ulti-
mately prevail, the central purpose of the act is inapplicable and under the Nut
Margarine case, the attempted collection may be enjoined if equity jurisdiction
otherwise exists.
(emphasis added).
See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). In McGlotten, Chief Judge
writing for the court concluded: "Even where the particular plaintiff objects to his own taxes,
the court has recognized that the literal terms of the statute do not apply when 'the central
purpose of the Act is inapplicable'." Id. at 454. See "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477
F.2d 1169, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd mem., - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 2053 (1974); Note,
Applicability of Prohibition of Suits to Restrain Assessment and Collection of Taxes to
Revocation of Tax Exemptions under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 1502, 1511-12 (1973).
44. 370 U.S. at 7.
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501(c) (3) ruling letter and the advance assurances of deductibility
in order to maintain the flow of contributions. 5 Petitioner con-
tended that the tax liability of Bob Jones University, after the revo-
cation of its tax status, would be insignificant. Thus, since there
would be no significant taxes to restrain the Commissioner from
collecting, an injunction pendente lite would not frustrate the cen-
tral purpose of section 7421(a). The Court, however, concluded that
since the petitioner had alleged in his complaint in District Court
that he would suffer "substantial" income tax liability,46 the allega-
tions left "little doubt that a primary purpose of the lawsuit [was]
to prevent the Service from assessing and collecting income tax. '4 7
Although the Court recognized that there is some doubt that Bob
Jones Univeristy would actually be liable for federal income tax
after the revocation of the tax exempt status,4 the requested injunc-
tion would still restrain the collection of federal social security taxes
(F.I.C.A.) and federal unemployment taxes (F.U.T.A.) from Bob
Jones University and taxes from donors who would use the charita-
ble contribution deduction to reduce their tax liability.49
The removal of section 501(c) (3) status normally subjects an
organization to liability for income taxes, federal social security
taxes (F.I.C.A.) and federal unemployment taxes (F.U.T.A.). How-
ever, in "Americans United," "Americans United" still would have
been exempt from the income tax despite the revocation because it
qualified under section 501 (c) (4) as a social welfare institution."
In addition, "Americans United" had in the past voluntarily paid
F.I.C.A. and F.U.T.A. taxes and stated its willingness to continue
to do so even if it obtained an injunction."1 Thus, "Americans
United" had an even stronger argument than did Bob Jones
University that the primary purpose of its suit could not be to re-
strain the assessment or collection of taxes. However, the Court
concluded that the purpose of the suit was to restrain the collection
of taxes from "Americans United's" contributors and thus reduce
the level of taxes of its donors.52 The Court did not analyze "Ameri-
45. - U.S. at _ 94 S.Ct. at 2046.
46. The University had alleged federal income tax liability of three-quarters of a million
dollars for one year and in excess of half a million dollars for another. - U.S. at , 94
S.Ct. at 2046-47.
47. Id. at-_ 94 S.Ct. at 2047.
48. Id. The University failed to take into account possible deductions for depreciation
of plant and equipment.
49. Id.
50. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(4); - U.S. at , 94 S. Ct. at 2056.
51. - U.S. at , 94 S.Ct. at 2056, 2058.
52. - U: S. at _., 94 S. Ct. at 2058.
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can's United's" argument that most donors would probably redirect
their contributions to other tax-deductible organizations. The re-
sult, if the organization's argument is valid, would be that the reve-
nue collected will not be significantly affected by the loss of "Ameri-
cans United's" section 501 (c) (3) and section 170 (c) (2) status.53
The Court, by not analyzing this argument, seems to de-emphasize
the role of the "central purpose of the Act" in its analysis of whether
section 7421 (a) applies.
In Bob Jones University, the petitioner also argued that the
Commissioner's true purpose was to coerce, through the use of the
taxing power, private educational and religious institutions to adopt
racially non-discriminatory admission policies and practices.'4 If the
University were to compromise its religious beliefs and admit Blacks
on a non-discriminatory basis, then the Unviersity could maintain
its tax-exempt and tax-deductible status, and no additional taxes
would be collected. From this, the petitioner concluded that the
Commissioner's primary intent was not to collect taxes, but to im-
plement policy-based guidelines. Because the prompt collection of
revenue, the "central purpose of the Act," was not truly involved
in the lawsuit, the University argued that the Anti-Injunction Act
was inapplicable. 5
The Court in Bob Jones University, however, found that
"[t]here is no evidence that the position [of the Service] does not
represent a good-faith effort to enforce the technical requirements
of the tax laws. ... -"1 This response did not answer the question
of whether the Commissioner's primary intent was to collect taxes.
Here again, there seems to be a de-emphasis of the "central pur-
pose" test. By giving less weight to this approach, the Supreme
Court has broadened the applicability of section 7421(a) beyond the
scope of Williams Packing. The Court appears to say that even if
the injunction would not significantly hinder the prompt collection
of revenue, the injunction is still barred if the effect, no matter how
indirect, is to restrain the collection of taxes.
In addition, the Court in Bob Jones University and "Americans
United" employed the Williams Packing test in the face of constitu-
53. See statutes quoted note 5 and 7, respectively, supra.
54. - U.S. at _, 94 S.Ct. at 2047. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 230
(1970).
55. Id. See Note, Applicability of Prohibition of Suits to Restrain Assessment and
Collection of Taxes to Revocation of Tax Exemptions under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 73 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1502, 1510 (1973).
56. - U.S. at -, 94 S.Ct. at 2047.
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tional challenges which were absent in Williams Packing." Bob
Jones University and "Americans United" argued that Williams
Packing should not be controlling when a substantial constitutional
attack is made on the Service's ruling.58 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court relied on Williams Packing in dismissing the first amend-
ment, due process and equal protection claims of these organiza-
tions.59 The Court in "Americans United" held that" . . . the con-
stitutional nature of a taxpayer's claim . . .is of no consequence
under the Anti-Injunction Act."6
By rejecting the "central purpose" approach and the organiza-
tions' constitutional arguments, the Supreme Court extended the
prohibitory effects of section 7421(a) beyond the scope of Williams
Packing-the primary precedent upon which the Court purportedly
bases its decisions. The application of section 7421(a) to charitable
organizations challenging the revocation of advance assurances of
deductibility, makes it virtually impossible for such an organization
to enjoin the revocation. The action is prohibited even though the
institution may suffer extremely significant"1 and irreparable harm
by the loss of contributions which may jeopardize its existence. The
organization would have to show that under no circumstances could
the government prevail before an injunction pendente lite could be
granted. Obviously, the burden on one seeking to enjoin collection
is practically insurmountable. Moreover, the alternative remedies of
refund suit, donor suit and tax court suit are inadequate.62
57. 370 U.S. at 3, 4. The petitioner in Williams Packing contended that § 7421(a) should
not bar his action because the fishermen to whom he rented trawlers were not his employees
for purposes of determing liability for social security and unemployment taxes.
58. The rationale for this argument is that when a classification penalizes or restrains
the exercise of a constitutional right, the courts tend to hold that greater procedural safe-
guards should be provided. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Note,
Taxation-Anti-Injunction Act: A Suit Brought by Non-Taxpayers Challenging the Constitu-
tionality of a Revenue Statute Is Not Barred by the Anti-Injunction Act Where Such Suit
Only Incidentally Affects the Tax Liability of Third Parties, 40 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 489, 506-
07 (1973).
59. - U.S. at _ 94 S.Ct. at 2052.
60. - U. S. at __, 94 S.Ct. at 2058.
61. The Supreme Court in Bob Jones University concluded that the degree of harm is
irrelevant in determining if § 7421(a) prohibits the suit. - U.S. at -, 94 S.Ct. at 2050.
62. A charitable organization ordinarily has five possible remedies: 1) administrative
review by the Service; see 9 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcorm TAXATION §§ 49.110, 49.112,
49.114, 49.115, & 49.118-124 & (Rev. Ed. 1971); 5 RABKiN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT
ANm ESTATE TAXATION § 71.02C (1974); 2) a refund suit after the payment of a tax; INT. RIV.
CODE OF 1954, § 7422; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (a)(1), 1491 (1970); 3) a suit in the tax court after
the receipt of a deficiency notice; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6612, 6213; 4) a suit by a
"friendly" donor whose claim based on the contribution was not allowed; and 5) a suit to
enjoin pendente lite the revocation of the charitable organization's status. See generally
Thrower, IRS Is Considering Far Reaching Changes in Ruling on Exempt Organizations, 34
1975]
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Furthermore, the degree of bureaucratic control that has been
given the Service over charitable organizations is susceptible to
abuse, regardless how conscientiously the Service attempts to carry
out its duties. 3 The Service is permitted to damage irreparably
charitable institutions upon the merest chance that the Commis-
sioner might be right." This virtual plenipotentiary power is partic-
ularly hazardous in the light of recent findings that political pres-
sure may unduly influence the Service's determination of the tax
status of philanthropic organizations. " In addition, a former Com-
missioner of the Service contends that the danger of such a power
is that it gives a greater finality to Service rulings than was intended
by Congress."
Since the Supreme Court has taken such a firm stand&I on its
interpretation of section 7421(a) in two recent cases, it is unlikely
that it will reverse itself in the near future. Therefore, correction of
this harshness and susceptibility of abuse should merit congres-
J. oF TAx. 168 (1971). Administrative review is often an inadequate remedy because the final
revocation decision is made by the Service which has broad discretion in such matters. The
Service is subject to independent review only by the filing of a refund suit, tax court suit,
donor suit or suit for unjunctive relief. Except for the injunction pendente lite relief the
judicial remedies present serious problems of delay during which the charitable organization
is certain to lose contributions. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon -. U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2038,
2042-43, 2051 (1974); Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., - U.S. 94 S.Ct. 2053,
2059 (1974). Under the very best of circumstances it would be at least one year after the
revocation before a court would decide the issue. Furthermore, this assumes that the charita-
ble organization wins and the government does not appeal. If an appeal is made, several years
may pass before a final decision is made. See Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc.,
U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2053, 2067 (dissent).
In addition to the problem of delay, a suit for a refund or in the tax court may be
unfeasible because even after the revocation of the tax-exempt and tax-deductible status,
most charitable organizations have no tax liability and thus have no payment of taxes issue
to litigate. See Brief for Respondents at 23 and n.22, Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, __ U.S.
-, 94.SCt. 2038 (1974) (the Commissioner's brief); Note, supra note 58, at 497-98. Also, a
"friendly" donor suit is questionable as an adequate remedy for the charitable organization
because of the difficulty of finding a willing donor to both contribute and file suit and because
the organization must depend on the contributor to assert the rights of the organization. Bob
Jones Univ. v. Simon, - U.S. - , 94 S.Ct. 2038, 2051 n.21 (1974).
63. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, - U.S. - 94 S.Ct. 2038, 2052 (1974).
64. See the dissent of Senior Circuit Judge Boreman in Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally,
472 F.2d 903, 908 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd, - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 2038 (1974).
65. Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Schultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973).
See also Note, Tax-Injunctions- The Federal Courts of Appeals Have Split Over Whether a
Tax Exempt Organization May Enjoin IRS Revocation of Its Tax Exempt Status, 62 GEo.
L.J. 1019, 1031-32 (1974).
66. Thrower, IRS Is Considering Far Reaching Changes in Ruling on Exempt
Organizations, 34 J. OF TAx. 168 (1971).
67. In Bob Jones University and in "Americans United", Justice Powell delivered the
opinions of the Court for seven justices; Justice Douglas took no part in the decisions and
Justice Blackman concurred and dissented, respectively.
72
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/15
1975] RECENT CASES 187
sional consideration." Congress has amended section 7421(a) in the
past 9 to circumscribe the discretion of the Internal Revenue Service
and similar steps should be taken in the future. 0
MARK E. JOHNSON
68. The Supreme Court on both Bob Jones University, - U.S. _, 94.S.Ct. 2038,
2052, and "Americans United", - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 2052, 2059 n.14, suggests that
Congress should consider specific treatment of charitable organizations to allow them to seek
injunctive relief.
69. Each of the three express exceptions to § 7421(a) were added by amendment. See
note 10 supra.
70. Section 7421 (a) should be amended to allow injunctive relief when a revocation of
§ 501(c)(3) and § 170(c)(2) status is challenged. This recommendation should not be con-
strued to mean that there are no other areas that might also merit consideration as exceptions
to § 7421(a).
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ULTIMATE LIABILITY FOR THE FEDERAL ESTATE
TAX IN MISSOURI: CHARITABLE LEGATEES
EXONERATED
In re Estate of Wahlin'
Carl Wahlin, a bachelor, died testate. His will was admitted to
probate by the Probate Court of Jackson County, Missouri. The will
contained clauses directing payment of debts and expenses, a sole
specific bequest of personal property, and a bequest of the remain-
der of his estate as follows: twenty-five percent to each of two indi-
vidual legatees, twenty-five percent to a charitable institution, and
the remaining twenty-five percent to six named charitable institu-
tions. The will did not expressly direct which shares were to bear
the burden of the federal estate tax.
Testator's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes 2
amounted to $281,227.39.1 After subtraction of debts, expenses, and
the sole specific bequest, the residuary estate amounted to
$133,113.89. The total federal estate tax due was $29,445.11.1 The
1. 505 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
2. The gross estate includes all property (except real property situated outside the
United States) to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death;
dower and curtesy and their statutory substitutes; transfers in contemplation of death; trans-
fers taking effect at death, including transfers with a reservation of a life interest and revoca-
ble transfers; annuities; survivorship in joint estates; powers of appointment; and life insur-
ance. INr. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2031-44. For an amplified discussion of specific problems in
computing the gross estate, see R. STEPHENS & G. MAXFmLD, THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr
TAXES 36-161 (2d ed. 1967); Lowndes, An Introduction to the Federal Estates and Gift Taxes,
44 N. C. L. REV. 1, 3-30 (1965); C. LOWNDES AND R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIT TAXEs
6, 24-294 (2d ed. 1962).
3. Nearly half of this amount was non-probate property, consisting of property owned
jointly by testator and the individual legatees and insurance, of which one individual legatee
was the beneficiary.
4. The federal estate tax was computed as follows:
Probate property $155,663.86
Non-probate property (see note 3 supra) 125,563.53
Gross estate 281,227.39
Less: expenses of administration
and debts of testator 21,905.97
Adjusted gross estate 259,321.42
Less: exemption 60,000.00
Less: deduction for charitable
contributions 66,556.96
Net taxable estate 132,764.46
Federal Estate Tax 30,529.34
Less: credit for state inheritance
taxes 1,084.23
Federal Estate Tax due $ 29,445.11
74
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/15
1975] RECENT CASES
executrix filed a petition to construe the will to determine where the
ultimate burden of the federal estate tax should fall. The central
issue was whether the charitable legatees should be exonerated from
contributing to the payment of the tax.5 Both the Probate Court and
the Circuit Court of Jackson County held that the charitable lega-
tees were exonerated from contributing to the payment of the tax.
The individual legatees appealed. The Missouri Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that, absent a contrary testamentary intention
expressed in the will, the doctrine of equitable apportionment ap-
plied, and charitable legatees were exonerated from contributing to
the payment of the federal estate tax.6
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 requires that the federal
estate tax be paid by the executor.7 This provision merely dictates
that the executor has the duty to pay the tax in the first instance.
It does not constitute a federal mandate determining the ultimate
liability for payment of the tax.' The allocation of the ultimate
burden of the federal estate tax is a question of state law
Unlike many other states,10 Missouri has no statute expressly
directing the manner of allocating the ultimate burden of the federal
estate tax. In addition, Missouri courts have not found any implied
legislative direction in other state statutes dealing with decedent's
The deduction for charitable bequests was computed as if the charitable beneficiaries were
not liable for any estate tax. See note 15 infra, for a discussion of the problem of calculating
the amount of this deduction if the residuary charitable legatees must bear part of the estate
tax burden.
5. The court also reaffirmed the principle that, absent a contrary provision in the will,
takers of non-probate property are liable for contribution to payment of the federal estate tax,
to the extent that the non-probate property generated the tax. 505 S.W.2d at 112. Accord:
Love v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 497 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. En Banc 1973); Commerce Trust
Co. v. Starling, 393 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1965); Sebree v. Rosen, 349 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1961);
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954).
6. 505 S.W.2d at 112.
7. Section 2203 of the Internal Revenue Code defines "executor" as being the executor
or administrator of a decedent's estate, or, if there is no executor or administrator, any person
in actual or constructive possession of any property of the decedent.
8. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
9. Id. at 98; Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955). Accord: United States v.
Traders Nat. Bank, 248 F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 1957); Saracino v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
254 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Mo. 1952); In re Poe's Estate, 356 Mo. 276, 282, 201 S.W.2d 441, 444
(1947); Priedman v. Jamison, 356 Mo. 627, 632, 202 S.W.2d 900, 903 (1947); In re Bernhei-
mer's Estate, 352 Mo. 91, 109, 176 S.W.2d 15, 22 (1943).
10. For a discussion of the varied state statutes dealing with the burden of the federal
estate tax see Powell, Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 327;
Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 199 (1954). Two versions of a uniform law have also been proposed.
UNIFORM ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT Acr (1958); UNIFoRM ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACr
(1964).
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estates." Hence, the process of determining the ultimate burden of
the federal estate tax in Missouri has been one of judicial interpreta-
tion.
Regardless of the presence or absence of a state statute regard-
ing allocation of the federal estate tax, a testator may place the
ultimate burden of the federal estate tax wherever he wishes by a
provision in his will. 2 In Wahlin, the court found no such provi-
sion. 3
11. In Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Mo. 1961) the Missouri Supreme
Court said that the federal estate tax was not a "debt" within the meaning of § 469.090,
RSMo 1949 (repealed, Mo. Laws 1955, at 385, § A), the widow's election statute in effect at
the time. In Jones v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 210, 217-18 (Mo. En Banc 1964) the supreme court
said that §§ 474.160 and 474.190(2), RSMo 1955 Supp., concerning the surviving spouse's
elective share, merely prescribed the form of the election, but did not constitute legislative
preclusion of the application of the doctrine of equitable apportionment. In Reed v. United
States, 316 F. Supp. 1228, 1232-33 (E.D. Mo. 1970)(applying Missouri law), the court said
that § 473.620, RSMo 1969, relating to the abatement of legacies, does not modify or other-
wise affect the doctrine of equitable apportionment. Finally, in In re Estate of Wahlin, 505
S.W.2d 99 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973) the court of appeals found that the following state
statutes did not preclude the application of the doctrine of equitable apportionment: §§
473.620, .623, RSMo 1969, (regarding abatement of legacies), id. at 107 (citing Reed v. United
States, supra); §§ 472.010 and 473.397(3), RSMo 1969, (dealing with the duty of an executor
or administrator to pay all debts, including taxes), id. at 106-07; § 474.430, RSMo 1969,
(regarding the effect given to a testator's intent), id. at 107.
12. See e.g., Reed v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 1228, 1230 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (applying
Missouri law); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Krueger, 377 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Mo. En Banc
1964); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 795, 267 S.W.2d 632, 640 (1954). See generally
Annot. 37 A.L.R.2d 7 (1954).
13. In Wahlin the individual legatees had urged the court to hold that the will expressed
testamentary intent precluding the application of the doctrine of equitable apportionment,
relying on the reasoning of St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Krueger, 377 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. En
Banc 1964). In Krueger, testatrix left one-half of her gross estate to her husband, with the
provision that, "[sihould my husband predecease me, I hereby give and bequeath my said
husband's share to my nephew. . . ." The husband survived the testatrix, and the issue
confronting the court was whether the husband's bequest should bear a share of the federal
estate tax. The supreme court said that, since testatrix did not specifically state in her will
what source was to be used to pay the federal estate tax, it was reasonable to assume that
she intended it to be paid from her gross estate, and that the bequest to her husband be
effective only as to that part of the gross estate over which testatrix had the power to direct
disposition-i.e., the net or distributive estate. Furthermore, the court found in the words
"my said husband's share" a testamentary intention that the nephew, as contingent benefici-
ary, should receive the identical share in case of the husband's death that the husband would
receive if he survived. Since any bequest to the nephew would be burdened with a share of
the federal estate tax, the court concluded that testatrix intended the bequest to her husband
to bear a like share of the tax.
In Wahlin the court rejected the Krueger approach, citing two differences in the Krueger
and Wahlin wills which it deemed sufficient to prevent the inference of a testamentary
direction of the allocation of the ultimate burden of the federal estate tax in the Wahlin will.
First, the Wahlin will provided for fractional share of the residuary estate, not for fractional
shares of the gross estate as in the Krueger will. Second, the Wahlin will included a provision
that if one individual legatee predeceased testator, "that portion of my estate which she
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Absent a controlling state statute or a testamentary direction
as to where the burden of the federal estate tax is to fall, the courts
have taken two different approaches to allocate the ultimate burden
of the tax.14 The first, the so-called "burden on the residue" doc-
trine, requires the amount of the federal estate tax to be paid out
of the residuary estate before the distributive shares are calcu-
lated.'5 The second, the so-called "equitable apportionment" doc-
would have received under this will" was to go to one of the charitable legatees. This provision
involved a deduction in determining testator's net taxable estate only if the contingent
beneficiary took, not if the primary beneficiary took, as in the Krueger will. 505 S.W.2d at
111.
Although these differences provide a technical ground for distinguishing Krueger, they
are far from overwhelming. In fact, the court could easily have reached the opposite conclu-
sion on this crucial point. The fact that the court chose to distinguish Krueger suggests that,
although Krueger was affirmed in principle, the court looked upon it as being at the outer
limit of cases in which testamentary intention as to the ultimate burden of the federal estate
tax would be inferred.
Cf. Reed v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (applying Missouri
law); Jones v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Mo. En Bane 1964) for language suggesting that
testamentary provisions allocating the ultimate burden of the federal estate tax must be
clearly expressed.
14. 42 AM. JuR.2d Inheritance, Estate, and Gift Taxes § 344 (1969); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d
169 (1954).
15. Jurisdictions following the "burden on the residue" doctrine are presented with a
difficult valuation problem. Section 2055(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 says that,
if gifts qualifying for the charitable deduction are to bear a share of the federal estate tax or
other state taxes, the amount of the charitable deduction is to be the amount bequeathed
less any amount paid in taxes. In effect, this makes the amount of the deduction dependent
on the amount of the tax, and the amount of the tax dependent on the amount of the
deduction. In Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61 (1924), af'g. 287 F. 651 (2d Cir. 1923), Justice
Holmes criticized these "mutually dependent indeterminates" as departing from the normal
practice of not regarding the incidence of a tax in the levying of a tax and as being contrary
to the express intention of the statute to encourage charitable giving. Nevertheless, Congress
has seen fit to enact such a provision, and its validity was upheld in Harrison v. Northern
Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476 (1943). Thus, in states that require residuary charitable legatees to
bear a share of the tax, the total tax payable is increased because the charitable deduction is
decreased by the share of the tax it will be required to pay. This is a circular, cumulative
process, in which the amount of the charitable deduction is reduced by subtracting therefrom
the share of the tax it will be required to pay, which in turn reduces the amount passing to
charity, which in turn increases the size of the taxable estate and the estate tax liability,
which further reduces the amount passing to charity, etc. A similar cumulative process was
held valid, in another setting, in Estate of Aldrich v. Commissioner, 425 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400
(5th Cir. 1970) (involving the valuation of a lifetime usufructory interest in a bequest to
charity). The problem is exacerbated when there are mutually dependent state and federal
taxes. These problems are usually solved through the use of algebraic formulae. See 1 FED.
EST. & GiFT TAX REP. 2023.99, 2090.07; 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE
TAXATION 641-716 (1959). Jurisdictions follow ing the equitable apportionment doctrine do
not, of course, face this problem. For a discussion of the merits and shortcomings of each
approach see Lauritzen, Apportionment of the Federal Estate Taxes, 1 TAX CoUN. Q. 55
(1957); 1958 WASH. U. L. Q. 89, 91-93 (1954); Sutter, Apportionment of the Federal Estate
Tax in the Absence of Statute of an Expression of Intention, 51 MicH. L. REv. 53, 54 (1952).
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trine, requires each bequest or other item of property included in
testator's gross estate which generates part of the federal estate tax
to bear a proportionate share of the tax.
An early case established the "burden on the residue" doctrine
as the rule in Missouri.'" However, in Carpenter v. Carpenter,'7 the
Missouri Supreme Court rejected that doctrine and adopted the
"equitable apportionment" rule. This case involved an annuity con-
tract which was included in testator's gross estate for estate tax
purposes, but which did not pass under the will. Confronted with
the issue of whether the burden of the tax attributable to the annu-
ity contract should be borne by the beneficiary of the contract or by
the residuary legatees, the court said that the controversy should be
decided "upon equitable principles,"' 8 and held that the beneficiary
should pay the amount of the federal estate tax generated by the
annuity contract. Since the decision in Carpenter, the doctrine of
equitable apportionment has been applied consistently in Mis-
souri."6
The Internal Revenue Code permits, in addition to the $60,000
exemption to which all estates are entitled, two important deduc-
tions from the adjusted gross estate0 in determining the net taxable
estate. The first, the "marital deduction," permits a deduction of
the value of any interest in property passing to a surviving spouse,
not to exceed fifty percent of the adjusted gross estate.2' The second,
the "charitable deduction," permits a deduction of the value of all
bequests "to or for the use of any corporation organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or edu-
cational purposes .... ,,22 Since property qualifying for either the
marital or the charitable deduction is not included in the net taxa-
ble estate, it generates no federal estate tax.
In Missouri, the doctrine of equitable apportionment has been
applied in cases involving the marital deduction, with the result
16. In re Holmes' Estate, 328 Mo. 143, 40 S.W.2d 616 (1931).
17. 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954).
18. Id. at 796, 267 S.W.2d 632, 642.
19. See e.g., Reed v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (applying
Missouri law); Love v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 497 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. En Banc 1973); In re
Estate of Hough, 457 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. 1970); Commerce Trust Co. v. Starling, 393 S.W.2d
489 (Mo. 1965); Jones v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
20. The starting point for calculating the federal estate tax is the "gross estate," dis-
cussed in note 2, supra. The adjusted gross estate is computed by subtracting funeral expen-
ses, administration expenses, and debts of the decedent from the gross estate. INT. Rav. CODE
OF 1954, § 2053.
21. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(a)(2).
[Vol. 40
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that property passing to a spouse which qualifies for the deduction
has been exonerated from contributing to the payment of the federal
estate tax.? In re Estate of Wahlin raised, for the first time in
Missouri, the issue of whether property qualifying for the charitable
deduction should also be exonerated. The court applied the doctrine
of equitable apportionment and held that the charitable legatees
were exonerated from contribution to the payment of the tax. Rely-
ing on the cases involving the marital deduction,24 the court rea-
soned that since property qualifying for the charitable deduction
generates no tax liability, the charitable legatees should be exoner-
ated from contributing to the payment of the tax.
The importance of the decision in Wahlin is twofold. First, its
holding that, absent a contrary testamentary provision, charitable
legatees are not liable to contribute to payment of the federal estate
tax, makes for more certainty in this area of estate planning. This
holding is especially important since testamentary charitable giving
is likely to become increasingly significant in estate planning.2 Sec-
ond, the decision reinforces the notion that, absent a contrary testa-
mentary provision, "Missouri is committed to the doctrine of equi-
table apportionment .... ,,21
However, the real lesson of Wahlin is that tax consequences
should be fully considered by estate planners, and provision made
for allocation of the tax burden in the will. If this is done, judicial
interpretation and allocation of the burden is unnecessary, "because
the will settles it."-" Prudent estate planners would be well-advised
to avoid ambiguous language, in order to avoid costly and time-
consuming litigation. The best interests of the testator and the ob-
23. In Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1961), testator's wife renounced the
will and elected to take her statutory share. The supreme court held that, since her statutory
share did not contribute to the generation of the federal estate tax, her share should be
exonerated from contributing to its payment. Three years later, a similar issue was presented
in Jones v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. En Banc 1964). The facts of this case were essentially
the same as in Hammond, but the issue was raised as to whether the Missouri Probate Code
of 1955 (enacted after the controversy in Hammond arose) constituted legislative direction
precluding the application of the doctrine of equitable apportionment. The supreme court
said that the Probate Code did not deal with the ultimate burden of the federal estate tax,
and applied the doctrine of equitable apportionment, thus exonerating the widow from con-
tributing to the payment of the tax.
24. See note 23 supra.
25. Cf. Snyder, The Role of Charitable Contributions in Estate Planning: How to Eat
Part of Your Cake and Keep Almost All of It, 9 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 343 (1973).
26. Reed v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (applying Missouri
law).
27. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Krueger, 377 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
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jects of his bounty dictate that tax allocation provisions be clear and
precise."
R. J. ROBERTSON, JR.
28. Some suggested tax provisions are found in Lauritzen, Apportionment of Federal
Estate Taxes, 1 TAX CouN. Q. 55, 91 (1957); 3 J. RABKIN AND M. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL
FoRMs wrrH TAX ANALYsis 8-1285 (1974); AM. JUR. LEGAL FoRms 2d, Inheritance, Estate, and
Gift Taxes ch. 145, §§ 145.31-145.36 (wills), §§ 145.40-145.44 (trusts).-For will provisions
which have been judicially construed, see Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 7 (1954). The latter collection
should serve as a list of phrases to avoid in order to prevent the possibility of litigation due
to ambiguity.
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TAX CONSEQUENCES OF REPAYMENTS BY
INSIDERS IN SATISFACTION OF SECTION 16 (b) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Anderson v. Commissioner'
I. INTRODUCTION
On four occasions2 in the last four years, the Tax Court has
considered the question of what kind of tax deduction is to be al-
lowed for payments made pursuant to section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.1 The court has been consistent in allowing the
taxpayer an ordinary deduction under section 162(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. 4 The first two cases have been reversed by
the Sixth Circuit 5 and the Seventh Circuit,8 respectively. This note
will consider the Anderson case, the reversal by the Seventh Circuit,
and its impact on future decisions.
II. THE Anderson CASE
Taxpayer, James E. Anderson, purchased 1000 shares of Zenith
Radio Corporation common stock for $14,039 during 1962 and 1963
while he was vice president of Zenith. He sold these shares on April
1 and 7, 1966 realizing a capital gain of $148,884. On April 11, 1966,
Anderson purchased another 750 shares of Zenith common stock for
$49,312. The Zenith legal department advised Anderson that his
insider7 sales of April 1 and 7 and purchase of April 11 fell within
1. 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g, 56 T.C 1370 (1971).
2. Charles I. Brown, P-H 1973 TAX CT. MEM. 73,275 (Dec. 17, 1973); Nathan Cum-
mings, 60 T.C. 91 (1973), affd. on rehearing, 61 T.C. No. 1 (Oct. 2, 1973); James E. Anderson,
56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973); William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170
(1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971), non acquiescense
in, 1970-2 CUM. BuLL. xxii.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(b)(1970). Section 16(b) provides in part:
"For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted secu-
rity) within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired
in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months
4. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) which allows a deduction for all ordinary and
necessary expenses incurred in a trade or business.
5. Commissioner v. Mitchell, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909
(1971), rev'g, 52 T.C. 170 (1969), non acquiescense in, 1970-2 Cui. BuLL. xxii.
6. Commissioner v. Anderson, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g, 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(a)(1970). Section 16(a) defines insiders as:
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the prohibitions of section 16(b) and that Zenith was entitled to the
profit. In 1966 he paid the profit of $51,2591 to Zenith as demanded.
On his 1966 return, taxpayer treated the $148,884 gain on the
sale of the stock as long term capital gain' and the $51,259 payment
to Zenith as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The Com-
missioner determined that the payment should be treated as long-
term capital loss 0 rather than an ordinary and necessary business
expense. The Tax Court held for the taxpayer in deciding that the
payments were deductible under section 162(a) " and did not require
capital loss treatment, since they were made to preserve taxpayer's
employment and to avoid injury to his business reputation.
The issue on appeal was whether Arrowsmith v. Commissioner12
applied, so that the section 16(b) payment assumed the character
of the earlier sale, which was a long-term capital transaction. The
Seventh Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit's reversal of the
Mitchell"5 case and concluded that Arrowsmith was applicable. The
"Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per
centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which
is registered pursuant to section § 781 of this title, or who is a director or an officer
of the issuer of such security . ... "
8. See generally 2 L. Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION 1062-66 (2d ed. 1961). For treatment
of multiple transactions see Nelson, Tax Deductibility of Insider Profit Repayments: Resolv-
ing An Apparent Conflict, 24 CASE W. RES. L.REv. 330, 351-52 (1973). For treatment of options
see Kornfeld v. Eaton, 327 F.2d 263, 265 (2nd Cir. 1964), discussing 17 C.F.R. § 240.16(b)-
6(a) and (b) (Supp. 1973).
9' The Internal Revenue Code sections applicable to long-term capital gain are: INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(3) which defines long-term capital gain as that "gain from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months."; INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 1202
which allows a deduction from gross income of fifty percent of the amount by which the net
long-term capital gain exceeds the net short-term capital loss.
10. The sections applicable to long-term capital loss are: INTERNAL RaEvENU CODE OF
1954, § 1222(4), which defines long-term capital loss as that "loss from the sale or exchange
of a capital asset held for more than six months."; and INTEItNAL REvENE CODE OF 1954, §
1211(b)(1) which provides in part:
(1) In general - . . . losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be
allowed only to the extent of the gains from such sales or exchanges, plus (if such
losses exceed such gains) whichever is the smallest:
(A) taxable income
(B) $1,000, or
(C) the sum of-
(i) The excess of the net short-term capital loss over the net long-
term capital gain, and
(ii) one-half of the excess of the net long-term capital loss over the
net short-term capital gain.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 162(a).
12. 344 U.S. 6 (1952). See text accompanying note 27 infra.
13. Commissioner v. Mitchell, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909
(1971), rev'g, 52 T.C. 170 (1969), non acquiescence in, 1970-2 CUM. BULL. xxii. See text
accompanying note 30 infra.
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business purpose of the payment was held to be irrelevant, since the
nature of the deduction was controlled by the nature of the income
item from which it was derived' Thus the taxpayer was limited to a
long term capital loss deduction'
m. HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE CONFLICT
The early cases held that a payment in satisfaction of section
16(b) was in the nature of a penalty and was neither deductible as
an ordinary and necessary business expense nor as a capital loss.
The case of William F. Davis, Jr.,'4 first established this penalty
doctrine. There, petitioner was vice president and director of United
Drug, Inc. He incurred section 16(b) liability by purchasing 2000
shares of his corporation's stock within six months after he had sold
1000 shares. Petitioner reported $20,469 long term capital gain on
his 1945 return.
The Securities and Exchange Commission upon examination of
petitioner's transactions notified United Drug of the section 16(b)
liability. Thereupon, petitioner was requested to pay $12,659 to the
company; the difference between the proceeds realized from the sale
and the price subsequently paid for a like number of shares. Peti-
tioner paid the amount requested in 1946 and sought to deduct the
payment on his 1946 return either as a business expense under sec-
tion 23(a)(1)"' or as a loss under section 23(e) 6 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939.
Respondent contended that payment pursuant to section 16(b)
was a penalty and that to allow a deduction would frustrate the
policy of the section. Petitioner, relying on the legislative history"
of section 16(b), claimed that the obligation was not penal and that
a deduction would not frustrate the intent of the act. The court held
that the payment was a penalty and any deduction for such pay-
ment would be against public policy and contrary to the intent of
the act.'"
14. William F. Davis, Jr., 17 T.C. 549 (1951).
15. This section was the forerunner of section 162(a) of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF
1954.
16. This section was the forerunner of section 165(c) of the INTENAL REVENUE CODE OF
1954.
17. Petitioner relied on the REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON
PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMIENTS TO THE SECURITIES Acr OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE AcT
OF 1934, August 7, 1941, p. 36: "The consequences of failing to comply with this standard
(section 16(b)) are not penal. The section does not make insiders' trading unlawful; it does
not even subject insiders to injunctive proceedings." See 2 L. Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION
1037, 1085 (2d ed. 1961); Nelson, Tax Deductibility of Insider Profit Repayments: Resolving
An Apparent Conflict, 24 CASE W. REs. L.REv. 330, 342 nn. 44-46 (1973).
18. The holding is questioned in 2 L. Loss, SEcuRrms REGULATION 1037, 1085 (2d ed.
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This case was followed in I.T. 4069'1 and was the precedent for
subsequent case law,2" until the Laurence M. Marks21 case in 1956.
In this case taxpayer voluntarily paid to his company the profits of
$17,67222 which represented the amount agreed to be his maximum
liability under section 16(b). The payment was made "to avoid
unfavorable publicity and injury to his business reputation, and to
avoid extended controversy and the expense of litigation." The sole
issue raised was the deductibility of the payment as a business
expense. The Tax Court held for the taxpayer and allowed the de-
duction as an ordinary expense to protect his business reputation,
and concluded that the allowance of the deduction in the circum-
stances in question would not violate the policy expressed in section
16(b). After the Marks case and Revenue Ruling 61-11523 which was
issued following Marks, the penalty notion was never argued again
as a reason for denial of a deduction. However, the question of
ordinary deduction versus capital loss was not at issue in Marks.
In considering this issue, it must be remembered that the pri-
mary purpose of section 16(b) is to place the insider in the position
he would have occupied had he not engaged in the stock transac-
tions.24 The goal of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was an
open securities market without unfair advantages for insiders. Since
corporation insiders have access to information not available to
most traders, 16(b) was adopted to remove the profit from short-
swing trading by insiders in their corporation's stock. It was said in
Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation5 that "(T)he statute was intended
1961) where it is stated: "Actually six judges of the Tax Court dissented in the Davis case,
and the balance might have been the other way save for the peculiar juxtaposition of § 16(b)
and the Internal Revenue Code under the facts of the case."
19. 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 28 (revoked.)
20. See Robert Lehman, 25 T.C. 629 (1955); William L. Dempsey, 10 P-H TAX CT. MEM.
936 (1951).
21. 27 T.C. 464 (1956), acquiesced in, 1966-2 CuM. BuLL. 6.
22' The taxpayer was the senior partner of an investment banking company and was a
shareholder and director of Shamrock Oil and Gas Corporation. In the years 1948 and 1949
the partnership dealt in Shamrock stock several times and realized a gross profit of $45,313
from these transactions. Taxpayer received as his share of the Shamrock transactions $17,672
which was included in his partnership profits as ordinary income. Shamrock was alerted by
the Securities and Exchange Commission to the possible 16(b) violation. No determination
was ever made that the taxpayer violated section 16(b) and the taxpayer never admitted to
a violation.
23. 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 46.
24. See Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
992 (1970); See e.g., Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1, 3(1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 961 (1965); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
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to be thoroughgoing, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock
transactions . ". -.6 To be consistent with the intent of section
16(b) a deduction must return the taxpayer as nearly as possible to
his original position.
The net tax result is an important factor to consider in deter-
mining what kind of deduction is most consistent with the purpose
of 16(b). An ordinary and necessary business expense will be offset
against ordinary income in full while a capital loss deduction can
offset against ordinary income in full while a capital loss deduction
can offset a maximum of $1000 in ordinary income. Thus the ordi-
nary business deduction may result in a benefit to the taxpayer
which is inconsistent with section 16(b). The courts have not used
the net tax result in a comparison with the intent of section 16(b),
but it is perhaps the most important argument.
The courts have used two cases outside the area of section 16(b)
to characterize the deduction for the 16(b) payment as a capital
loss. In Arrowsmith v. Commissioner,27 a final distribution was
made to two share holders on the liquidation of their corporation in
1940. These taxpayers reported these payments as capital gains. In
1944 a judgment was rendered against the corporation; each share-
holder paid half and deducted his payment in full as an ordinary
and necessary business expense. The Commissioner looked to the
1940 treatment of the distribution as a capital gain and determined
that the 1944 payment was a capital loss. The Supreme Court held
the payments to be capital losses since the taxpayer's liability was
based on the sale of a capital asset and not an ordinary business
transaction. All the events of the distribution and repayment were
examined not to reopen and readjust the 1940 return, but to deter-
mine the nature of the 1944 payment.28 The court concluded that
where the taxpayer receives and reports a capital gain, a subsequent
payment made by that taxpayer in satisfaction of a liability arising
from the earlier capital transaction must be treated as a capital loss.
In United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 9 taxpayer paid tax on certain
26. Id. at 239. See, e.g., Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
27. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
28. This result does no violence to the annual accounting system, since the earlier
returns are not being reopened. The earlier year is being examined to determine whether the
repayment gives rise to a regular or a capital loss. See e.g., Eugene H. Walet, Jr., 31 T.C.
461 (1958); Note, Tax Treatment of Payments For Apparent Violations of Section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 ALANY L. Rxv. 736 (1972); 2 L. Loss, SEcURrrms
REGULATION, 1036, 1086 (2d ed. 1961). The Arrowsmith doctrine merely extends the claim of
right doctrine developed in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931) and North
American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
29. 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
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income from sales of natural gas after deducting the 27 1/2% deple-
tion allowance. In a subsequent tax year the taxpayer was required
by a regulatory board to refund portions of this income to its cus-
tomers because of overcharges. The taxpayer attempted to deduct
the full amount of the refunded income while the Internal Revenue
Service contended that the deduction should be reduced by 27 2%
to correspond with the prior depletion deduction allowed against the
income when received. The court held that it was proper to consider
the earlier transaction in order to determine the tax consequence of
the later expenditure and that the deduction should be reduced by
27 1/2 %. These two cases are said to stand for the general proposition
that when income which was taxed at a reduced rate is later given
up, the taxpayer should not be permitted to deduct the refund in
full as an ordinary deduction.
The Tax Court first considered the nature of the section 16(b)
payment in William L. Mitchell" and concluded that the payment
resulted in an ordinary and necessary business expense. There the
taxpayer, vice president of General Motors Corporation, sold and
repurchased 2130 shares of General Motors stock within a six month
period. He reported the profit on the sale as long-term capital gain
on his 1962 return and took an ordinary deduction under 162(a) for
the repayment on his 1963 return. The Commissioner disallowed the
deduction relying on Revenue Ruling 61-115 and Arrowsmith v.
Commissioner, to require characterization of the payment as a capi-
tal loss due to the integral relationship of the payment and the
earlier sale. Arrowsmith required that where there is such a relation-
ship an income tax deduction must be characterized by the income
item from which it is derived and without which it would not have
been paid. The Tax Court found Arrowsmith inapplicable since it
did not find the requisite relationship between the gain and the
16(b) payment, and allowed the taxpayer an ordinary deduction
because the payment was made to avoid injury to his business repu-
tation. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding Arrowsmith and Skelly
applicable and the business purpose of the payment irrelevant. The
taxpayer was limited to a capital loss deduction in 1963 because of
his capital gain treatment of the 1962 sale profits.
In 1971 the Tax Court again considered the deductibility of
section 16(b) payments in James E. Anderson.31 Here the court em-
phasized the business purpose of preserving the taxpayer's employ-
30. 52 T.C. 170 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909
(1971), non acquiescence in, 1970-2 CuM. BuLL. xxii.
31. 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
[Vol. 40
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ment and business reputation32 and stated: "Thus Arrowsmith and
Skelly Oil are both distinguishable because the payment was not
directly and integrally related to the earlier sale transaction which
gave rise to the capital gain and because the status of petitioner in
making the payment differed from that which he had at the time
such gain was realized."3 The court followed its earlier decision and
allowed taxpayer an ordinary and necessary business expense under
162(a).
While Anderson was on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Tax
Court on April 23, 1973 decided Nathan Cummings. 4 On facts simi-
lar 5 to Anderson the Tax Court allowed Cummings an ordinary and
necessary business expense deduction under section 162(a) relying
on the reasoning of Mitchell and Anderson for the nonapplicability
of Arrowsmith. On June 14, 1974 Anderson was reversed by the
Seventh Circuit on the grounds that Arrowsmith did apply and that
the right of deduction under 162(a) for protection of business repu-
tation was irrelevant.
Based on the reversal of Anderson, the Commissioner moved for
reconsideration and revision of the Cummings opinion by the Tax
Court. The Tax Court reviewed the opinion but its earlier findings
were not affected by the Seventh Circuit reversal and it entered the
decision for Cummings on October 2, 1973 stating: "We have care-
fully re-examined our position in the light of the views expressed by
the Seventh Circuit, but with due respect to that court, we are not
32. See, e.g., Joseph P. Pike, 44 T.C. 787 (1965); Old Town Corp., 37 T.C. 845 (1962);
Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956), acquiesced in, 1966-2 CuM. BuLL. 6; Paul Draper, 26
T.C. 201 (1956); William L. Butler, 17 T.C. 675 (1951). See Nelson, Tax Deductibility of
Insider Profit Repayments: Resolving An Apparent Conflict, 24 CASE W. REs. L.RIv. 330
(1973); Note, A CoRPoRATE INSmER NOT ALLowED To DEnuCr PAYMENTS MADE To Avom
THREATENED 16(B) LITIGATION As AN ORDiNARY Busnmss EXPENSE BuT ONLY As A CAPrrA
Loss, U. TOL. L. REv. 559 (1971).
33. 56 T.C. at 1375 (1971).
34. 60 T.C. 91 (1973).
35. In Cummings taxpayer was a director and shareholder of MGM. In the year 1961
taxpayer sold and then bought 3000 shares of MGM within a six month period. The Securities
Exchange Commission notified MGM who in turn notified the taxpayer in 1962 of the possible
16(b) violation. The profit, $53,870.81, was paid to the corporation in 1962 and a deduction
was taken as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The respondent determined that
the payment should be a long-term capital loss since the gain on the sale of the stock was
long-term capital gain. The court found, as petitioner contended, that the payment was made
to protect the business reputation of the taxpayer and to avoid any delay in the issuance of
MGM's proxy statement which was dated the day after the payment was made. The court
held for petitioner and allowed the payment to be deducted as an ordinary and necessary
business expense and the opinion was filed on April 23, 1973. The court relied on Mitchell
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convinced that our position should be changed. Since venue for
appeal of this case is in the Second Circuit, we are not required to
follow the decisions of the Circuit Courts in Anderson v.
Commissioner, and Mitchell v. Commissioner."38 The outcome of
the Cummings case is still pending. An appeal was granted Decem-
ber 28, 1973 and the decision should have significant impact on
future Tax Court opinions in this area.
The most recent case decided by the Tax Court is Charles L
Brown," filed December 17, 1973. Taxpayer purchased and sold
shares of Western Nuclear Inc. within a six month period while he
was vice president."5 He reported $49,060 long term capital gain on
his 1966 return. Taxpayer paid the section 16(b) profit to the com-
pany to avoid damaging his business reputation and took a business
expense deduction for the payment in 1968. The Commissioner
asked for reconsideration of the rule applied in prior cases, but the
Tax Court declined to adopt a different standard for determining
the character of the deduction from that it had used in Mitchell,
Anderson and Cummings." Thus the Tax Court persists in resolving
this issue for the taxpayer.
IV. DOES ARROWSMITH APPLY?
The basic question raised throughout the cases is whether
Arrowsmith applies. A narrow reading of the case merely allows a
prior year to be examined to determine the character of a repayment
in a subsequent year when the two transactions are related. Both
the Courts of Appeal and the Tax Court have applied the case to
section 16(b) repayments but each has reached different interpreta-
tions: (1) The Tax Court has interpreted Arrowsmith to require a
36. Nathan Cummings, 61 T.C. No. 1, CCH DEC. 32, 158 at 3056 (Oct. 2, 1973).
37. 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1251 (Dec. 17, 1973).
38. In Brown, taxpayer was vice president and treasurer of Western Nuclear Inc. He
purchased 16,000 shares of Western for $57,569 in 1966. Between January and May of 1966
taxpayer sold 3000 shares of Western stock acquired in 1959 and 1960 for $58,325, thus
realizing long term capital gain of $49,060. He also incurred section 16(b) laibility of $37,795
which was subsequently paid to Western. It is interesting to note that at the Tax Court level
there was a six man dissent on the review decision of the Cummings case, two of whom
dissented in Anderson. In Brown, two months later, on nearly identical facts and without a
court change there was no dissent. This could represent a backing off by the Tax Court-and
a willingness to allow the ordinary deduction without serious dispute. In addition, the court
in Brown did not even discuss Arrowsmith.
39. The court in Brown sets up a two part rule for deductibility as an ordinary and
necessary business expense: (1) the taxpayer was in the trade or business of being a corporate
executive and (2) payments were made to protect his employment and business reputation'
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relationship between two transactions which is sufficient to require
the conclusion that both transactions are "parts of a unified
whole."4 Although this relationship has never been met to the satis-
faction of the Tax Court in the 16(b) cases, it is agreed that if it is
met, the tax treatment of a prior year will control the treatment in
a subsequent year. (2) The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have empha-
sized the rationale that was stated in Skelly that "[I]f money was
taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer would be
accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally de-
ductible from receipts taxable at the higher rate applicable to ordi-
nary income."41 The circuits have recognized that there must be a
relationship between the two transactions, but have given a broader
interpretation to this requirement and have found the relationship
to exist when the origin of the deduction is the earlier capital trans-
action,4" in effect an origin test.
The Tax Court has held Arrowsmith inapplicable for lack of an
integral relationship, on several different theories. In Mitchell the
Tax Court stated that the relationship being considered was be-
tween the purchase, which had no tax consequences, and the
repayment; since the sale was a completed transaction.43 The court
also stated that there was no relationship between the amount of
gain and the amount of payment under section 16(b).44 In Anderson
the Tax Court found a lack of integral relationship because of a
" status" argument, i.e., the taxpayer had different capacities at sale
and at repayment. During the sale upon which long term capital
gain was realized he acted in his capacity as a shareholder, but his
obligation to make payment arose out of his status as an employee.45
40. James E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370, 1376 (1971).
41. 394 U.S. 678, 685 (1969). This rationale can be said to be based on public policy
and on policy of section 16(b). This brought a reaction from Judge Campbell in his dissent
in Anderson, 480 F.2d at 1309 (1973). In this dissent the questions are posed as to whether
the Internal Revenue Code should enforce the policies of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and whether equity has a place in the tax law administration.
42. Referring to the sale of stock, whether it is the sale or a subsequent purchase that
triggers 16(b) liability.
43. The sale is said to be a completed transaction and the purchase is said to have only
securities law significance. Payment of the 16(b) liability is then based on the purchase and
thus there is no tax relationship between the two transactions. This rationale applies only in
sale-purchase cases since in the puchase-sale situation it is the sale which triggers 16(b)
liability.
44. An example used to demonstrate this position is: a basis of $20 per share, a sale of
that share for $10, and a subsequent repurchase within 6 months of the same stock at $5 per
share. In this example there would be a loss on the sale transaction, yet a $5 per share profit
recoverable in violation of section 16(b). See William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. at 174-75 (1969); 2
L. Loss, Sacumn'rs REGULATMON 1037, 1062 (2d ed. 1961).
45. This argument has been seriously questioned, since the net effect of this status
1975]
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In Cummings the Tax Court grounded its opinion on: (1) the lack
of correlation between the amount of capital gain and the amount
of repayment, as was argued in Mitchell; and (2) the "status" argu-
ment of Anderson. On review the court added that "had the pay-
ment been made in the same year as the gain was recognized, it
would not have reduced the amount of such capital gain."4
The Sixth Circuit, in Mitchell, responded to the integral rela-
tionship theories by saying that the payment is controlled by the
underlying sale-purchase transaction which gave rise to the section
16(b) liability. Both the sale and purchase were said to be needed
and thus 16(b) relates to the whole transaction, not merely the sale
or the purchase individually.47 The Seventh Circuit found sufficient
relationship in the fact that the taxpayer acted in the capacity of
an insider at ll times during the transactions" and held that the
payment and sale-purchase transaction as a whole were "inextrica-
bly intertwined". 5
Whether Arrowsmith applies seems to be a matter of semantics.
The Tax Court in allowing an ordinary deduction has failed to find
the high degree of relationship that it feels is needed for Arrowsmith
to apply. The circuits define the necessary relationship in such a
way that Arrowsmith does apply. Neither interpretation is a sound
basis for future cases. A better approach would be to test the results
obtained by each possible alternative against the purpose and intent
of 16(b). 5
V. CHARACTERIZATION OF DEDUCTION BASED ON THE INTENT OF 16(B)
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have both bolstered their inter-
pretation of Arrowsmith by stressing that they prevent the taxpayer
theory is to allow an officer an ordinary and necessary business expense, since he made the
repayment as an employee; but to limit a director or 10% shareholder to capital losses since
the repayment would be in the capacity as a shareholder. The theory is that if the capacity
at sale and at repayment is the same, that of a shareholder, then there would be an integral
relationship satisfying Arrowsmith and a capital loss would be appropriate. This treats the
classes of insiders differently. See e.g., 56 T.C. 1370 (1971) (Dawson & Quealy, JJ., dissent-
ing); Note, Repayment of Profits Realized in Violation of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 By A Corporate Officer In Order to Protect His Corporate Position and
Business Reputation Is Deductible By Him AsAn Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense,
9 HOUSTON L.RPv. 841 (1972).
46. 61 T.C. No. 1, CCH DEC. 32, 158 at p.3057 (Oct. 2, 1973).
47. 428 F.2d at 261.
48. This application of the status theory treats all insiders the same and avoids the
problems that a contrary holding would cause. See Nelson, Tax Deductibility of Insider Profit
Repayments: Resolving An Apparent Conflict, 24 CAsE W. Rws. L. Rav. 330, 338 (1973).
49. Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 at 1307 (7th Cir. 1973) quoting from the
dissenting opinion in the Tax Court, 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
50. See text accompanying note 25-26 supra.
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from getting the windfall result of a double deduction from his pay-
ment. This is in effect an argument based on the intent of section
16(b) and not an integral relationship rationale. By a comparison
of the net tax benefit from the deduction, with the intent expressed
by section 16(b), a more logical treatment of the deduction can be
determined. There are at least four possible treatments that have
been suggested: (1) allowance of an ordinary and necessary business
expense deduction in the year of repayment;" (2) application of
section 1341 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195452 to the repay-
ment;53 (3) allowance of a capital loss deduction in the year of repay-
ment;," (4) an addition of the amount repaid to the basis of the stock
purchased.5
Revenue Ruling 61-115 declares the purpose of 16(b) to be "to
place the insider in the same position he would have occupied if he
had never engaged in the stock dealings."5 A more understandable
expression of this concept is to describe the purpose to be to return
the insider to the position he would have occupied had he bought
and sold at the same price.5"
The allowance of a deduction against ordinary income as an
ordinary and necessary business expense in the year of repayment
51. The Tax Court has followed this in Mitchell, Anderson, Cummings and Brown.
52. INTErNAL REvENUE CODE OF 1954, § 1341 provides in part:
If:
(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year because it
appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item,
(2) a deduction is allowed when it is established that taxpayer did not have
an unrestricted right to such item; and
(3) the amount exceeds $3000 then the tax imposed is the lesser of,
(4) the tax for the current taxable year computed with such deduction, or
(5) amount equal to -
(A) The tax for the current year computed without such deduction,
minus
(B) The decrease in tax for the prior year resulting from exclusion of
such item from gross income.
53. See e.g., Nelson, Tax Deductibility of Insider Profit Repayments: Resolving An
Apparent Conflict, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 330, 349-51 (1973); Lokken, Tax Significance of
Payments In Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 4 GA. L. REv. 298, 312-21 (1970).
54. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have opted for this approach.
55. William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170 (1969) (Drennen and Tietzens, J.J., concurring);
Nathan Cummings, 61 T.C. No. 1 (Oct. 2, 1973) (Drennen J., dissenting); Lokken, Tax
Significance of Payments in Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Under Section 16(b) of The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 GA. L. REv. 298, 309-12 (1970). If the stock is resold prior
to the year that the 16(b) payment is paid or if it is a purchase followed by a sale the
deduction would be characterized by the nature of the gain or loss on the sale of the purchased
stock. Id' at n.66'
56. 1961-1 CUM. BuLL. 46 at 48.
57. Lokken, Tax Significance of Payments In Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Under
Section 16(b) of the Secarities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 GA. L. REv. 298, 309 (1970).
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clearly frustrates the intent of section 16(b) when the sale that fixes
liability under the section is capital in nature. Such a characteriza-
tion results in an after tax profit to the taxpayer from his insider
trading."8 When the sale transaction produces a long term capital
gain it appears that an ordinary deduction should not be allowed if
the net tax result is to be in compliance with Revenue Ruling 61-
115 and the intent of section 16(b).
Since the claim of right doctrine and the annual accounting
period rule prevent reopening of the prior year's return, section 1341
was devised to give the taxpayer an alternative when an item is
taken into income and must be repaid in a subsequent year. How-
ever, application of section 1341 to the repayment of section 16(b)
liability has several obstacles,59 which, when viewed as a whole,
raise serious doubts as to its applicability under present interpreta-
tion.0
The allowance of a capital loss deduction and the addition to
basis of the amount of 16(b) liability repaid can both be justified
with respect to the intent of section 16(b). In each instance the
general principles of Arrowsmith are applied, since the court must
refer back to a prior year to determine the type of treatment to be
afforded in the current year; but the fact that Arrowsmith does
apply is not determinative and the absence of any rigid relationship
tests can avoid the semantic problems that have surrounded the
problem. When the court refers back to the circumstances involved
58. The taxpayer realizes a long term capital gain from the sale which is reduced by
fifty percent before it is added to ordinary income. If the taxpayer is allowed an ordinary
deduction for the repayment, he can deduct this in full against ordinary income. Thus he will
have only put half the gain into ordinary income and taken a deduction in full for the
repayment.
59. The main obstacle is Revenue Ruling 68-153, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 371, which requires
that a taxpayer have had an unrestricted right to the funds when received. Section 1341
requires an "appearance" of an unrestricted right. Thus far mistake of fact has not been
sufficient for such "appearance" and presumably this strict interpretation would preclude
mistake of law as well. Also Section 1341 must be tied to a sale so it would not be applicable
to a sale-purchase factual pattern. The section would not apply if the original sale produced
a loss or if the amount of payment exceeded the gain. Lokken, Tax Significance of Payments
in Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 4 GA. L. REV. 298, 317 (1970).
60. See Nelson, Tax Deductibility of Insider Profit Repayments: Resolving An Appar-
ent Conflict, 24 CASE W. REs. L.REv. 330, 349-351 (1973), where the author proposes reconsi-
deration of Revenue Ruling 68-153 and applicability of section 1341 to insider repayments.
For illustration: Taxpayer holds stock with a basis of $20. He sells the stock at $25, generating
$5 of capital gain. He purchases more stock at $15 incurring section 16(b) liability of $10.
Treating this $10 payment as a capital loss has the same effect on the taxpayer as if he had
sold at $15-he has a net-capital loss of $5. If taxpayer purchases at $20 and later sells for
$25 incurring 16(b) liability of $5, treating this payment as a $5 capital loss would have the
same effect as if taxpayer had sold for $20-no capital gain or loss.
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in the transactions that triggered 16(b) liability, the intent of the
section will dictate whether a capital loss or an addition to basis
should be allowed. This may raise arguments from the taxpayer that
he is being penalized by a capital loss in a subsequent year when
he has no capital gains. But this result is inherent in the annual
accounting rule and the fact that the tax law does not afford exactly
parallel treatment to capital gains and losses This inequity would
result from any method other than an adjustment of the taxpayer's
tax liability for prior years.
The goal of returning the taxpayer to the economic position he
would have held had he bought and sold at the same price requires
tax treatment sufficiently flexible to be properly applied whether
the 16(b) transaction is a sale followed by a purchase or a purchase
followed by a sale. 16(b) liability is always premised on a short-term
profit result from two closely related transactions. In the sale-
purchase sequence the advantage comes when the stock price swings
down during the intervening few days; in the purchase-sale sequ-
ence the insider profits when the price swings up. In one situation,
the 16(b) liability is actually premised on the purchase and sale of
the same shares of stock, but more commonly it is premised on the
purchase of certain shares within a short time before or after the sale
of other shares which may have been held by the insider for a long
period of time and in which he may have either a high or low basis.
The 16(b) liability is based on the fiction that the short swing sale
is at a profit. However, the tax consequences of the actual sale will
be determined by which stock is actually sold; how long that stock
was owned; and whether it is sold at a gain or a loss. Thus, the tax
consequences of the sale will not necessarily correspond with the
short term profit result which gives rise to the 16(b) liability.
The section 16(b) sanction is imposed in the sale-purchase se-
quence on the theory that the taxpayer really didn't sell anything
since he bought back within such a short period of time. Thus, for
16(b) purposes, the substance of the transaction was to average
down the insider's cost of stock, freeing up invested capital without
making any substantial change in his ownership of stock. To correct
this resulting advantage, section 16(b) requires the insider to pay to
the corporation the amount of capital which the transaction thereby
freed up, i.e. the amount by which the sale price exceeded the subse-
quent purchase. The tax treatment of this payment which would
best correspond to this rationale for the 16(b) payment would be to
treat the payment as an investment in the cost of the stock; thus
bringing the cost of the stock to an amount equal to the prior sale
price. This tax treatment would be accomplished by merely adding
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the amount of the 16(b) payment to the taxpayer's basis in the stock
provided he still owns the stock when the 16(b) payment is made.
If the stock has been disposed of in the intervening period, the
taxpayer should be afforded a capital loss deduction, either short
term or long term depending on the character of the sale of the
purchased stock. This deduction is the nearest equivalent possible
to increased basis where the stock is no longer held by the taxpayer.
The other sequence involves a purchase followed within a short
period by a sale. Although the short-term result must be a profit
before 16(b) liability will result, the actual sale may be of either the
stock purchased a short time before or of some other stock of the
same kind purchased at an earlier time. In this latter event, the tax
consequences of the sale may be either short term or long term and
at either a gain or a loss. However, the 16(b) liability is predicated
on the theory, actual or fictional, that the recently purchased stock
was sold at a profit. The advantage to the insider is taken from him
by requiring that he pay the resulting short term profit to the corpo-
ration. Thus the sale price is constructively reduced to an amount
equal to the prior purchase. The tax consequences which best corre-
spond to this approach of 16(b) would be to allow the taxpayer a
deduction keyed to the tax consequences of the sale, i.e. a capital
loss which is either short term or long term depending on the charac-
ter of stock actually sold.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a sale-purchase sequence the addition to basis method, com-
bined with a capital loss treatment where there is no stock to adjust,
is justifiable in light of the intent of section 16(b). In a purchase-
sale sequence, a capital loss characterized by the nature of the stock
sold will likewise comply with the intent of the section. Both meth-
ods will yield tax penalties in some situations, but they both avoid
any possible tax windfall to the insider which would weaken the
sanctions of section 16(b). The Anderson court's choice of a capital
loss method was an acceptable result but will be questioned so long
as it relies on the relationship analysis. A decision based squarely
on furthering the public policy of section 16(b) would be a desirable
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TORTS-MINOR CHILD'S CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE DOES NOT BAR PARENTAL CLAIM
FOR TORTIOUS INJURY TO CHILD BY THIRD
PARTY
Handeland v. Brown'
Vincent Handeland, a minor, was injured when the motorcycle
he was operating collided with an automobile driven by Jane Eileen
Brown and owned by Dennis Brown. Vincent's father, Ronald
Handeland, as next friend, brought a negligence action against the
Browns for his personal injuries. Ronald also joined the action to
assert his own claim under Rule 82 which provides, "A parent, or the
parents, may sue for the expense and actual loss of services, com-
panionship and society resulting from injury to or death of a minor
child." 3 The defendants pleaded Vincent's alleged contributory neg-
ligence as a bar to both claims. At trial, the court refused to instruct
that any negligence of Vincent would not bar the plaintiff's claim
under Rule 8. The jury was instructed that if they found Vincent
negligent and his negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries,
the defendants should prevail on the claims of both Vincent and his
father.'
The jury found for the defendants on both claims. Ronald ap-
pealed his claim based on Rule 8. The single issue on appeal was
whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a defense
of contributory negligence which would be good against Vincent
would also be good against Ronald. The Supreme Court of Iowa held
that a child's contributory negligence, not the sole proximate cause
of his injuries, is not a defense to a parental claim under Rule 8.1
Prior to Handeland, American decisions unanimously recog-
nized that contributory negligence by a spouse or child is a defense
to the other spouse's or a parent's recovery of the collateral damages
arising from the personal injury.' American courts have advanced
various rationales to justify this result. In Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad v. Honey,7 the court applied an imputed negligence
1. 216 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 1974).
2. IOWA R. Crv. P. 8 [hereinafter referred to as Rule 8].
3. Id.
4. Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 575 (Iowa 1974).
5. Id. at 574.
6. 41 Am. JuR.2D Husband and Wife § 401 (1968); 59 Am. Jur.2d Parent and Child §
126 (1971); 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 452 (1944); 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 47 (1950).
The injured party's assumption of the risk or a statute of limitations applicable to him have
also been held to defeat the recovery. W. PRossER, LAW OF ToRTS § 125. (4th ed. 1971).
7. 63 F. 39 (8th Cir. 1894).
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theory in holding that a wife's contributory negligence barred her
husband's claim for consortium and medical expenses arising from
the wife's injury by a negligent third party.8 The court followed the
now discarded principle that a husband is to be held responsible for
the conduct of his wife. The wife's contributory negligence was im-
puted to the husband as a complete bar to recovery of the collateral
damages he suffered as a result of his wife's injuries.'
The court in Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co.,10 held that a
parent's negligence action to recover medical expenses and loss of
services due to the physical injury of his child was barred by the
child's contributory negligence. The court specifically rejected the
imputed negligence theory and introduced the assignment rationale
as a basis for denying recovery. Stating that the parent is required
by law to support his child, the court reasoned that the parent in
return takes a part of the child's cause of action by operation of the
law and must necessarily take the claim as the child leaves it."
The derivative action theory was discussed in Dudley v.
Phillips." The court acknowledged the existence of both the im-
puted negligence and assignment theories, but reasoned that a
cause of action arising in favor of a parent as a result of a tort against
the child is by nature derivative and therefore is subject to the same
defenses that are available with respect to the claim arising in favor
of the child. 3 Missouri appears to follow the derivate action ration-
ale. In Huff v. Trowbridge,4 the Missouri Supreme Court held that
a wife could not recover on her collateral claim for her husband's
injuries if he was contributorily negligent, because her claim was
merely derivative.15
A fourth approach which has been employed to deny recovery
is the "well-settled rule" theory of Ross v. Cuthbert." In Ross, the
Oregon court acknowledged that the general rule had been subject
to valid criticism, but felt compelled to deny recovery because the
8. Id. at 42.
9. Id. at 41. Since the husband's right to recover was dependent upon the marriage
relationship and could not exist without it, the court was able "with no logical difficulty" to
hold the husband accountable for the wife's contributory negligence. Id. at 42.
10. 188 Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198 (1925).
11. Id, at 380-81, 206 N.W. at 200.
12. 218 Tenn. 648, 405 S.W.2d 468 (1966); see Annot., 21 A.L.R. 3d 469 (1968). The
opinion in Dudley placed heavy reliance on 39 AM. Jun. Parent and Child § 85 (1942).
13. Dudley v. Phillips, 218 Tenn. 648, 656, 405 S.W.2d 468, 469 (1966).
14. 439 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1969).
15. Id. at 498. See also Rieke v. Brodof, 501 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); Holt
v. Myers, 494 S.W.2d 430'(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
16. 239 Ore. 429, 397 P.2d 529 (1964).
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rule was "well-settled" in American case law.'7
From practically the moment of its inception, the general rule
denying recovery has been the subject of severe criticism from schol-
ars,' 8 textwriters,5 and judges. 0 Most authorities have been quick to
point out that denial of recovery in such circumstances is a violation
of the "both ways test"2' of tort law. American courts have generally
adhered to the view that one is not liable for the negligent torts of
his spouse or child.22 However, the same courts have held a spouse
or parent accountable for the contributory negligence of a child or
the other spouse.2 3
Critics of the general rule frequently draw an analogy between
a plaintiff's interest in his spouse or child and his interest in his
property. If a plaintiff sued to recover damages to his automobile
incurred in a collision with a third party while the plaintiff's minor
child was operating the automobile, the minor child's contributory
negligence, if not the sole proximate cause of the damage, would not
bar the plaintiff's recovery against a negligent third party.24 Never-
theless, under the same circumstances, the general rule would bar
recovery by the plaintiff for collateral damages suffered by him as
a result of injury to his minor child. Although the plaintiff suffers a
definite financial loss in both interests under identical circumstan-
ces, the general rule allows him compensation only for the damage
to his automobile.
The derivative action theory appears, at least to one author-
ity,2 to be a timely invention employed by the court to reach a result
17. Id. at 434-36, 397 P.2d at 531-32.
18. Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for
Loss of Services, Etc., 2 U. Cm. L. REV. 173, 180-93 (1935); James, Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 14 LA. L. REv. 340, 354-60 (1954).
19. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 8.8, 8.9 (1956); W. PRossER, LAw
OF TORTS § 125 (4th ed. 1971).
20. See the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connell in Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Ore. 429,
397 P.2d 529 (1964).
21. Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for
Loss of Services, Etc., 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 173, 180 (1935) (vicarious or imputed liability has to
work both ways or not at all).
22. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 123 (4th ed. 1971).
23. Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for
Loss of Services, Etc., 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 173, 181 (1935).
24. Emery v. Frateschi, 161 Me., 218 211 A.2d 578 (1965); see James, Imputed Contri-
butory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REv. 340, 355 (1954). Some courts have considered the parent's
interest in the services of his child and freedom from medical expenses as analogous to a
property interest. Frazier v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 101 Ga. 70, 75, 28 S.E. 684, 686
(1897); Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N.Y. 422, 433, 122 N.E. 247, 251 (1919).
25. Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for
Loss of Services, Etc., 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 173, 181 (1935).
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believed to be necessary. The basis of the derivative action rationale
is that a cause of action found in one party originating from injury
to another party is derived from the injured party and is therefore
subject to any defenses which preclude recovery by the injured
party. However, simply because an action is closely related to a
person or thing, it does not necessarily follow that the action is
derived from that person and dependent on that person's ability to
recover."8
The assignment rationale has been criticized on the ground that
an injured party cannot assign to another a right of action that never
did belong to the injured party. From the initial moment of injury,
the law gives to the spouse or parent an independent cause of action
which the other spouse or child could never "sue on, or destroy by
settlement or judgment, or assign."-"
Although the general rule has for some time been the subject
of criticism,2 it has been consistently followed by American courtsY.2
The Supreme Court of Iowa in Handeland, however, after mechani-
cally examining each of the four basic rationales for the rule, dis-
played little hesitancy in rejecting the rule. Plaintiff's claim in
26. An action for the injury of a horse is obviously closely related to the horse and
originates from the horse's injuries, but one could hardly say that the action is a derivative
one, being derived from the horse. Id. at 183. Another valid point here is that the action for
the seduction of one's minor daughter can be said to be derivative in the sense of Dudley,
yet the consent of the daughter will not bar the recovery of the parent. W. PRossER, LAW OF
Tonws § 124 (4th ed. 1971).
27. James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REv. 340, 355 (1954). One
leading textbook, in a statement often quoted, but never followed until the Handeland case,
sums up the "certain illogical aspects" of the general rule:
If there are different interests invaded by different wrongs, it might be thought
irrelevant to the husband's cause of action that the wife's has been barred by her
contributory negligence. If we are to accept the principle of the Restatement of
Torts, negligence is not "imputed" to a plaintiff unless his relationship to the
person whose negligence is involved is such as to make him liable for that person's
negligence if it resulted in injury to a third person. Here, the husband is not in
modern law liable for his wife's torts and accordingly should not be barred from
recovery against a third person by her negligence. To assign, as a reason, the
derivative character of his action is really begging the question since it does little
more than to state the result in different language. And to state that there is but
one cause of action which is "divided" between the wife and husband is not accur-
ate since the nature of the husband's interest is different and distinct from the
wife's.
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF Tor § 8.9, at 640 (1956).
28. A Canadian case as early as 1933 refused to follow the general rule. Wasney v.
Jurazsky, 1 D.L.R. 616 (1933).
29. Pioneer Constr. Co. v. Bergeron, 170 Colo. 474, 462 P.2d 589 (1969); Schaffner v.
Smith, 158 Colo. 387, 407 P.2d 23 (1965); Broitman v. Kohn, 16 Mich. App. 400, 168 N.W.2d
311 (1969); Barash v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 315 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); McNally
v. Addis, 317 N.Y.S.2d 157, 65 Misc. 2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
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Handeland, although previously recognized as a claim at common
law, was statutory in Iowa." The derivative rationale, as applied to
this statutory claim, had previously been rejected by the Supreme
Court of Iowa in Irlbeck v. Pomeroy." In Irlbeck the court distin-
guished the Rule 8 claim for a truly derivative action such as wrong-
ful death, which is brought to redress a wrong done to another rather
than to the claimant. Under Rule 8 the parent brings a claim for a
legal wrong done to himself, not to his child.32 The imputed negli-
gence theory had been expressly condemned in McMartin v.
Saemish, 3 where the court described Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad v. Honey34 as "an interesting discussion of the old law."-"
Earlier Iowa cases had rejected the family relationship itself as a
basis for imputing contributory negligence. The court in
Handeland explicitly rejected the rationale of the Honey case stat-
ing that it "rest[ed] on an archiac and discredited view of familial
responsibility. ' 37 The assignment rationale was described in
Handeland as a "convenient legal fiction without historical valid-
ity. ' 38 Furthermore, the court noted that the Rule 8 claim was an
independent action in no way based on an assignment rationale.
The Handeland court believed it was under no obligation to follow
a rule simply because it was generally accepted in other jurisdic-
tions. "When common law principles are no longer supportable in
reason they are no longer supportable in fact. 39 Finding no support-
ing reasons for the general rule, the court rejected the rule in fact
and held that a child's contributory negligence is not a defense to a
parental claim under Rule 8.11
The effect of the Iowa decision on the law of other states may
be limited. Handeland was a case of first impression, allowing the
court considerable freedom in reaching its result. Furthermore, be-
30. IOWA R. Crv. P. 8.
31. 210 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1973); see also Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d
439, 443 (Iowa 1971).
32. Irlbeck v. Pomeroy, 210 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1973).
33. 254 Iowa 45, 116 N.W.2d 491 (1962).
34. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
35. McMartin v. Saemisch, 254 Iowa 45, 50, 116 N.W.2d 491, 494 (1962).
36. Wymore v. Mahaska Couniy, 78 Iowa 396, 43 N.W. 264 (1889) (parent's negligence
not imputed to his child); Watson v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., 66 Iowa 164, 23 N.W. 380 (1885)
(child's negligence not imputed to his parent).
37. 216 N.W.2d at 576 (Iowa 1974).
38. Id. at 577. The court cited two recent Iowa cases in explaining its view of the
assignment rationale as applied to Rule 8. Irlbeck v. Pomery, 210 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1973);
Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971).
39. Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Iowa 1974).
40. Id. at 579.
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cause the general rule is well established in most states, few cases
are likely to be appealed challenging the validity of the rule. Thus,
if change is to come in this area it will likely be the result of legisla-
tive rather than judicial action. The fact that the cause of action
was based on Rule 841 may further limit the application of
Handeland to those states having statutory causes of action similar
to Rule 8. However, the court's reasoning in Handeland may be
applied to the similar common law cause of action with no logical
difficulty. To the extent that Handeland is based solely on Rule 8,
it applies only to a parental claim for tortious injury to a minor
child, and not to the other half of the general rule concerning a
spouse's action for tortious injury to the other spouse. Nevertheless,
the court's reasoning is applicable to a spouse's consortium and
medical expense actions under a similar factual situation.
In holding that a child's contributory negligence is not, per se,
a defense to a parental claim for loss of services, the Supreme Court
of Iowa has chosen a result which is "logical" rather than one which
other courts have termed "just."42 The usefulness of Handeland in
other jurisdictions may be limited by the strength of the general rule
denying recovery, but the case does serve as some basis for an asser-
tion of a previously unaccepted viewpoint.
GARY R. LONG
41. IOWA R. Civ. P. 8. Some of the cases cited in the opinion in rejecting the different
rationales of the general rule were concerned specifically with Rule 8. See Irlbeck v. Pomeroy,
210 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1973); Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971).
42. The Handeland case was a five to four decision. Such decisions, as most judicial
observers are quick to note, are often prone to change.
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